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Abstract 
Pascal's Wager, discussed in his Pensees, has provoked discussion and strong views 
ever since its publication. In it, he proposes: 
Either God is or he is not. But to which view shall we be inclined? Reason cannot 
decide this question.! 
In this thesis I hope to make a contribution to the ongoing debate by setting 
Pascal's Wager into a modern decision-making context, providing a taxonomy of 
objections to the Wager and developing a critical framework which can be used to 
systematically examine each category in turn to see whether an objection holds. I 
will also present a new approach to handling 'mixed' strategies, as suggested by 
Alan Hajek and others, which uses a heuristic model of our perception of infinite 
rewards. 
I hold that Pascal's remedy for the unbeliever is a therapeutic response which is 
entirely in line with modern psychological practice and should not offend moral 
sensitivities, because it is purely an experiment to see whether faith can naturally 
arise once the objections are temporarily set aside. 
I argue that Pascal's Wager needs to be seen as an exercise in personal risk 
management and that Pascal anticipated both modern decision theory and the 
associated psychology of how we make choices in formulating his Wager. I suggest 
that if we understand it in this light, employing the critical toolkit that I assemble, 
then Pascal's Wager holds against all current objections. 
1 Blaise Pascal, Pensees, trans. A. J. Krailsheimer (London: Penguin, 1995). 122. L418 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
Pascal's Wager, discussed in his Pensees, has provoked discussion and strong views 
ever since its publication. In it, he proposes: 
Either God is or he is not. But to which view shall we be inclined? Reason cannot 
decide this question. Infinite chaos separates us. At the far end of this infinite 
distance, a coin is being spun which will come down heads or tails. How will you 
wager? Reason cannot make you choose either, reason cannot prove either 
wrong. 2 
It was not a completely new idea - John Ryan3 finds references to the concept by La 
Bruyere in 1689 and even further back with St Thomas More - but Pascal is the first 
to clearly express it in the terms of a gambler. He asserts that we must choose 
what to believe, yet we cannot do so on the basis of evidence, or pure reasoning. 
Pascal's thesis is a probabilistic argument and as we shall see, it presages much 
modern decision theory. He presents the wager in terms of the outcomes, rather 
than the odds. His wager is a pragmatic and utilitarian approach to belief; it 
appeals to self-interest and personal risk reduction. Peter Bernstein, a historian of 
probability, concurs with Pascal's approach, saying that life is all about dealing with 
problems for which there is no certain solution and where any kind of rational 
decision is almost impossible to make.4 
The Wager seems to infuriate atheists and has provoked a number of analyses of its 
basic premises. It has moved in and out of fashion in decision theoretical circles 
over the last thirty years, with various authors either confirming or rejecting its 
mathematics, only to have their conclusions overturned a few years later. 
In this thesis I hope to make a contribution to the ongoing debate by setting 
Pascal's Wager into a modern decision-making context, providing a taxonomy of 
objections to the Wager and developing a critical framework which can be used to 
systematically examine each objection in turn to see whether it holds. As part of 
this critical framework, I identify some fundamental conceptions of the nature of 
God that are often tacitly used when discussing the wager, but have been rarely 
exposed for critical examination. I will also present a new approach to handling 
'mixed' strategies, as suggested by Alan Hajek and others, which uses a heuristic 
model of our perception of infinite rewards. 
21bid.l418 
3 John K. Ryan, "The Wager in Pascal and Others," in Gambling on God, ed. Jeff Jordan (Maryland: 
Rowman & littlefield, 1984). 
4 Peter l. Bernstein, "Facing the consequences," Business Economics 35(2000): 9. 
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, argue that Pascal's Wager needs to be seen as an exercise in personal risk 
management and that Pascal anticipated both modern decision theory and the 
associated psychology of how we make choices in formulating his Wager.' suggest 
that if we understand it in this light, employing the critical toolkit that I assemble, 
then Pascal's Wager holds against all current objections. 
1.1 Shape of the Thesis 
In the first chapter, , will examine the wording of the Wager itself and discuss how 
it incorporates several variants, as Pascal was developing and refining his ideas. I 
will briefly discuss the historical background that led Pascal to formulate the Wager 
and examine who his likely target audience were. Virgil Nemoianu is very critical of 
Pascalians who treat the Wager independently of Pascal's general thoughtS and so , 
will attempt to locate the Wager within Pascal's general theology, while 
acknowledging that this cannot be a definitive answer, since Pascal's own intentions 
about the work that came to be called Pensees are largely unknown. 
Finally, I cover some of the modern reworkings of the Wager, since it has gained a 
life of its own in our age, independent of Pascal's own theology and times. 
In Chapter 2 I will set out the critical framework that I will use in my detailed 
analysis of the objections to Pascal's Wager. , will start by discussing in broad terms 
the discipline of risk management and how this applies to religious faith within the 
Wager. I will then expose some assumptions and preconditions that pervade the 
Wager's logic, but which have not always been articulated. I suggest that 
uncovering these for critical review allows us to deal with many common criticisms 
of the Wager, by showing that such attacks violate one of these unspoken 
assumptions. This new approach allows critics the opportunity to challenge the 
axioms at the outset, but once accepted, there can be no appeal beyond those 
agreed parameters later on in the discussion. This understanding will underpin my 
later dissection of the individual objections which have built up over time and give 
us a toolbox to treat each one fairly and consistently. 
As part of this chapter, , will provide an overview of the areas of classical decision 
theory (generally known as von Neumann-Morgenstern decision theory) that . 
pertain to the Wager and will discuss some of the mathematical problems posed by 
the notion of infinite rewards. 
In the final part of the chapter, , will explain how Pascal's suggestions for the 
unbeliever, who is convinced against his will, match the modern therapeutic 
practice of Cognitive Behaviour Therapy (CBT) and will refute the commonly held 
5 V. M. Nemoianu, "Pascalian Faith and the Place of the Wager," Heythrop Journal - a Quarterly 
Review of Philosophy and Theology 52, no. 1 (2011). 
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notion that Pascal thought that someone could (or should) fake belief in order to 
convince God. 
Chapter 3 forms the bulk of the thesis and is a systematic examination of the major 
extant objections to the Wager, arranged within a new taxonomy. I developed this 
new arrangement so that we can understand the root of the objection and any 
axiomatic understandings that are being challenged by that approach. For each 
objection, I estimate whether it succeeds as a whole, in part, or whether it fails, 
using the toolbox that we developed in Chapter 2. . 
In Chapter 4 I discuss how modern developments in understanding decision-making 
have affected the traditional von Neumann-Morgenstern theories that were used in 
chapter 2 and how Pascal's own philosophy of mind and his choice of wording for 
the Wager anticipated those developments. I will discuss some of the paradoxes in 
how humans actually make real-world decisions and how this has an impact on the 
Wager's propositions. I also suggest some lines of further research in this area. 
In chapter 5, I conclude by examining the extent to which the objections have 
succeeded and I consider whether Pascal's Wager still applies to us in our current 
cultural setting. 
I will be using Dr A.J. Krailsheimers translation of Pensees, except where noted, and 
references to the text use the numbering scheme of Louis Lafuma, such that liasse 
418 (the one which contains the Wager) in Lafuma's system will be identified as 
L418. Where I use Roger Ariew's translation, which is based upon the Sellier text, I 
give the Sellier number followed by its Lafuma equivalent (e.g. S628/L428). 
1.2 The Origins of the Wager 
This thesis is not primarily a historical or textual study of Pascal's Wager, but in 
order to understand how Pascal viewed it and the context in which it arose, I 
believe that it is helpful to briefly set out some details of his own history, the 
development of his personal theological convictions and how he came to be 
interested in probability, particularly with respect to its application to games of 
chance. 
Pascal's family were moderately religious people, typical of their time and social 
status. Blaise's mother, Antoinette had died shortly after the birth of his sister 
Jacqueline in 1625, leaving him to be brought up by his father and his older sister 
Gilberte. 
One night in January 1646, Blaise Pascal's father, Etienne, was on his way to stop a 
duel, but slipped on ice and fell, breaking his hip. In the seventeenth century this 
was a serious condition and could easily have led to his death, or at least severe and 
permanent disability. However, Etienne knew two local bonesetters, M. Deslandes 
and M. de la Bouteillerie6 and was convinced of their skill, so allowed no-one else to 
attend him. This proved to be a good choice as he recovered quickly and was able 
to walk once more. The two men stayed in Etienne's house for three months and 
became an example for the Pascals, not only in their skill, but in their religious 
devotion.7 The two men were Jansenists, having been converted by Guillebert of 
Rouville and they began to teach Blaise, Jacqueline and Etienne about this new 
version of Catholicism. 
Jansenism had its origins in the book Augustinius, published in1640 by Cornelius 
Jansen, two years after his death. In the book he set out his thesis for an account of 
the divine will and the role of the human soul in salvation. Rejecting the Jesuit 
model that human will could frustrate the will of God, Jansen put forward a new 
framework, drawing heavily upon patristic writers, especially Augustine. This 
doctrine was treated with deep distrust by the Jesuits and by Richelieu, who saw it 
as form of Calvinism, and had its main surviving exponent, the Abbe de Saint-Cyran, 
imprisoned.8 
While Jansenism was not true Calvinism, since it still allowed prayers to saints and 
the veneration of Mary, it had much in common with it, particularly the focus on 
predestination and irresistible grace. The Jesuits (or Molinists) taught that human 
will could frustrate the will of God, but that there was enough divine grace 
remaining after the Fall that humans could still choose good over evil. By contrast, 
Jansenism insisted on the total depravity of the human will and the idea of an 
"elect" who were chosen purely by God's sovereign will, irrespective of the 
individual's merits or conduct. 
James Connor9, argues that predestination became "chic" at that time, because it 
shifted the emphasis from having to do good works, to detecting whether or not 
one was one of the elect. Since the signs of the latter were decided by one's 
spiritual director, it gave those leaders immense power over their followers. 
Richelieu might be able to cast you into the Bastille, but Saint-Cyran might have the 
power to grant or deny salvation. Augustinianism was thus the perfect formula for 
assembling a holy "remnant" which would fight tirelessly for its cause. The 
martyrdom of Saint-Cyran merely added weight to it all. 
Augustinius was condemned and the French church leaders in the Sorbonne set out 
five propositions within it that they declared to be heretical. The Jansenists 
generally took the approach of agreeing that the five propositions suggested were 
6 James A. Connor, Pascal's Wager: The man who played dice with God (New York: HarperColiins 
Publishers, 2006). 70. 
7 Ernest Mortimer, Blaise Pascal: the life and work of a realist (London: Methuen & Co, 1959). 74. 
8 Connor, Pascal's Wager: 61. 
9 Ibid., 62-63. 
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indeed heretical, but that they did not actually appear in the book. The stage was 
set for a theological confrontation in which Blaise Pascal would eventually playa 
major part, even at the risk of his own life. The conflict resulted in his "Provincial 
Letters", which are a masterpiece of wit and creative writing, although they were 
not entirely fair in their treatment of Jesuit theology. The battle between the 
church and the Jansenists would continue for some time, although Pascal's frequent 
illnesses meant that he adopted a lower profile and largely moved out of the front-
line. He suffered great pain throughout his entire life, possibly as a result of a skull 
malformation, which often confined him to bed. 
Blaise, at twenty-three, was moved by the charitable works of the two bonesetters 
(they ran a hospital with thirty beds free of charge}10 and by their new theology. He 
himself became more religious and was "converted" by them. By this we do not 
mean that he acquired faith for the first time,l1 nor ceased to be Catholic; rather 
that he gained a new piety and determination that he should do the work of God. 
Up until this time the Pascals had been honnete hommes - people who were 
religious, but not particularly fervent in any respect. Now they were attentive and 
submissive to their new spiritual directors. Gilberte and her new husband became a 
consistently devout couple for the rest oftheir Iives.12 Jacqueline felt called to the 
religious life as a nun, a vocation that she would not be able to pursue for many 
years, as she needed to care for her father. Blaise became devoted to the scriptures 
and devoured Jansenist books like M. Arnauld's De La Frequente Communion, which 
were brought by his father's carers. He read Saint-Cyran's Reformation de I'homme 
interieur and was energised, but also deeply troubled. In the book, it suggested that 
scientific curiosity was nothing more than a form of sexual indulgence. Pascal had 
spent a large part of his life as a scientist and it was one of his great passions (and 
no small talent). Suddenly Pascal's deepest joy in a life of pain had become a source 
ofthe basest wickedness.13 What was he to do? It was a shadow on his life that 
would never completely lift. 
Pascal's "worldly" period 
After his father's death in 1651, Blaise was alone. His sister had taken the veil, 
leaving him bereft, and he fell into a deep depression. Some of his discomfort was 
compounded by money worries, but most of it was the loss of his immediate family, 
who had always cared for him. He moved around for a while, but finally retreated 
to Clermont to live with his sister Gilberte and her family from 1652-1653. He spent 
a lot of time trying to collect the debts owed to the estate without a great deal of 
10 Ibid., 71. 
11 Hugh Davidson, Blaise Pascal, ed. Maxwell A. Smith, Twayne's World Authors (Boston MA: Twayne 
Publishers, 1983). 7. 
12 Mortimer, Blaise Pascal: 74-75. 
13 Connor, Pascal's Wager: 72-73. 
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success.14 There is some evidence that Blaise hoped to marry,lS although Jacqueline 
advised against it, possibly out of a fear that her brother was becoming increasingly 
worldly, or perhaps because she felt that his reasons were not entirely genuine.16 
Although it is known as Pascal's "worldly" period, it is very unlikely that he indulged 
in the pleasures of the flesh, rather that it seemed worldly from the Jansenist 
viewpoint of Port-Royal, where anything short of monasticism could be seen as 
half-hearted. Pascal's actual life would look much more like extreme religious 
austerity to us, than that of a libertine. However, Blaise did travel and make 
acquaintance with a group of three friends who were distinctly outside his normal 
circle. These were the Duc de Roannez, Antoine Gombaud17 (also known as the 
Chevalier de Mere), and M. Mitton.1S 
The Duc de Roannez had been born Arthus Gouffier, but inherited his dukedom on 
the death of his grandfather.19 Blaise had met him and his sister, Charlotte, in Paris, 
as they owned a hotel just a short distance from the Pascals' residence. They shared 
a common Catholic background and a desire for authentic spirituality; Roannez also 
showed an entrepreneurial interest in the commercial exploitation of Pascal's 
earlier invention, the Pascaline, which was the first commercial calculating 
machine. 
In 1653 Blaise travelled with the young duke to Poitou, where they met up with the 
other two.20 The Chevalier de Mere described his companions in the following 
words: 
"I once made an expedition to Poitou with the Due de Roannez, who talks 
both wisely and well and is excellent company. With us came M. Mitton, 
whom you know and whom everybody at Court finds so entertaining. [ ... J The 
Duc is interested in mathematics and had brought with him a man entre 
deux ages who was little known at the time but has since made a great stir 
in the world. He was a great mathematician, but nothing else. ,,21 
Clearly Pascal did not initially impress Gombaud, although he grudgingly admits that 
Blaise gradually loosened up over the course of the trip. Mere himself had been a 
knight and in the wars, but had tried to reinvent himself as one of the new 
14 Ibid., 131-32. 
15 Davidson, Blaise Pascal: 14. 
16 Connor, Pascal's Wager: 132. 
17 Ibid., 134. 
18 Davidson, Blaise Pascal: 15. 
19 Connor, Pascal's Wager: 132. 
20 Mortimer, Blaise Pascal: 104. 
21 1n ibid. 
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intellectuals and a man of poetry and fashion.22 He spoke several languages and 
studied Plato, Demosthenes and Homer.23 
M. Mitton was also one of the libertins erudits, having come out of a middle-class 
background and had once held high state office. He was a man with a powerful 
mind, but equally powerful passions and was both a gambler and a sceptic. Mitton 
makes several unflattering appearances in Pascal's Pensees such as: '7he self is 
hateful. You, Mitton, hide it up; but you do not succeed in getting rid of it". 24 
It seems that Mitton and the Chevalier saw Pascal as a geek, while they were the 
Ilcool kids". He was probably rather a bore to them, as his only interests were 
religion and mathematics, while theirs revolved around gambling. Gilberte was 
certainly scathing about them both, in the way that only a big sister can be, writing 
with cold disdain about the two and their obsession with gambling.25 Yet it is to 
these two bad influences that we probably owe the existence of Pascal's Wager. 
The birth a/probability 
One night Mere approached the despised Blaise with a couple of mathematical 
problems. He had been losing money by the bucketful to Mitton on a game of 
chance. At first he had bet that he could roll one six in four throws,26 where he won 
initially, but then started to lose. So he switched games and bet that he could roll a 
double six in twenty-four rolls of two dice. At this point he started to lose in a much 
bigger way, so was he simply unlucky, or was there more going on? 
Pascal thought about it for a while and told the knight that double-six in twenty-
four throws would be a bad bet, but it would be a good bet if it were twenty-five 
rolls.27 He had invented a whole new field of mathematics. 
Mere's second problem was rather more complicated. Two players agree that they 
will each stake thirty-two pistoles and that the winner of the pot will be the first 
player to win three games of dice. Now, suppose that they reach a position where 
player A has won two games and player B has won one, but they need to interrupt 
their wager. How should they divide the money between them? 
22 Connor, Pascal's Wager: 134. 
23 Mortimer, Blaise Pascal: 107. 
24 Pascal, Pensees., in Mortimer, Blaise Pascal: 106. 
2S Connor, Pascal's Wager: 135. 
26 To work this out, we calculate the probability of not throwing a single six in four throws. This is 
! x ! x ! x ! = ~ ~ = 0.482 Thus the probability of throwing a six is 1-0.482 = 0.518, so the odds 
6 6 6 6 1296 
were in his favour. 
27 The chance of throwing a double six in a single roll is .!.., so the odds of not throwing a double six 
36 
are ::. In 24 rolls, we have a chance of (::)24 which is 0.508, so we have 0.482 to roll the double six 
and on average we will lose. However, in 25 rolls it is now 0.505 to roll the double and it becomes a 
good bet. 
7 
Pascal's logic was typically elegant. If player A wins the next game, then he will have 
won three games and will collect all sixty-four pistoles. If he loses, then both he and 
player B will have won two games each, so it would be fair to divide the pot equally. 
Thus, A will have a minimum of thirty-two pistoles due to him either way. The 
remaining thirty-two will be his half of the time, so his share is thus sixteen pistoles. 
The fair split is therefore forty-eight pistoles to player A and sixteen to player B.28 
For good measure, Pascal also calculated the splits after two games and just one. 
Pascal wrote to Pierre Fermat (who had been a member of Etienne's mathematics 
group) of his discovery. We do not have his letter, but we can deduce from Fermat's 
reply that it might have been something like: 
In a game of dice, a gambler bets that he will throw a six with a single die in 
eight tosses. The gambler throws three times and loses every time, but then 
for some reason the game is called off. What proportion of the stake does 
the gambler have the right to take with him f9 
Fermat appeared to misunderstand the problem as described and his reply implies 
that he thought Pascal was asking what the probability was of winning the next 
throw. Yet Pascal's purpose was different, he was thinking about the final outcome, 
not just the next throw. He had moved from simple probability to something far 
more complex.3o 
Although operating at a slight tangent to Pascal, Fermat arrived at similar 
conclusions algebraically and wrote back to Blaise in great excitement. Pascal 
immediately flung himself into further mathematical research and came up with his 
Arithmetical Triangle,31 which made the development of binomial theory a simple 
step for Isaac Newton to make, as well as supplying Leibniz with the necessary 
28 Connor, Pascal's Wager: 136. 
29 Ibid., 138. 
30 For those readers interested in the solution, the gambler has five further tosses to throw a six. The 
odds of not throwing a six are thus: ~ ~ x ~ ~ x ~ ~ x ; x ~ ~ = ~ ~ ~ : : = 0.40 So he could claim 60% of the 
stake. His odds of winning at the start of the game were 1 - 5s
8 
= 1 - ~ ~ = 1 - 0.233 = 6 1679616 
76.7% 
31 Pascal's Triangle arranges numbers in an equilateral triangle, so that each number is the sum of 
the two numbers immediately above it. i.e. 
I 
2 
3 3 
8 
coefficients for integral calculus.32 Pascal gave a short lecture on his discoveries at 
the Parisian Academy where he dubbed his new science the Geometry of Chance.33 
The Night of Fire 
Pascal enjoyed the company of his gambling friends and remained close to the Duc, 
but he had an increasing disquiet in his spiritual life. His close relationship with his 
sister Jacqueline had been damaged by Port-Royal's insistence upon a full 'dowry' 
for Jacqueline upon entering the convent after her father's death. The rift was 
gradually closing, but he himself felt a deep dissatisfaction with his life. Although he 
had been annoyed by Port-Royal, he visited his sister and his two nieces there and 
could not help but notice the serenity that they appeared to enjoy, which was in 
stark contrast to his own feelings of wretchedness. He wrote a short piece: 1t0n the 
Conversion of a Sinner" where he tried to express something of the turmoil he felt. 
"The soul can no longer serenely enjoy the things that captivated it. Constant 
scruples attack the soul in its pleasure and because of this introspection it no 
longer finds the usual sweetness in the things to which it once abandoned 
itself blithely with an overflowing heart".34 
Blaise spent a lot of time with his sister, discussing his discomfort. Unfortunately, 
she saw his pursuits of science and mathematics as the major stumbling block to 
faith, so her advice always was that he should sacrifice it as a worldly distraction. 
Yet for Blaise, it was his raison d'etre, if he gave up his intellect, then he gave up 
everything that he valued. Why would God have given him such a mind, if it was not 
to be used? As Connor notes, had Pascal turned to the Jesuits for spiritual advice, 
they would have seen no problem, since there was no dichotomy between the faith 
and intellect. One finds God in life, rather than having to abandon it. 35 However, 
the Pascal family were not at all sympathetic to Jesuit theology and Blaise would 
later make deadly enemies of them. 
On the evening of Monday 23rd November 1654, Pascal's life was transformed by an 
encounter with God. He never spoke about it and told no-one what had transpired 
that night. It was only after his death that a servant noted that one of Blaise's 
jackets seemed unusually padded. They examined it closely and found a fragment 
of paper sewed into the lining. This was a relatively common practice in the 17th 
Century, but Pascal kept his secret from everyone. When a jacket wore out, he 
would carefully unstitch the hidden pocket and re-sew it into the new garment.36 
The original paper no longer survives, but we have a copy in Pascal's handwriting 
32 Mortimer, Blaise Pascal: 118. 
33 Pascal, Oeuvres, 2:1034-1035 in Connor, Pascal's Wager: 142. 
34 Pascal, Minor Works, in ibid., 145. 
35 Ibid., 147. 
36 Emile Cailliet, Pascal: The Emergence of Genius, 2nd ed. {New York: Harper & Brothers, 1945).133. 
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which is attested to be a faithful copy by his nephew Fr. Perier. It is now displayed 
in the Bibliotheque Nationale in Paris. 
The change in Pascal's behaviour was dramatic, but no-one around him knew what 
had caused it. His family imagined all sorts of events that might have triggered this 
conversion and discussed them in their correspondence at the time,37 but no-one 
understood it until their discovery of the Memorial after his death. Blaise contacted 
Jacqueline and told her that he was ready to place himself under the direction of 
Port Royal and to turn his back upon the world. 
Pascal was initially placed in the care of Pere Singlin, who was no intellectual, 
although he was wise enough to realise that Pascal would need more than he could 
offer. So he despatched Blaise to Port-Royal-des-Champs where M. Arnauld would 
encourage him in the sciences and M. de Saci would teach him to despise them.38 
Although Pascal remained interested in mathematics, he ceased his 
correspondence with Fermat on probability, stopped work on his arithmetic 
machines and postponed publishing his paper on the arithmetical triangle, although 
it had already been printed.39 If he had entertained any thoughts of marriage, he 
gave them up at Port-Royal-des-Champs and from that point on, he never attached 
his name to any of his writings, apart from private correspondence.4o His focus had 
turned heavenward, tracing the path set by his Jansenist mentors. He contacted the 
Duc de Roannez and told him that he had decided to go into retreat at Port Royal 
des Champs and would have to leave Roannez's entourage, which the Duc 
reluctantlyaccepted.41 
Devising the wager 
There seems little doubt that Pascal had his friends M. Mitton, the Chevalier de 
Mere and the Due de Roannez in mind when devising the wager. M. Sellier dates 
the infini-rien fragment as having been written between 1658 and 166242 and it was 
in the summer of 1660, when Pascal was staying with Gilberte and her family in 
Clermont, that he received a letter from his mathematical correspondent Pierre 
Fermat inviting him to Toulouse. Pascal by this time had largely renounced his 
scientific work, but still wanted to meet his friend as a man of honour and integrity. 
Sadly, neither was well enough to visit the other by this stage and the two great 
collaborators never actually met in the flesh. 
37 Connor, Pascal's Wager: 151. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid., 152. 
40 Mortimer, Blaise Pascal: 125. 
41 Ibid., 127. 
42 Blaise Pascal, Pensees, trans. Roger Ariew (Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Co, 2005). 211. 
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It is possible that this letter from Fermat reminded him of his earlier work on 
probability and the puzzles set by his two gambling friends that he had 
corresponded with Fermat over. Thus, he set out to turn his mathematical 
discoveries in a more worthy apologetic direction. 
1.3 Commentary upon the Wager 
In this section I will develop a commentary on the text of the Wager, showing its 
somewhat fragmentary and provisional nature. like much of Pensees it is clearly a 
work in progress and we can observe Pascal's mind in operation as he iteratively 
refines his logic in what Ian Hacking43 and others44 have seen as a succession of 
wagers. It is written on a single sheet, folded once to give four sides, two inside and 
two outside.45 As we can see from a photograph of the infini-rien fragment below, it 
has many amendments and corrections. His writing becomes smaller and the lines 
get closer together towards the bottom of the page, as Pascal struggled to get all 
his thoughts down. Some lines are written vertically and the most famous section 
regarding the reasons of the heart is written upside down. Honor Levi suggests that 
it is possible that some of the later additions might not belong to the text itself, but 
were simply scrawled on the piece of paper that Pascal happened to have in his 
pocket at the time.46 
43 Ian Hacking, "The Logic of Pascal's Wager," American Philosophical Quarterly 9(2)(1972). 
44 Edward McClennen, "Finite Decision Theory," in Gambling on God, ed. Jeff Jordan (Maryland: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 1984). 
45 Blaise Pascal, "Writings on Grace," in Pensees and Other Writings (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1995), 243. trans. Honor Levi 
46 Ibid. 
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Figure 1 The Wager Fragment 41 
In my commentary I am using the Krailsheimer translation of fragment l418, which 
is based upon the louis lafuma text, but I have inserted the horizontal separation 
marks that Pascal used and which are found in the Sellier version (also known as 
Copy B). 
The section containing the Wager is entitled "Discourse on the Machine". It is an 
interesting title and we should start by briefly discussing what Pascal might mean 
by "the Machine". Pascal understood the value of machines, having already 
developed a very advanced one, which he called the Pascaline and which he had 
built to assist his father in his job as a tax collector. It was one of the earliest ever 
calculating machines and Pascal managed to sell a few, including one to royalty. 
47 Le manuscrit des Pensees de Pascal, Phototypique ed. (Paris: les libraires Associes, 1962). at 
http://www.e-tidsskrifter.dk/ojs/tidsskrift-dk/revy/revimg!rro_0001_0069_1.jpg 
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Although the design was relatively straightforward, building it was a challenge and 
it took him two years to complete.48 His initial version could only add and subtract, 
but leibniz came up with the idea of using stepped teeth, which allowed repeated 
addition or subtraction so that the device could multiply and divide toO.49 It was 
thus a forerunner of the modern computer. 
Pascal's choice of title might imply that he will be discussing how to construct an 
intellectual framework which will reduce the complex process of decision making 
into something which is as simple as turning the handle of a Pascaline. 
Sara Meltzer holds that the title stems from Pascal's fundamental premiss that 
reason alone will not be adequate to find God in a universe in which God is both 
silent and where he has removed evident signs of his existence.50 In her model, 
therefore, Pascal introduces the machine as a required substitute for conscious 
thought, which offers an alternative approach for those who wish to find God, but 
lack adequate signposts.51 If one feeds in the possibilities, the machine will produce. 
the correct decision where human reason cannot. This model of the mind accords 
closely with modern experimental psychology and I will explore this further in 
Chapter 4. 
The Wager section begins with its fundamental proposition: infinity or nothing. 
Infinity--nothing. 
Our soul is cast into the body, where it finds number, time, dimensions; 
Pascal sees the soul as being 'cast' into a body and the French word he uses here is 
''jetee'', which is the same verb as to throw or cast dice, so there is potentially a 
play upon words, indicating the gaming metaphor which is to follow.52 Modern 
readers might find a foreshadowing of Martin Heidegger in this thrown-ness of the 
soul. For just as Dasein is 'thrown' into being and is placed into a world that is not of 
its creation, nor choosing, so the soul has fallen from pure potential into limited 
being. Pascal could be argued to be taking a Platonic, or neo-Platonic, model of the 
human soul and, as leslie Armour notes, neo-Platonism53 was certainly very much 
in the minds of seventeenth century France, both as espoused by Yves de Paris in 
48 Mortimer, Blaise Pascal: 7. 
49 Connor, Pascal's Wager: 54. 
so Sara E. Melzer, Discourses of the Fall: A Study of Pascal's Pensees (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1986). 58. 
51 Ibid., 59. 
52 levi translates '1etee" as "thrust", although Krailsheimer and Ariew both go with "cast", which I 
believe makes more sense, for the reasons I outline. 
53 Armour uses the term "neo-Platonism" as a means of describing an updated Platonism and to 
distinguish it from "Neoplatonism", which is usually associated with the thought of Plotinus. 
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the years shortly before Pascal and then developed by Nicolas de Malebranche. 
Jansenism certainly has strong Platonic roots in Augustine. The neo-Platonic 
understanding of the One was that it was the source of everything and truly had no 
limits,54 everything came from the One and would ultimately return to it. There 
seem to be some neo-Platonic overtones in Pascal's reference to the "Infinite" in his 
opening phrase, but it could equally be a dramatic device to add urgency to the 
argument which he is about to unfold. 
This sense of fallen-ness and imposition of the arbitrary limits of dimensionality is 
echoed by Meltzer, who suggests that Pascal believed in an epistemological change 
at the Fall. Prior to the Fall, humankind had direct experience of God, but since the 
Fall we can only access that knowledge mediated through human memory. There 
was thus a fall from truth into language.55 Pascal is not arguing for some form of 
dualism, such that taking on a human body constituted the Fall, but rather that an 
immaterial soul, which existed without limits, finds itself cast into materiality and 
can then only understand and reason based upon its sense experience. 
It reasons about these things and calls them natural, or necessary, and can 
believe nothing else. 
Pascal spells out the limitations of the material world. In it we have found number, 
time and dimension, but these are all the material world knows, or can know. We 
are separated from true knowledge by the Fall and all understanding is now 
contingent upon the materiality which we inhabit. We can believe nothing else, 
because there is nothing else for us; we are entrapped within the rules of a 
Wittengensteinian language game This is the wretchedness of humankind which 
Pascal laments so often in his Pensees, decrying the fact that we have fallen from 
the riches of truth into the poverty of language. 
Whatever Pascal meant of infinity in his opening statement, he now starts to use 
infinity in its strict mathematical sense. 
Unity added to infinity does not increase it at all, any more than a foot added to 
an infinite measurement. 
Alan Hajek makes much of this Pascalian definition of infinity, calling it "reflexivity 
under addition",56 namely that infinity plus one is still infinity or: 
00+1=00 
54 Leslie Armour, In/ini-Rien (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1993). xi. 
55 Melzer, Discourses o/the Fall: 2-3. 
56 Alan Hajek, "Waging War On Pascal's Wager," Philosophical Review 112, no. 1 (2003): 45. 
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This is what Pascal means by: 
The finite is annihilated in the presence of the infinite and becomes pure 
nothingness. 
The finite value '1' is annihilated by infinity, because it makes no difference to it. A 
finite quantity cannot have any material effect upon the infinite, so it may as well 
never have existed at all. Pascal now uses this mathematical axiom as an analogy 
for God: 
So it is with our mind before God, with our justice before divine justice. There is 
not so great a disproportion between our justice and God's, as between unity 
and infinity. 
Pascal often took an apophatic approach in his Pen sees and he reinforces it here. 
Although we have invoked infinity, Pascal is quite clear that we cannot limit God to 
a concept of infinity. God's justice is even greater than the distance between one 
and infinity; it is greater than infinite. 
God's justice must be as vast as his mercy. Now his justice towards the damned 
is less vast and ought to be less startling to us than his mercy towards the elect. 
Although not central to his argument, Pascal takes time to remind us that there 
might be punishment or loss for the 'outcast', namely the unbeliever. As we will see 
when we come to discussion of moral objections to the Wager, Pascal is well aware 
that there could be a moral issue in denying an infinite reward to someone. After 
all, how could a just God legitimately deny a benefit to some, while granting it to 
others? 
Pascal's reply is that we should not be offended that God blesses some, but rather 
we should be offended that he should grant eternal benefits to anyone at all. He 
suggests that it should be seen as a greater injustice to grant us grace which we do 
not deserve, than it would be to let us have our just deserts. In a typically Pascalian 
turn, he argues that although God's justice is infinite, his mercy is greater still. 
He now returns to more traditional understandings of mathematical infinity, using it 
as an analogy for the unknown nature of God. 
We know that the infinite exists without knowing its nature, just as we know 
that it is untrue that numbers are finite. Thus it is true that there is an infinite 
number, but we do not know what it is. It is untrue that it is even, untrue that it 
is odd; for by adding a unit it does not change its nature. 
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Pascal is, of course, arguing from an understanding of infinity prior to Georg 
Cantor's work on it, nonetheless he understood that it could not be considered 
either even or odd in the strict sense. 
Yet it is a number, and every number is even or odd. (It is true that this applies 
to every finite number). 
Modern mathematicians would be less comfortable with calling infinity a number at 
all, because it lies in a different branch of mathematics from the real numbers, or 
natural numbers. Pascal also recognises this fact that infinity is different from other 
numbers in its essential quality and uses it to argue that while God is not a thing like 
other things, this should not matter in this debate. 
Therefore we may well know that God exists without knowing what he is. 
Pascal wants us to admit that we do not need to know what God is (even if that 
were possible) in order to know that God exists. He is using the analogy that if we 
can allow the possibility of an infinite number which is unlike other numbers and 
without knowing its nature, then we should not stumble over the possibility of 
God's being unlike any familiar object. 
Is there no substantial truth, seeing there are so many true things which are not 
truth itself? 
It is not easy to see why he wants us to deduce the existence of a truth by the 
existence of many errors, but it is not central to his argument, so we will move on. 
Thus we know the existence and nature of the finite, because we also are finite 
and are extended in space. We know the existence of the infinite, without 
knowing its nature, because it too has extension, but unlike us no limits like us. 
But we do not know either the existence or the nature of God, because he has 
neither extension nor limits. 
Pascal is establishing the boundaries of our knowledge. We are souls cast into a 
finite body and thus have discovered finite quantities, such as length, breadth and 
depth, which exist within finite dimensions. We recognise that we have limits and 
we can even measure them, but the infinite is different, because while it has 
extension (such as length), it does not have a limit. We can talk about the infinite 
simply by extrapolating what we do know. However, Pascal argues that we cannot 
even talk about God as having any material properties, such as length, or breadth, 
because he is not cast into dimensional existence in the way that we are. 
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But by faith we know his existence; through glory we shall know His nature. 
Nowl I have already proved that we may know something existsl without 
knowing its nature. 
Pascal has completed his scene-setting from a mathematical viewpoint. He has 
located us within limited dimensionality, but has established that it is intellectually 
allowable to speak of something which is infinite, as long as we retain at least one 
point of contact with our own existence, namely that it has extension. He now 
moves to his main thesis, which is that God is not knowable, nor can we reason by 
analogy, since we have no point of reference. 
Let us now speak according to our natural lights. If there is a God, He is infinitely 
beyond our comprehension sincel being indivisible and without limitsl he bears 
no relation to us. We are therefore incapable of knowing either what he is or 
whether he is. 
He bluntly sets out the reality that we cannot know what God is like and in true 
apophatic fashion, that all we can know is that he is not like us. 
That being SOl wha would dare ta attempt an answer to the question? Certainly 
not weI who bear no relation to him. Who then will condemn Christians for 
being unable to give rational grounds for their belief, professing as they do a 
religion for which they cannot give rational grounds? They declare, that it is a 
jollYI stultitiaml 57 in expounding it to the world. 
He now challenges his interlocutors directly. How can they demand that Christians 
provide detailed apologetics for something which they cannot possibly know? St 
Paul said in his letter to the Corinthians that is was folly to attempt to try and 
explain the Cross of Christ to unbelievers, although Pascal here has expanded this 
understanding to encompass everything about God, including his nature and the 
fact of his existence. 
and then you complain that they do not prove it. If they did prove it, they would 
not be keeping their word. It is by being without proof that they show that they 
are not without sense. 
Pascal does not regard any of the traditional proofs of God as being of much value 
in legitim ising belief and he has now established one reason why they are deficient. 
Christians believe not because of a series of logical proofs, but rather by faith, 
which transcends mere proof. If Christians were to provide such proofs, they would 
be negating the very ineffability of God which they rely upon in faith. Dawn Ludwin 
holds that Pascal rejects cosmological proofs of God as vehemently as he does the 
57 1 Corinthians 1:18 
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heresy of pagan religions, believing that nature cannot yield even the vaguest 
flicker of knowledge of God, because that is only accessible through the mediation 
of Jesus Christ.58 
"Yes, but although that excuses those who offer their religion as such, and 
absolves them from the criticism of producing it without rational grounds, it 
does not absolve those who accept it. " 
Pascal wants to defend faith as being beyond reason, but his imaginary interlocutor 
presses the point that even if they cannot expect to have reason on their side, 
Christians still should not believe in this ineffable God. Pascal now sets up the 
discussion in terms of a game, in this case a simple coin-toss. 
Let us then examine this point, and let us say, "Either God is, or he is not. " But to 
which view shall we be inclined? Reason cannot decide this question. Infinite 
chaos separates us. At the far end of this infinite distance a coin is being spun 
which will come down heads or tails. How will you wager? 
Various authors accuse Pascal of over-simplifying the possibilities here, but Pascal is 
starting with the simplest possible case, that either God exists or he does not. In 
this example of a coin-toss, he appears to assume that the two alternatives are 
equi-probable, which is itself open to challenge as a proposition, but he justifies this 
by appealing instinctively to the Principle of Indifference,59 a theorem which would 
not be described formally until much later. 
Reason cannot make you choose either, reason cannot prove either wrong. Do 
not then condemn those who have made a choice; for you know nothing about 
it. 
Pascal suggests that we cannot criticise either choice unless we have reason to do 
so, but he has already established that it is axiomatic that we do not have any 
reason to prefer one option over the other. 
The doubter suggests that it is therefore wrong to choose at all. 
"No, but I will condemn them not for having made this particular choice, but any 
choice; for, although the one who calls heads and the other one are equally at 
fault, the fact is that they are both at fault; the right thing is not to wager at 
all. " 
Pascal's opponent thus proposes agnosticism as the correct way forward in such 
matters. If we have no reason to prefer one over the other and no evidence to 
58 Dawn M. Ludwin, Blaise Pascal's Quest/or the Ineffable, New Perspectives in Philosophical 
Scholarship: Texts and Issues (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 2001). 12. 
59 See further description on page 48. 
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support either choice, then the best option should be scepticism. We should 
reserve judgement until we have sufficient reasons to decide one way or the other. 
Pascal has his reply ready: 
Yes; but you must wager. There is no choice, you are already committed. 
This is one of the key parts of Pascal's argument, that we are already embarked 
upon the journey. Scepticism cannot be an option for us, because its outcome will 
be identical with that of deciding that God does not exist. To use William James' 
term, this is a 'forced' option.GO 
Which will you choose then? Let us see. Since a choice must be made, let us see 
which offers you the least interest. 
Pascal continues with discussing what you can win or lose in this game which you 
are already playing. He sets up three pairs of values, starting with: 
You have two things to lose, the true and the good; 
Potentially, either option could lose 'the true', simply by being wrong, but only one 
of those options can lose 'the good' in Pascal's understanding. For him, the only 
good is God and to love God is to love what is true. 
and two things to stake, your reason and your will, your knowledge and your 
happiness; 
Pascal says that there are two things to stake, but then lists four. There are two 
ways of reading this. He could be bracketing reason and will together, implying that 
they operate as one, such that to lose your reason is also to lose the ability to 
rationally choose your actions and your ultimate destiny. Likewise, he groups 
knowledge and happiness together, which seems an unusual pairing. In the rest of 
this fragment Pascal talks much of happiness and a happy life, but does not 
mention knowledge again. Is he therefore arguing for a form of fideism, as Terence 
Penelhum suggests?Gl l do not think so. Rather Pascal is saying that to bet against 
God is actually to stake both your knowledge and your happiness. He often makes 
the distinction between the empty knowledge of the philosophers and the true 
knowledge, which is knowing God. Virgil Nemoianu suggests that Pascal describes 
"willing" as being transforming the particular, or individual, will into the fullness of 
the will of God and that knowledge must always be seen in its context of knowing 
60 William James, The Will To Believe, The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy 
(New York: Dover Publications, 1956). 
61 Terence Penelhum, Religion and Rationality: an introduction to the philosophy of religion (New 
York: Random House, 1971). 
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God.62 Knowledge without God is thus empty and if God does not exist, then 
knowledge will perish together with happiness. 
The other way to interpret this is to consider that reason and knowledge are one 
pair, while will and happiness are the other.63 This would be appealing to the 
traditional Aristotelian or Scholastic understanding of the tension between reason 
(or 'rati01 and will (or 'voluntas1. Our happiness is bound up in our will, while our 
reason must necessarily be anchored in knowledge, for how could we reason about 
things which we do not know? Whichever way we interpret this phrasing, it seems 
clear that all four are simultaneously at stake in this game of chance. 
and your nature has two things to avoid, error and wretchedness. 
In his final pairing, Pascal turns to our human nature, which is concerned primarily 
with its own comforts and which thus wishes to shun misery, both temporal and 
eternal; whereas human reason wishes to avoid error. 
Since you must necessarily choose, your reason is no more affronted by 
choosing one rather than the other. This is one point cleared up. 
He suggests that we have solved (or at least bypassed) the difficulties posed to our 
reason, by recognising that we do not have evidence to base any decision upon. 
This absolves us from being accused of acting against reason, because we lack the 
evidence required for a fully reasoned decision, but are still obliged to make a 
choice one way or the other. 
He now moves on to discuss his central thesis, which is based upon the pursuit of 
happiness. He sums up the essence of the wager in its Simplest form: 
But your happiness? Let us weigh up the gain and the loss in calling heads that 
God exists. Let us assess the two cases: if you win, you win everything; if you 
lose, you lose nothing. Do not hesitate then, wager that he does exist. 
As I discuss in more detail on page 217, Pascal's choice or wording is extremely 
important here. It is phrased in the terms that if you lose, you lose nothing. It is a 
one-way bet that you can only win. Even if the two options are not equi-probable, 
there is no loss in being wrong, as long as you bet for God. Pascal does not see 
belief as having any drawbacks whatever, as we shall see later in the passage. 
Nonetheless, he anticipates the sceptic's next objection, that even if he is 
convinced, the stakes may be too high. 
62 Nemoianu, "Pascalian Faith," 32. 
63 I am grateful to Karen Kilby for this suggestion. 
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"That is wonderful. Yes, I must wager; but perhaps I am wagering too much. "--
Let us see. 
Pascal, remembering his conversations with his gambling friends Mitton and 
Roannez, now moves to the mathematics of stakes and rewards. He starts with the 
simple coin-toss analogy: 
Since there is an equal chance of gain and of loss, if you stood to win only two 
lives for one, you could still wager. 
He starts by proposing odds of 2:1. That is, suppose you were to gain two lives by 
risking one, would you not choose to play? It is worth noting that Pascal is here 
apparently relying on the two possibilities being equal, although he will quickly 
show why the actual probabilities are irrelevant. I suggest that he is drawing his 
reader into his understanding of infinity by showing a trivial case, rather than 
leaping straight in to the insight which he has personally already grasped about 
infinity. 
But supposing you stood to win three? You would have to play (since you must 
necessarily play), and it would be unwise of you, once you are obliged to play, 
not to risk your life in order to win three lives at a game where there is an equal 
chance of losing and winning. 
He increases the odds to paying out 3:1, thus the average payout on a 50:50 chance 
will be one-and-a-half times the stake. He tells the reader that they would be being 
"imprudent" not to accept such odds, especially since they are already committed 
to playing anyway.64 He then makes his next step by introducing the notion of 
eternity as being an infinite quantity. 
But there is an eternity of life and happiness. 
Now he makes a complicated sideways movement in the argument, almost 
stumbling over himself. Once infinite reward is in play, then any odds become 
reasonable. Even if there were an infinite number of chances, of which only one 
was a winner, you should still take that chance if there is infinite reward available 
for the winner. 
That being so, even though there were an infinite number of chances, of which 
one only would be in your favour, you would still be right to wager one in order 
to win two, and you would be acting wrongly, being obliged to play, by refusing 
to stake one life against three at a game in which out of an infinity of chances 
there is one for you, if there were an infinity of infinitely happy life to be won. 
64 Although, as we shall see in Chapter 4, real-world experiments suggest that many people require 
even better odds than this in order to playa gambling game. 
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Pascal goes much further, asserting that you would be more than just imprudent if 
you refused such a wager with an infinite payout, you would be acting "wrongly".6s 
As a brief mathematical aside here, we might observe that Pascal is playing rather 
fast and loose with the notion of infinity. He is assuming that: 
1 
oox-=oo 
00 
This is not necessarily a safe assumption, but I will discuss the difficulties of infinity 
on page 74 and so will not explore it further at this point. Pascal returns to safer 
ground when he compares an infinite reward with finite odds and a finite cost. 
But there is here an infinity of an infinitely happy life to be won, one chance of 
winning against a finite number of chances of losing, and what you are staking 
is finite. That leaves no choice; wherever there is infinity and where there are 
not infinite chances of losing against that of winning, there is no room for 
hesitation, you must give everything. 
Here he is saying that: 
1 
Vn>OelR: oox-=oo 
n 
He has also introduced a second infinite quantity; not only is there an infinitely long 
life (or infinite number of lives), but this life is itself infinitely happy. Numerous 
authors, including James Wetzel, doubt that humans can actually comprehend what 
an infinitely happy life might be like, or whether an infinitely long life might not be 
tedious.66 Thus they feel inclined to reject Pascal's account on this basis. There is, 
however, no reason to suppose that an eternal God would not be able to manage 
such difficulties and I deal with this topic further in Chapter 3. 
And thus, since you are obliged to play, you must be renouncing reason if you 
hoard your life, rather than risk it for an infinite gain, as likely to occur as a loss 
amounting to nothing. 
If Pascal is accused of fide ism, he counters that it would be irrational to try to hang 
on to our life when there is infinity to be won and we are forced to play. This life is 
finite and should be risked in order to obtain the infinite gain. It should be noted in 
passing that Pascal does make the claim in this sentence that the two options are 
equiprobable and he will repeat this further on in the passage. 
65 Ariew rather aggressively renders this as "stupidly". There is a revision in Pascal's text changing 
Nauriez tort de", meaning "would be wrong to", into Nagiriez de mauvais sens" which means "going 
in the wrong direction". 
66 James Wetzel, "Infinite Return: Two Ways of Wagering with Pascal," Religious Studies 29, no. 2 
(1993): 148. 
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For it is no good saying that it is uncertain whether you will win, that it is certain 
that you are taking a risk, and that the infinite distance between the certainty of 
what you are risking and the uncertainty of what you will gain, makes the finite 
good which you are certainly risking equal to the infinite good that you are not 
certain to gain. 
Pascal anticipates an objection which could be made, such that it is a certain risk, 
but an uncertain gain. Someone might thus argue that there is an infinite distance 
between certainty and uncertainty and that this should thus cancel out the infinity 
involved in the gain. I doubt that any modern reader would make such an objection, 
since we are brought up with a clear mathematical formulation of probability. In 
our system, an event which is certain has a probability of 1, while an event that will 
never occur is assigned a probability of O. Any uncertain event thus has a probability 
between these two extremes: i.e. 
O<p<l 
and so we would not imagine an infinite distance between p and 1. 
This is not the case. Every gambler takes a certain risk for an uncertain gain, and 
yet he is taking a certain finite risk for an uncertain finite gain, without sinning 
against reason. 
He argues that the basis of all gambling upon earth is to place a certain stake 
against an uncertain reward. Since it is not an offence against reason to make such 
a wager for a finite stake and a finite reward, how could it offend reason to receive 
an infinite reward? As we shall see when we discuss moral objections on page 165, 
there may however be some case for an offence against justice here. It might be 
considered unjust to receive an infinite reward for a finite good, or conversely to 
receive an eternal punishment for a finite crime. 
Here there is no infinite distance between the certain risk and the uncertain 
gain; that is not true. There is indeed an infinite distance between the certainty 
of winning and the certainty of losing, 
With a dash of hyperbole, Pascal implies that the gain in betting on God is both 
certain and infinite, while the loss in betting against is also certain, but is finite. 
There is thus an infinite distance between those two options. 
but the proportion between the uncertainty of winning and the certainty of 
what is being risked is in proportion to the chances of winning and losing. 
Pascal observes that the payout is usually proportional to the risk in any gambling 
game. The riskier the game, then the greater the payoff. He illustrates this with the 
example of a simple coin-toss: 
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And hence, if there are as many chances on one side as on the other, you are 
playing for even odds; 
He wants to distinguish this simple equation from the wager that he is suggesting, 
because this is a case where both the risk and the reward are finite. 
and in that case the certainty of what you are risking is equal to the uncertainty 
of what you might win, it is by no means infinitely distant from it. 
In his proposal, however, there is an infinite gain for only a finite stake and that this 
fact alone should be fully persuasive. 
Thus our argument carries infinite weight, when the stakes are finite in a game 
where there are equal chances of winning and losing, and an infinite prize to be 
won. This is conclusive and if men are capable of any truth, this is it. 
His imaginary interlocutor re-enters the conversation, accepting that the argument 
might be convincing, but asking if there might be any evidence to sway the decision 
one way or the other. 
"I confess, I admit it, but is there really no way of knowing what the cards are ?"-
-Yes, Scripture and the rest, etc. 
Pascal points out that the tenets of the Christian faith set out plainly that God exists 
and that he rewards those who believe. This, of course, might be sufficient for 
Pascal personally, but he would have recognised that others might not find it fully 
authoritative. However, his thesis is that the Wager holds even if there were 
nothing else in its favour, because of its mathematical undergirding in an infinite 
reward. 
Thus his dialogue partner gives up attacking the argument itself and instead turns 
to his67 own plight. Even if he is convinced by Pascal, what is he supposed to do 
about it? 
"Yes, but my hands are tied and my lips sealed; I am being forced to wager, and 
am not free. I am being held fast, and am so made that I cannot believe. What 
do you want me to do then 7" 
Puzzlingly, many modern critics of Pascal assume that he was unaware of this 
difficulty. Richard Dawkins, for example, asserts that "There is something distinctly 
odd about [Pascal's Wager}. Believing is not something you can decide to do as a 
matter of policy". 68 As a result of his misunderstanding of Pascal's intent, he goes on 
67 I use the masculine form throughout this section, partly for readability's sake and partly because I 
believe that Pascal wrote it with his male gambling friends in mind. 
68 Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion (London: Bantam Press, 2006). 103-4. 
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to mock it as a ludicrous idea.69 Yet Pascal clearly tackles this issue of not being able 
to believe at will (or doxastic voluntarism) head-on in the text of the Wager. He 
does not expect people to feign belief, as Dawkins suggests, but rather recognises 
that this is a genuine obstacle and goes on to offer a practical solution. 
That is true. But at least get it into your head that, if you are unable to believe, 
it is because of your passions, since reason impels you to believe and yet you 
cannot do so. Concentrate then not on convincing yourself by multiplying proofs 
of God's existence, but by diminishing your passions. You want to find faith, and 
do not know the road. You want to be cured of unbelief and you ask the remedy: 
Pascal is proposing that the genuine unbeliever should undertake a course of 
therapy to cure their unbelief. He holds that unbelief is an illness which needs to be 
treated and that a restoration of mental health will lead to natural, salvific belief in 
God. He suggests that the unbeliever needs to learn from those who have followed 
the same path. 
learn from those who were once bound like you, and who now wager all they 
have. These are people who know the road which you wish to follow, and who 
have been cured of the affliction of which you wish to be cured: 
His methodology is not purely cerebral, as it relies upon its behavioural element. As 
I discuss in section 2.9, Pascal's approach has much in common with modern 
Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT). 
follow the way by which they began. They behaved just as if they did believe, 
taking holy water, having masses said, etc. This will make you believe quite 
naturally and will make you more docile 
He does not think that that we can control our beliefs, but that we can perhaps 
control our behaviour and thus habituate ourselves to faith by domesticating70 our 
worldly passions.71 Peter Bernstein suggests that Pascal's purpose was to reveal 
the dominating importance of decision making in that we cannot change our 
beliefs, but how we behave is a decision that we can make.72 It is our passions that 
Pascal believes are blocking the path to true faith. Bernard Howells claims that 
Pascal intends the full force of the French "s'abetira" with its implications of animal 
behaviour, but in an ironical sense.73 
69 Ibid., 104. 
70 The word French word used Us'abetira" means "to become like a beast", but I have deliberately 
chosen a gentler form of the verb. 
71 Pascal, Pensees: 124-25. L418 
72 Bernstein, "Facing the consequences," 9. 
73 Bernard Howells, "The Interpretation of Pascal's "Pari"," The Modern Language Review 79, no. 1 
(1984): 58. 
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"But that is what I am afraid of. " 
It is a common complaint by non-believers that theistic belief may perhaps 
somehow compromise one's intellectual faculties. This is often expressed by citing 
perverse cases, such as hard-line creationism, which appear to show the believer in 
an unflattering light. It is implied that all belief is a form of fideism which denies 
scientific reality and goes against intellectual good practice. Pascal puts these words 
into his potential convert's mouth. The unbeliever values his acuteness and does 
not want it to be deadened, as Pascal is proposing. 
--But why? What have you to lose? 
Pascal feels that he has already demonstrated that the atheist will lose nothing if he 
is wrong, because he will not offend reason. 
But to show you that this is the way, the fact is that this diminishes the passions, 
which are your great obstacles. 
He returns to the Biblical allusion of the obstacle, the stumbling-block 
(c,.,(aVOaAol1 or stultitiam that he mentioned earlier in the discourse. For Pascal, it 
is the passions which prevent the formation of faith and which must therefore be 
repressed. 
End of this address.--
Howells holds that this last section was added as an afterthought, perhaps trying to 
address the misplaced fears of the Iibertin?4 
Now, what harm will come to you from choosing this course? You will be 
faithful, honest, humble, grateful, full of good works, a sincere, true friend ... It is 
true that you will not enjoy noxious pleasures, glory and good living, but will you 
not have others? I will tell you that you will gain even in this life 
As Nemoianu observes, Pascal genuinely believes that his wager has no actual 
costS?5 If the unbeliever argues that he will have to give up his pleasures, Pascal is 
ready to point out that one should give those up anyway, in order to have pleasures 
that are actually much better. 
and that, at every step you take along this road, you will see that your gain is so 
certain and your risk so negligible, that in the end you will realise that you have 
wagered on something certain and infinite, for which you have paid nothing. 
74 Ibid., 60. 
75 Nemoianu, "Pascalian Faith," 331. 
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James Wetzel is critical of Pascal's apparent belief that the wagerer risks nothing, 
calling it a supercilious assumption that "all irreligious folk are liable to become 
decadent and despairing libertines, ready to set at naught the value of their finite 
satisfactions. ,,76 Perhaps Pascal could have softened this by reminding the reader 
that the finite should be considered to be as nothing when compared with the 
infinite. He now closes with the apparent conversion (or at least acquiescence) of 
his interlocutor. 
"How these words fill me with rapture and delight II{ my words please you and 
seem cogent, you must know that they come from a man who went down upon 
his knees before and after to pray this infinite and indivisible being, to whom he 
submits his own, that he might bring your being also to submit to him for your 
own good and for his glory; and that strength might thus be reconciled with 
lowliness. 
Pascal finishes on a humble note, attributing any skill that he may have displayed as 
being obtained through prayer, which he heartily recommends to his reader. 
Its Place in Pascal's Theology 
At first glance, Pascal's Wager seems completely at odds with his Augustinian belief 
in predestination and as I show on page 125, a deity who predestines people can be 
ignored from a risk-management perspective and is irrelevant to the Wager. levi 
suggests that Pascal's nature was to desire a complete resolution of the dichotomy 
between his doctrine of grace and the apparent damnation of humankind and that 
he was struggling with their seeming incommensurability. Thus, it could be 
suggested that the Wager might simply be one strand that Pascal was trying to 
weave into a more complex whole and levi holds that Pascal lacked the theological 
or philosophical depth to tackle the task adequately.77 My own belief is that Pascal 
did not consider the Wager to be a way of obtaining faith as such, but that it was 
simply a device to penetrate what he perceived to be the thick skulls of his 
gambling friends. As Peter Kreeft argues,18 Pascal's apologetic approach was 
threefold, as he writes: 
Men despise religion. They hate it and are afraid that it may be true. The cure 
for this is first to show that it is not contrary to reason, but worthy of reverence 
and respect. Next make it attractive, make good men wish it were true, and 
then show that it is. 79 
76 Wetzel, "Infinite Return: Two Ways of Wagering with Pascal," 144. 
n Pascal, "Writings on Grace," xxxvi. 
78 See also Joel Esala, "The Epistemology of Pascal's Wager: A Christian Presuppositional Argument," 
Reformed Perspectives Magazine 8, no. 2 (2006), 
http://thirdmill.org!newfiles/joe_esala/pt.joe_esala.wager.html. 
79 Pascal, Pensees: 4. l12 
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His Wager addresses the first two of these points, showing that it is rational to 
believe in God and that men should wish that it were true that God exists, because 
their efforts to obtain faith would be infinitely rewarded. Krailsheimer argues that 
Pascal clearly believed that grace could never be earned and God could not be 
under any obligation to deliver eternal life, but that man could try and remove 
some of the obstacles to grace and thus create a state which was more conducive 
to its reception.so Pascal's initial approach is thus to show the suspicious reader that 
they are harming themselves by being in a state of unbelief, let alone breaking the 
laws of a God whose existence has yet to be proved.S1 Pascal is thus presenting the 
paradox that we must use reason in order to establish an order which is entirely 
beyond reason's capacity to appreciate. He says that 
"Reason would never submit, unless it judged that there are occasions when it 
ought to submit. It is right, then, that reason should submit when it judges that 
it ought to submit".82 
The Wager therefore uses reason to show that this is a case where it should submit 
itself to something bigger and thus to embark upon a course of therapy, so that its 
own imperfections might be corrected. 
Modern Reworkings 
Whatever Pascal intended, the Wager has been taken from its original formulation 
and has taken on a life of its own, apart from its original context. The underlying 
argument is that pragmatic reasoning should be employed whenever there are 
momentous consequences at stake, but where there is considerable uncertainty 
over the exact possibilities involved. Pascalian logic has been used in the area of 
climate change, arguing that if we are wrong and we allow the earth to overheat, 
then the entire human race will perish, which dwarfs any costs that we might incur 
in averting the disaster. 
Likewise it has been used to suggest that we should invest in cryopreservation. The 
logic runs as follows: Cryopreservation assumes that it is possible to freeze your 
body (or just your head) after death in such a state that future generations will be 
able to restore your corpse to life, complete with your personality. It is argued that 
even if we do not know how to accomplish such a thing today, we have seen such a 
colossal increase in scientific knowledge in our own time that we cannot rule out 
the possibility that scientists may be able to perform such a feat in the future. On 
the other hand, if we are not cryopreserved, then our bodies will decay and rot to 
the point that no-one will be able to recover them. Thus, if you are cryopreserved 
you have a chance of survival, while if you are not, then you will definitely die. 
80 Ibid., xxi. 
81 Ibid., xxiii. 
82 Ibid., 54. L174 
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The Pascalian parallel is thus that if cryopreservation fails, then you lose nothing, 
because you would have definitely died without it, but if it succeeds, then you may 
live on. It could be argued that there is a significant cost in cryopreservation, but at 
death you lose all your material goods anyway, so losing part (or even all) of them is 
no worse an outcome. This assumes, of course, that you are indifferent to its effect 
upon your heirs, or even to your financial state upon resurrection.83 
83 Such resurrected corpses might find that they have accumulated considerable debts while in 
cryosuspension, due to the costs of keeping them in storage for centuries and the medical 
treatments required for revival. They could awake to find themselves as servants, slaves, or worse. 
James D. Miller suggests that a cryonics unbeliever and believer might make an agreement where 
the believer pays for the cryosuspension of the unbeliever in return for the unbeliever's becoming 
effectively the indentured servant of the believer in the event of success. 
http://jamesdmiller.blogspot.co.uk/2007/06/cryonics.html 
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Chapter 2 A Critical Framework for Evaluation 
In this chapter I will outline a number of tools that I shall use to evaluate both the 
Wager and the objections raised against it. These form a framework against which I 
will judge the success or otherwise of Pascal's Wager and its various detractors. The 
tools are largely drawn from outside theology, because the Wager is at heart an 
appeal to the non-theologian, as we saw in the previous chapter. Using these tools, 
I will define a number of principles that will enable us to examine each objection on 
its own merits, but without my needing to spell out all the logical steps required in 
each case. My approach throughout this thesis is to consider Pascal's Wager as an 
exercise in practical risk management and I suggest that the fundamental risk is that 
of losing our eternal salvation. 
I will commence this chapter by discussing risk management in general and then 
outline how I propose to use risk management techniques in a theological context. I 
move on to provide an introduction to decision theory, including the concept of a 
'mixed' strategy, which incorporates a random element into the process and which 
is important in many modern mathematically-based objections to the Wager. I also 
discuss the Principle of Indifference, which is often cited in critiques. 
In order to highlight some important assumptions that underpin the logic 
employed, I examine the model of God which I believe is being presumed within 
this context and how this may have an impact on the decision-making process. In 
the final part of this chapter, I examine how Pascal's answer to the wagerer, who is 
convinced by the Wager's logic, but who finds themselves unable to believe at will, 
anticipates the modern therapeutic practice of Cognitive Behaviour Therapy. I hold 
that this therapeutic approach sidesteps objections which suggest that the wagerer 
must somehow engage in deceiving either God or themselves. 
If we are to view Pascal's Wager in the context of managing one's exposure to risk, 
as I suggest, then I first need to explain what I mean by risk management, since it is 
not a field that is usually studied within theology. 
2.1 Risk Management 
Michel Crouhy et al. identify four ways to deal with risk:84 
• Avoid 
• Transfer 
• Mitigate 
• Keep 
84 Michel Crouhy, Dan Galai, and Robert Mark, The Essentials of Risk Management (New York: 
McGraw-Hili, 2006). 2. 
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Although their focus is upon financial risk management, the risk management 
strategies they describe apply to most other spheres of decision making. The 
Institute of Risk Management et al. state that for organisations: 
"The focus of good risk management is the identification and treatment of [the 
risks attaching to their activities) . ... It marshals the understanding of the 
potential upside and downside of all those factors which can affect the 
organisation. It increases the probability oj success, and reduces both the 
probability of failure and the uncertointy of achieving the organisation's overall 
objectives ,,85 
These principles apply just as much for individuals but they are rarely considered in 
any sort of formal exercise, except perhaps when deciding upon one's investment 
portfolio. We can illustrate the four principles operating at a personal level with a 
simple example. 
Imagine that we want to buy some fruit from the greengrocer's shop, but this will 
involve crossing a busy road. We can avoid the risk by deciding that we do not need 
the fruit after all, or perhaps by buying from a nearby supermarket, which does not 
require us to cross the road. We could transfer the risk by sending our spouse to get 
the fruit instead, or perhaps by having it delivered to our home. We can mitigate 
our risk, by using a pedestrian crossing and looking both ways before crossing the 
road, but even this strategy will leave some residual risk (such as being hit by an 
out-of-control, or speeding, driver) which we will have to keep (or accept). We 
might decide to accept the entire risk and step out without looking, but most 
people would not consider this to be sound risk management. 
As can be seen from this example, we adopt every-day risk-management 
techniques, such as mitigation, throughout the process of our early education. 
Parents of small children start off by keeping a firm hold of their hand, to avoid the 
risk of their running out into the road and being hurt. They move on to teach them 
about road safety (in order to mitigate the risk), as their children become more able 
to appreciate and weigh the risks involved. Eventually, the parent has to accept any 
residual risk in allowing older children to cross the road unsupervised, because it is 
regarded as an essential part of their growing up and becoming adults in their own 
right. 
As well as recognising that not all risks can be mitigated, we must also acknowledge 
that the potential costs of reducing the risk might end up being greater than the 
85 The Institute of Risk Management, The National Forum for Risk Management in the Public Sector, 
and The Association of Insurance and Risk Managers, A Risk Management Standard, (London: The 
Institute of Risk Management, 2002), ' 
http://www.theirm.org/publications/documents/Risk_Management_Standard_030820.pdf. 2. 
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risk itself. For example, we might choose to manage our risk in crossing roads by 
never leaving the house, yet that might cost us far more in terms of social contact, 
or losing the benefits of exercise. Thus risk management includes calculating the 
costs of the different strategies and which strategy (or combination of strategies) 
offers the best net return. 
Risk of faith 
Religion is rarely seen in terms of risk in the modern Western world. Enthusiasm for 
preaching about hellfire has waned dramatically since the seventeenth century 
according to D.P. Walker86 and the all-pervasive pluralism of religious education in 
the UK has eroded the claims of exclusivity in conventional Christianity to the point 
where many modern theologians and clerics are distinctly uncomfortable with even 
expressing the idea of Hell for non-believers. 
Pascal speaks little of Hell in his Pensees, mentioning the word "I'enfer" just eight 
times, and he does not show any strong feelings about eternal torment, allowing 
for the possibility of annihilation instead. For example, he writes, that "in leaving 
this world, I fall forever either into nothingness or into the hands of an angry God".87 
Notably, the Wager is couched in terms of the loss of infinite reward, rather than 
bearing infinite punishment, and most modern treatments of the Wager also ignore 
the disutility of Hell, not least because including it makes the mathematics much 
more complicated, as we shall see on page 106. 
Even so, missing out on an available infinite reward is effectively an infinite loss and 
Pascal is bemused by the fact that people could care so much about trifles in this 
present life, while ignoring what he saw as the greatest risk of all, namely this loss 
of eternal life. 
"Nothing is so important to man as his own state; nothing is so terrifying to him 
as eternity. And thus it is not natural that there should be men indifferent to 
their loss of existence and to the peril of an eternity of wretchedness . ... And this 
same man who spends so many days and nights in rage and despair at the loss 
of some office, or because of an imaginary insult to his honour, is the very one 
. who knows, without anxiety or emotion, that he will lose everything through 
death. It is monstrous thing to see in the same heart and at the same time this 
sensitivity to the slightest thing and this strange insensitivity to the greatest. ,,88 
Pascal wants to make people understand the risk that they are running, whether 
they are currently aware of it or not. The nature of the Wager is such that the first 
86 D.P. Walker, The Decline Of Hell (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1964). cited in George 
Hunsinger, Disruptive grace: studies in the theology of Karl Barth (Cambridge: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 
2000).228. 
87 Pascal, Pensees (tr. Ariew): 218. L428 
88 Ibid., 219. L428 
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technique of risk management, namely avoidance, is not open to us. Simply by 
being alive, we are already committed to one path or another and thus we cannot 
choose whether to play or not. Refusing to participate is simply to place our bet 
against God. We cannot avoid the risk, nor refuse to play, for we are already in the 
game. We must wager; it is not optional.89 
Nor can we use the second technique and transfer the risk to another, because 
each player is in charge of their own destiny and living one's life is not a task that 
can be delegated to anybody else. Each person must thus bear their own risk.9o 
Accepting the risk and potentially bearing an infinite loss, would not be considered 
sound risk management strategy, unless the costs of mitigation were also infinite. 
No cost in a finite lifetime could ever be infinite, and so accepting the risk of an 
infinite loss should not be considered rational. 
Thus, the only risk-management strategy available to us is one of mitigation. We 
need to reduce the risk to a level such that we could accept any residual losses. 
However, the only option available which delivers infinite benefit (and mitigates the 
loss) is that of coming to belief in God. This has the side-benefit that it not only 
avoids loss, but also delivers an infinite benefit and Pascal thus concludes that his 
argument has infinite force. Although objectors often suggest that becoming a 
Christian has significant (and possibly unacceptable) costs associated with it, Patrick 
& Christopher Toner argue that Pascal would have considered the adoption of a 
Christian lifestyle as a valuable gain in itself, rather than any sort of cost.91 
Nonetheless, whether there are losses or not, they will always be finite and thus 
overwhelmed by the infinite gain. 
In this thesis, I suggest that Pascal's Wager is an exercise in rational risk 
management in a theological and anthropological context. For an objection to the 
Wager to succeed under my model, it must either uncover a logical flaw in Pascal's 
approach, or it must show that there is an alternative mitigation strategy that does 
at least as well as Pascal's. This is a different approach from most recent works, 
which have typically focused upon examining the validity of the game-theoretical 
underpinning, particularly with respect to the mathematics of infinity; or by 
suggesting that even if it Is valid, the Wager cannot provide any actual guidance on 
which deity to select. My contribution is to offer a model which allows us to 
navigate our way around some of the difficulties, while remaining within the spirit 
89 Ibid., 212. L418 
90 Christians might argue that the principle of substitutionary atonement actually allows for the risk 
to be transferred to Christ, but I would reply that it can only be obtained through the mitigation 
strategy of belief. 
91 Patrick Toner and Christopher Toner, "Pascal's First Wager Reconsidered: A Virtue Theoretic 
View," International Philosophical Quarterly 46, no. 181 (2006): 82. 
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of the Pascalian endeavour. I will start by discussing one of the major tenets of my 
argument, which is that if a risk has no mitigation, then we should ignore it. 
Principle of Accepted Immitigable Risk 
Risk management concerns itself entirely with risks which can be managed. At a 
number of points in this thesis, we will encounter cases where there is a risk, but no 
mitigation of that risk is possible. For example, if we were to take a hard-line 
predestination view and declare that salvation is the sovereign choice of God alone 
which cannot be affected by any earthly actions of the individual. Under those 
circumstances, a person accepting Pascal's Wager cannot actually affect their 
outcome; whatever they do, they cannot change whether or not they are included 
among the elect. This does not mean that Pascal's Wager has no value at all, since it 
might be the means by which God had preordained that they would come to faith; 
however it has no value to those outside the elect. In this particular case, there is 
no mitigation strategy available for the individual. No matter what one does, 
whether it is to attend church or not, it will not affect whether or not one receives 
the infinite reward. Therefore, the rational person will simply have to accept the 
residual risk of predestination and hope to be one of the chosen. 
If there is no strategy to follow, except that of simply accepting the risk, then that 
case can actually be dismissed from further consideration within that risk 
management perspective. For example, there is a risk that an asteroid will collide 
with the earth and wipe out all life on the planet. However, there is nothing that we 
can do to avert such a disaster (at least with our current technology), nor can we 
buy asteroid insurance that would payout adequate compensation in the event 
that it did occur. We therefore have to accept the risk, ignore it and get on with the 
more manageable risks in our lives, such as choosing to wear a seatbelt while 
driving. Risk management is fundamentally only concerned with risks that can be 
managed; the rest are simply noted and ignored. 
I therefore suggest that we likewise dismiss all risks around Pascal's Wager which 
do not have an available mitigation strategy. This is not to say that these cases have 
no merit, but that once we have determined that we cannot chose any path but to 
accept the residual risk, we can safely dismiss them from further consideration, so 
as to focus our attentions on the risks which we can mitigate. When we encounter 
cases in subsequent discussion in this thesis that do not offer any mitigation, I will 
denote them as accepted immitigable risks, by which I mean that we have no choice 
but to accept the risk and to dismiss them from further consideration. Thus, the risk 
of a deity who predestines everyone is designated as an accepted immitigable risk. 
This acceptance of immitigable risks provides a powerful tool in cutting through the 
swathes of notionally possible (if unlikely) deities for consideration, including 
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parodies such as Invisible Pink Unicorns92 or The Flying Spaghetti Monster.93 I will 
return to this in greater detail in Chapter 3. 
2.2 Moral objections from a risk management point-of-view 
I will cover some moral objections to Pascal's Wager on page 153 onwards, but 
someone who proposes a moral objection to a course of mitigation is setting up a 
decision-making framework that is outside that of risk management. For example, 
let us consider a country facing a threat from an unstable leader in a foreign nation. 
The rulers of the country under threat might consider assassination of the opposing 
leader as being an efficient means of mitigating the threat. However, modern 
democracies do not consider assassination to be a legitimate means of risk 
reduction, even if it might be the most effective in certain circumstances.94 They 
thus choose strategies which may have a higher overall cost, but which do not pose 
the same moral difficulties. 
Morality is not generally considered to be on a commensurate scale with efficacy, 
although this is a contentious area in itself. If someone does have an unbending 
moral objection to Pascal's Wager, then I suggest that they are placing themselves 
outside the risk management framework which I shall be using and I shall not be 
exploring those options in any depth. I shall be assuming that the actor in the 
Wager is willing to consider taking Pascal's suggested course of action, as long as 
they are sufficiently persuaded by the arguments that they should do so. 
We shall now look at some of the central axioms of decision theory which are 
relevant to this essay. Pascal clearly anticipated some of decision theory's central 
formulae in the way that he approached the Wager and understood many of its 
tenets instinctively, although they would not be formally articulated until much 
later. I will start by discussing the theory of expected utility. 
2.3 Utility theory 
Within the field of economics, the term 'utility' represents a non-monetary value 
that may be placed upon a particular state of affairs.95 Utility is derived from 
subjective, rather than objective valuations and is inferred from particular 
preferences or actual choices that have been made. It cannot be measured directly 
and has no objective existence. 
As an example, if I had to choose between going out for an expensive dinner with 
my wife, or staying at home to watch the football game on TV, it is unlikely that 
anyone could place a monetary value on the two possible outcomes in order to 
92 See http://www.invisiblepinkunicorn.com/ipu/home.html 
93 See http://www.venganza.org/ 
94 Or at least, such governments publicly profess that they do not believe in assassination. 
95 I acknowledge that not all economists agree on what utility is, or even whether it truly exists, but I 
believe the theory to have some applicability to our current discussion. 
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compare them. Let us assume that I choose to go out for a dinner96 and that it has 
a higher monetary cost than staying at home. Since I have preferred the higher-
cost choice to the lower-cost one, it is clear that there must be non-monetary 
factors at work here, such as the enjoyment (or disappointment) associated with 
each choice. Economists would thus infer that going out for dinner had higher 
utility for me. 
Although systems of measurement have been proposed,97 utility can only be used 
comparatively within the realm of the actual choices under consideration. let us 
assume that I can choose to wear either a red or blue tie to an important meeting 
tomorrow. Since I think that the red tie goes better with my suit, I choose red and 
thus we can infer from that choice that the red tie has more utility than the blue tie 
for me. We do not need to know my underlying motives to know that it must have 
had more utility, since the estimation of relative utility is derived by observing the 
actual choices made. For example, if I said I preferred the red tie, but actually wore 
the blue one, we would infer that wearing the blue tie had more utility, whatever 
my stated preferences might have been. What we cannot do though, is to compare 
the utility value of wearing the red tie with the utility of gOing out for dinner, unless 
we can observe an instance where going out to dinner was an alternative to 
wearing a red tie.98 
Utility applies where there is more than one choice and where we can rank our 
preferences. Let us assume that in my choices above, I could also choose to stay in 
and work on my thesis. We start by looking at the choices in pairs: 
1. I'd rather go out than watch TV 
2. I'd rather work on my thesis than watch TV 
3. I'd rather go out than work on my thesis 
If we use the notation a > b to mean 'I prefer Q to b', then we can express the 
ranking as: 
Go out> Thesis> Watch TV 
Although we have ordered them, it does not tell us how much we prefer one over 
the other. If we were to add the option to 'die painfully' to the possible choices 
then we would have: 
96 Remembering always that my wife will be proofreading this. 
97 With units called 'utiles'. 
98 Or perhaps where an identical choice was offered in two different (but otherwise broadly 
comparable) scenarios, although establishing such comparability is exceptionally difficult, because 
people's circumstances will change over time. 
Go out > Thesis> Watch TV > Die painfully 
Since this simple ordering tells us nothing about the relative preferences, we might 
try to assign a numeric value to each state: 
Go out (100) > Thesis (80) > Watch TV (70) > Die painfully (0) 
That is, I assign a positive vale to the first three choices and no utility at all to dying 
painfully (in fact I might give it a very high negative value). However, these numeric 
values are completely arbitrary and apply only within the context of that one 
choice. If we returned to the red/blue tie choice, we might get: 
Red tie (2) > Blue tie (0) 
We have assigned a utility of zero in two distinct circumstances: selecting a blue tie 
in one example, and dying painfully in the other. This does not mean that I am 
indifferent between the two options of wearing a blue tie or dying painfully; the 
numerical values only apply within the context of each scenario. Utility values are 
not commensurate between scenarios, unless we have some linking comparison 
between the two. 
Utility theory holds that these comparisons should be transitive within a single 
context, that is, that if we have three possibilities: a, b, c and we know that: a > 
band b > c, then it necessarily follows that a > c. As we shall see in Chapter 4, 
experimental economists, such as Daniel Kahneman, have shown that this 
assumption is not necessarily true in real-world decision making and that the 
human mind may use different heuristic systems of thought, depending upon the 
nature of the task. However, for the purposes of the initial discussion, I shall 
assume that utility relationships are transitive. 
Rational behaviour 
An important part of utility theory is that people will be rational. That is, that the 
choices they made represented the highest utility for them, rather than being 
completely arbitrary. It is not that people actually calculate a numeric utility value 
for each outcome and then take the highest one (although there may be some 
weighing of pros and cons), it is rather that we can infer the utility from the choice. 
However, we must recognise that context plays a part in any decision. On a given 
day, I might prefer a red tie over a blue one because I like red more than blue, but if 
I were attending the Conservative conference, I might well choose the blue tie 
because I want to avoid causing offence. Thus decisions are contextual and the 
utility values may change accordingly. 
One side effect of the assumption of rationality is the expectation that if we reveal 
the payoffs and probabilities to the players, then people will choose accordingly. As 
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we will see in Chapter 4, this is far from a safe assumption, but we will leave 
discussion of those complexities for later and proceed here under the assumption 
that we can operate using a relatively simple calculus. 
2.4 Decision making 
According to Duncan Luce and Howard Raiffa,99 decisions can be made in one of 
three contexts: 
Certainty - each action is known to lead invariably to a specific outcome 
Risk - each outcome leads to one of a set of possible outcomes, each 
outcome occurring with a known probability. 
Uncertainty - each action has as its consequence a set of possible specific 
outcomes, but the probabilities of these outcomes are unknown or not even 
meaningful. 
Decision making under certainty occurs in a number of situations: for example, a 
company may want to know the optimum route for a salesman to travel between a 
number of cities. The distance between each city is known. It is merely a matter of 
calculating each possible route and then selecting the shortest overall. 
An example of a decision under risk might be where we toss a fair coin and gain £10 
if it comes up 'heads' but lose £5 if it comes down 'tails,.lOO Wagers in casinos are 
usually made under risk - the stake, the probability of winning and the payout are 
all known to the gambler in advance, although he cannot know which outcome will 
occur. 
Most of our life decisions are made under uncertainty. In the example earlier about 
what I should do tonight, I cannot know all the outcomes of going out for dinner, 
nor can I know the exact probability that I will end up sleeping on the sofa if I 
choose to stay at home and watch TV, rather than going out for dinner with my 
wife. 
Pascal's Wager is a decision under uncertainty - we cannot assign an exact 
probability to God's existence and it may not even be meaningful to try and guess 
one. 
Decision Theory 
As a simple introduction to decision theory under risk let us consider a gambling 
game where there are two outcomes and the probability of each is known, for 
99 R. Duncan luce and Howard Raiffa, Games and Decisions (New York: Dover Publications Inc, 1989; 
repr., Reprint of John Wiley 1957 edition). 13. 
100 For the moment, we will ignore the cases where the coin might land on its edge or be swallowed 
by a passing eagle. 
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example, playing roulette in a casino where we will simply bet on red or black. We 
can make a bet of a given size (the 'stake') and, if we win, we get our stake back 
plus an amount equal to that stake. 
In decision theory, it is common to express the possibilities in a matrix. In this 
example, each row represents the possible bet and each column represents the 
possible outcome. The intersection of row and column shows the payoff for the 
combination of bet and outcome. 
Red comes up Black comes up 
Bet £5 on red Win flO Lose £5 
Bet £5 on black Lose £5 Win flO 
In this example we might add another row: do not bet at all; in which case we 
neither lose nor win anything. 
Red comes up Black comes up 
Bet £5 on red Win flO Lose £5 
Bet £5 on black Lose £5 Win £10 
Do not bet Win £0 Win £0 
We can calculate the expected value (or EV) by multiplying the probability of each 
outcome by its payoff and then subtract the cost of playing. 
EV = (Probability of outcome x Payoff) - Cost 
Let us work on the basis that we will bet £5 on red and that red has a one in two (or 
~ ) ) chance of coming Up.10l 
EV(red) = (Probability of red x Payoff for red) - stake 
= ( ~ ~ x £10) - £5 
= £0 
If the expected value is deemed to be the sale utility of the bet then, as we can see, 
there seems to be no point in playing this particular game.102 
101 In reality casinos do not offer 50 :50 bets like this. Roulette wheels have a zero, which is 
considered to be neither red nor black. If it comes up, then all red and black bets lose. Some casinos 
even have a double-zero as well. In a single zero wheel, there are 18 red slots, 18 black and a zero. 
The probability of red is thus 18/37 or 0.4865, so the EV would be (0.4865 x £10) - £5 = -£0.135. 
102 The fact that people do bet in casinos, when their odds are actually worse than th is, implies that 
there are other factors involved. 
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To show a more complex game, let us assume that we toss a fair, six-sided die and 
bet £5. If it comes up with a value I, 2 or 3, then we lose; if it is 4 then we win £6, 
and if it is 5 or 6 we win £12. The expected value is the sum of the probabilities, 
multiplied by the payoff for each. The probability of rolling any single number is one 
in six, o r ~ ; ; the probability of rolling a I, 2 or 3 is three in six, o r r . . So we can 
6 6 
compute the EV as follows: 
3 1 2 
EV = (6' x £0) + (6' x £6) + (6' x £12) - £5 
= £0 + £1 + £4 - £5 
= £0 
The result is that it has the same EV as the simple coin toss or red-black game and 
thus we have seen that we can compare different sorts of wagers, by looking at 
their EV, even if the games associated with the wagers are quite different. 
Dominance 
An important concept in decision theory is that of dominance. Within a game, each 
player will adopt a strategy in order to win. There are no implications of long-term 
thinking or creativity in the choice of the word strategy, since it is perfectly 
allowable to have a poor strategy. It simply describes how a player makes her 
choices for each move in the game. 
If we take a simple two-player game like noughts and crosses103 then we can show 
that there is an optimal strategy for the player who goes first. That player will 
always win, or at worst draw. There is also an optimal strategy for going second 
which always guarantees a draw at worst. The player going second can only win if 
the player going first plays sub-optimally. Thus, choosing to go first will dominate. 
To show simple dominance let us consider an example from Morton Davis. 104 
Consider a game with a 3x3 matrix of outcomes, where you can choose one of the 
three rows (A, B, or C) and your opponent can choose from one of the three 
columns (I, II or III). Your payoff is given by the intersection of the two. 
A 5 -2 1 
B 6 4 2 
c o 7 -1 
103 Known as tic-tac-toe in the USA. 
104 Morton F Davis, Game Theory: A Nontechnical Introduction (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications Inc., 
1997}. 12. 
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By choosing row B you will always gain 2,4 or 6 units and you can never lose. While 
you might gain more by choosing row C, where the maximum payoff is 7, you could 
end up with nothing or even lose 1. As the second player we can see that column I 
appears a dead loss since it never gains, but could lose 5 or 6, while column III has 
the lowest risk, since we can never lose more than 2. 
If we simply consider row B against row A we can see that for each column chosen 
by the opponents, row B will always yield a better outcome. We can say that Row B 
dominates row A. Likewise for player 2, column III dominates column I because 
whichever row player 1 chooses, the result will be better for column III. 
If we eliminate the dominated rows and columns, we can thus simplify the problem 
to a 2 x 2 matrix. 
B 4 2 
c 7 -1 
Now which row should player 1 choose? If he takes row B then he is guaranteed to 
gain at least 2, but if he chooses row C then he could gain 7 at the risk of losing 1. If 
we take the average payoff of each row, we find that they are the same: 
4+2 
RowB=-2- =3 
7-1 
RowC=-2- =3 
Before deciding, let us look at the choices for player 2. Column II will lose between 
4 and 7, while column III might lose 2 or gain 1. The average payoffs are thus: 
4+7 
Column II = - ~ ~ = 3.5 loss 
2-1 
Column III = -2- = 0.5 loss 
In fact column II is dominated by column III. It will always do better whichever row 
player 1 chooses. Therefore, player 2 should always pick column III. Knowing this, 
the first player must choose row B in order to avoid a loss. Establishing dominance 
within the strategies ends up constraining each player's choices. In fact, like tic-tac-
toe, no player should ever choose to play second because he will be guaranteed a 
loss. As we will see, dominance (or indeed super-dominance) plays a part in the 
decision theory of Pascal's Wager. 
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Mixed strategies 
A mixed strategy is one where we assign probabilities to each of a number of 
competing 'pure' strategies and then use a random device in order to arrive at a 
particular choice from the available options. This could be as simple as tossing a 
coin to decide whether or not to believe in God. As we shall see in Chapter 3, mixed 
strategies playa significant part in some of the most successful of the mathematical 
objections to the Wager and thus it has been necessary for us to at least 
understand what we mean by a mixed strategy as part of developing our analytical 
framework. We now need to consider another decision theoretical idea which 
appears in some critiques, which is commonly known as the Principle of 
Indifference. 
2.5 Principle of Indifference 
The principle of indifference has a reasonably long history, appearing in various 
forms. Gottfried leibniz (b. 1646) initially coined the phrase the "Principle of 
Sufficient Reason" (or "PSR") in his Discourse on Metaphysics, although he was 
following on from Spinoza and Anaximander of Miletus who had described similar 
arguments. Arthur Schopenhauer, who wrote his doctoral thesis on the PSR, prefers 
Christian Wolff's description as being the most general: "nihil est sine ratione cur 
potius sit quam non sit" (or "Nothing is without a reason or ground why it is,,).lOS In 
its simplest form, the PSR states that "For every factI, there must be an 
explanation why lis the case." 106 The PSR can be expressed in a number of 
different ways, such as: 
• For every entity x, if x exists, then there is a sufficient reason why x exists. 
• For every event e, if e occurs, then there is a sufficient reason why e occurs. 
• For every proposition p, if P is true, then there is a sufficient reason why p is 
true. 
The Principle of Insufficient Reason was developed from the PSR by Bernouilli (b. 
1654) and laplace (b. 1749) and argues that if you do not have such a sufficient 
reason to prefer one case over another, then you should treat them as equi-
probable. John Maynard Keynes (b. 1921) renamed it the "Principle of Indifference" 
in his A Treatise on Probability, but was rather more cautious, arguing that it could 
only be applied in cases where we genuinely had no prior knowledge about the 
probabilities. As Nicholas Shackel puts it, the "possibilities of which we have equal 
105 Arthur Schopenhauer, On the Four/old Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, trans. E.FJ. 
Payne (Peru, Illinois: Carus Publishing Company, 1974). 6. 
106 Yitzhak Melamed and Martin Lin, "Principle of Sufficient Reason," in The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta (2011). 
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ignorance have equal probabilities" .107 He cites a few paradoxes that arise (drawing 
upon Johannes von Kries) and I will briefly paraphrase one of them. 
Suppose that we imagine a possible line whose length is a integer number of 
centimetres between 1cm and 10cm long. There are ten possible lengths, so we 
therefore assume that the probability of any given (non-zero) length is 1/10. So 
what is the probability that its length is 3cm or less? The principle of indifference 
states that it is 30% and in this case it is. 
Now let us make a square in similar fashion. The area of any possible square lies 
between 1 and 100 cm 2• So what is the probability that the area of any given square 
is 30cm 2 or less? At first glance, we might conclude that it too ought to be 30%, but 
let us look at the possible squares and their areas: 
Side length (em) I Area (em2) I 
1 1 
2 4 
3 8 
4 16 
5 25 
6 36 
7 49 
8 64 
9 81 
10 100 
As we can see from the squares shaded in yellow, 50% of the squares have an area 
less than or equal to 30 cm 2• Now let us consider a cube, whose volume ranges 
from 1 to 1,000 cm 3 • What proportion of the cubes have a volume that is 300cm3 or 
less? 
107 Nicholas Shackel, "Bertrand's Paradox and the Principle of Indifference," Philosophy of Science 
74(2007) : p 150. 
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I Side length (em) I Volume (em3) 
1 1 
2 8 
3 27 
4 64 
5 125 
6 216 
7 343 
8 512 
9 729 
10 1000 
In this case, 60% of the cubes have a volume of 300cm3 or less, which is twice the 
figure that the Principle of Indifference suggests that it should be. 
The Principle of Indifference relies upon there being a uniform linear distribution of 
cases across the entire range of possibilities and this can only strictly apply when 
we know that this is the case. As we have seen, if the distribution is not linear, such 
as with volume, then the Principle of Indifference will yield results that are 
dramatically wrong. In the cases I have cited above, we might reasonably expect 
that there would be some non-linear scaling in effect, since we know that area is 
proportional to the square of the sides and volume is proportional to the cube of 
the side length, but that is rather to beg the question. If we knew the distribution in 
advance, we would not be using the Principle of Indifference at all. As Nicholas 
Shackel suggests, only the "possibilities of which we have equal ignorance have 
equal probabilities";108 as soon as we know something about the distribution, we 
should use that knowledge instead. 
As with many aspects of decision theory, the Principle of Indifference particularly 
struggles when contemplating infinitely many possibilities, as exemplified by 
Bertrand's Paradox,109 but despite its known weaknesses, we encounter the 
Principle of Indifference quite often in objections to Pascal's Wager, particularly 
when we come to the many-gods objections in Chapter 3. In this thesis, I intend to 
follow Keynes and only allow the Principle of Indifference to apply when we 
genuinely have no reason to prefer one option over another. Wherever possible, 
other factors will be used to adjudicate between competing options which have the 
same expected outcome. 
108 Ibid., 150. 
109 For further discussion see ib id. or Edward T. Jaynes, "The Well Posed Problem," Foundations of 
Physics 3(1973). 
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2.6 Assumptions and preconditions 
Pascal's Wager incorporates a model which assumes a number of characteristics of 
God and of humanity which are not usually articulated, although a number of the 
extant objections hinge upon different models. In this section I sketch what I see as 
some unspoken assumptions that set preconditions for wagering and I briefly 
suggest some possible rationale underpinning those assumptions, together with 
any corollaries for the Wager. This is an area which is familiar to philosophers of 
religion and I do not propose to cover arguments around the nature or alterity of 
God in any depth and space does not permit much exploration of any notions of 
divine justice. Rather I am illustrating some assumptions that I believe are inherent 
in Pascal's formulation, purely in order that we might view the roots of objections 
more clearly. 
God will act fairly 
The essence of the Wager is the apparent bargain between the unbeliever and God, 
which in crude terms offers the proposition by God that: "if you will believe in me, 
then I will give you an eternal reward". We will assume for the moment, as Paul 
Bartha suggests, that it is the act of wagering that leads to the infinite reward in the 
case where God exists.110 We therefore need to be sure that if we do wager, that 
God is trustworthy and will keep his side of the bargain. Pascal clearly believes that 
God is just, infinitely more so than we are, as he sets out in the opening part of the 
Wager: 
There is not so great a disproportion between our justice and that of God, as 
between unity and infinity . ... The justice of God must be vast like His 
compassion. III 
It seems reasonable to assume that a just God will act fairly and will keep his 
word,112 even without any external control113 and that having allowed us to 
wager,114 he will honour the promise of eternal bliss. We trust that he will not 
change the terms of the contract, either before or after our death. Graham Oppy 
asks what would happen if there were a committee of deities who decide the 
110 Paul Bartha, "Many Gods, Many Wagers," in Probability in the Philosophy of Religion, ed. Jake 
Chandler and Victoria S. Harrison (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 189. 
m Pascal, Pensees: 121. L418 
112 Ibid., 262. L840 
113 In earthly bargains such as the purchase of a house, there is a third-party, in the form of the state, 
which enforces performance of any such contracts between individuals. Most nations have clearly 
articulated rules about what constitutes a valid contract and what remedies should be applied in the 
event of non-compliance by one or other party. In this case, however, God is both the offeror and 
the guarantor of the bargain. There is no third-party to appeal to if God fails to deliver his part of the 
deal. The human party is therefore entirely dependent upon God to honour the bargain. 
114 Assuming that God does not reject us simply because we wagered. 
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criteria for acceptance on some sort of rota.us In that case, the constantly changing 
requirements might make achieving the goal impossible, but I would like to defer 
discussion of this problem of unknowable or mutable criteria to section 3.4. 
Alfred Benn raises some interesting questions about whether even a single God can 
be trusted. He starts from the observation that a hidden God will have to make any 
prophecies ambiguous and misleading if he is to remain concealed. Benn reminds 
us that Pascal says that the game for our souls is being played out at an infinite 
distance116 and that the evidence for God's existence is set out in the pages of 
scripture. But if the evidence in scripture is necessarily clouded, then how do we 
know that the game is fair? The cards' "colour and value depend entirely upon the 
inscrutable will of the dealer. He can call black red and a king a knave."117 If God is 
good, as understood in the normal human sense, then this concern can be safely 
ignored. However, if we postulate an immoral God, then it becomes a proper 
concern, although not one that we can actually address. 
Pragmatically we have to trust that God will honour the Wager, since there is no 
alternative.us No mitigation is possible in the event that God is unfair, so this is an 
example of a scenario where we must accept the risk and then dismiss the case 
from further consideration. We need to assume that the criteria will remain 
constant and that the reward will not be taken away at some point in the future. 
It is also an important assumption that God will judge according to the observed 
beliefs and behaviour119 of the candidate and that this judgment will be fair, rather 
than on some whimsical scale. There would be no point in wagering if the reward 
were not linked to our actual belief/behaviour. In Victor Vroom's expectancy 
theory120 (developed in the context of management psychology), he holds that 
there must be a clear chain as follows: 
115 Graham Oppy, "On Rescher on Pascal's Wager," International Journal/or Philosophy 0/ Religion 
30(1990): S. 
116 Pascal, Pensees: 122. L418 
117 Alfred W Benn, "Pascal's Wager," International Journal 0/ Ethics 15, no. 3 (1905): 315. 
118 We also have the difficulty of making a judgement about God's fairness. It seems safe to assume 
that no human can observe God's mind, nor inside the minds of individuals, so no-one outside God 
can actually determine whether a given person believed or not (or whether such belief was 
sufficiently salvific). We are required to accept God's sole determination of the outcome, without 
possibility of appeal or review and we must therefore operate on the basis that God is fair. Unless 
there is a conscious afterlife, no-one would know that they had been condemned at all and, in any 
event, would be unable to say whether or not the sentence was just. If 'failure' simply means 
annihilation, they could not ever know that they had been deemed to have failed. 
119 This question of whether it is belief or behaviour that matters is a particularly complex one and I 
do not intend to elaborate upon the faith v works argument here. I shall assume that the deity 
values some combination of both, without trying to tease them apart . 
• 120 See https:l!sites.google.com!site!motivationataglanceischool!vroom-s-expectancv-theory for a 
simple overview, or Victor Vroom, Work and motivation, John Wiley & Sons, (1964) for the original 
theory. The exact details need not concern us here. 
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• Performance must be related to effort. That is, if we apply more effort to a 
task, our performance should improve proportionately. 
• Improved performance will lead to increased rewards121 and these rewards 
must be valued by the person concerned. 
• Assessment of the performance will be fair. 
In companies, employees need to know that if they work harder, the boss will 
increase their rewards in proportion. In the context of the Wager, assessment of 
whether we have met the criteria for betting on God needs to be done fairly. 
While it might seem a truism that God should be good, some critics of the Wager 
(as we shall see in Chapter 3) have described deities who are not good, at least in 
the sense that we might usually understand the term. I hold that there is an 
assumption of goodness in the Wager, and expectancy theory requires that the 
reward itself should be good, which implies that the being delivering the reward 
should also be goOd.122 Pascal suggests that it is an infinitely good reward, so it 
would seem rather odd for a deity to be able to produce a reward that is infinitely 
better than itself; thus God must also be infinitely goOd.123 
Graham Oppy allows more flexibility in this area and makes the point about his 
synthetic deities that 
"while these beings are not wholly good, , do not see that this fact provides any 
more reason to suppose that the existence of these beings is somehow more 
improbable than the existence of the traditional Christian God".124 
I am not using goodness as some sort of guide to probability; rather I am arguing 
that God must be good in order to be able to deliver on the promise of infinite 
121 In the Wager's case, the reward is a step function, rather than a curve. 
122 I accept that there is a possibility that an evil deity could deliver a good reward, although there 
might be moral implications in accepting it. I will return to this on page 169. 
m I would go further and suggest that God must be in fact be perfect, or it would not be safe to 
spend eternity with him. Over infinite time, a being who is not 100% good will Inevitably do bad 
things. This might include terminating our salvation at that point. If there is a non-zero probability 
that this could occur, then it will definitely happen at some point in infinite time. 
It could be argued that we might have a deity who has a 20% probability on any given day of doing 
something bad, but on each of those days decides not to do so. Thus, although there is the 
possibility of something bad occurring, it never actually happens, but upon what basis could we 
assign this probability of 20%? It cannot be from an observed frequency of occurrence, because that 
would yields a 0% probability. If we tossed a coin a thousand times and it came up heads every time, 
would we really be able to tell a third-party that there was a 50% chance of coming up tails? I 
believe that we would rather conclude that the coin was biased, than that we were simply unlucky. 
As I describe in section 3.3 infinity causes particular problems for any estimates of probability. In this 
particular case I am proposing the common-sense understanding that if something bad can happen, 
then over infinite time it will happen. Thus, if there is any chance that God can reject us in eternity, 
then he will. God must therefore be wholly good, if he is to deliver infinite good to us and to 
maintain that good for eternity. 
124 Oppy, "On Rescher on Pascal's Wager," 5. 
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reward. Schlesinger, however, does see a good God as somehow more probable, 
writing that 
"A God of faithfulness [ ... J whose attributes altogether resonate with our nobler 
sentiments, makes a great deal of sense and it is therefore reasonable to ascribe 
a higher probability to his existence than to an unprincipled, arbitrarily acting, 
wanton god. ,,125 
Christians might argue that our idea of what is noble is derived from being made "in 
the image of GOd",126 but that is unlikely to cut any ice with an atheist. Therefore, I 
cannot see that God's goodness does necessarily affect his probability, although we 
should admit that a purely good God is far more attractive as an eternal 
companion.127 
God is able to deliver infinite good 
God may be good and totally trustworthy, but he must actually be able to deliver 
the promised reward if we are to accept the Wager. We might argue that a good, 
trustworthy God would not make a promise that he could not keep, but that implies 
omniscience on the part of the deity.128 However, if heaven is to be infinitely good, 
then God must be able to produce an infinite reward.129 Thus, there has to be the 
assumption that for the purposes of the Wager not only must God be good, but also 
able to deliver an infinitely good reward to those who meet the criteria. l3O 
125 George Schlesinger, "A Central Theistic Argument," in Gambling on God, ed. Jeff Jordan 
(Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 1984),91. 
126 Genesis 1:26 
127 We could imagine an oscillating god who gives us immense bliss one day and tortures us on the 
next. As long as this god is marginally nicer than nasty, the net benefit would still be infinite from the 
Wager's point of view, but it seems far less valuable than that of a purely good God. There is also an 
aberrant heaven to consider, where the offer is an infinite number of days of finite torment, 
followed by an infinite number of days of infinite bliss. Mathematically it may seem that each day of 
infinite bliss should outweigh the corresponding day of finite torment, but of course, we never reach 
the bliss. 
128 We might allow that a non-omniscient deity could intend to do good, but encounter unforeseen 
circumstances that prevent the fulfilment of that promise. 
129 Potentially that could be experience infinite bliss for a finite time, which might be easier to supply 
than finite bliss for infinite time, but as we cannot easily imagine exactly how infinite, eternal bliss 
might be delivered, I do not want to get drawn down into the mechanics too much. 
130 This necessarily assumes that an infinitely good reward is possible and it could be argued that an 
infinitely long life, however delightful on a day-to-day basis, would ultimately become tedious and 
repetitive. There are possible strategies to mitigate this, such as having the person forget sufficient 
previous days such that each new day can be enjoyed in its own right. For example, this topic was 
explored in the 2004 film "50 First Dates", where the character Lucy has short-term memory 1055 
(known medically as anterograde amnesia) and meets her prospective suitor Henry every day as if it 
were their first encounter. The 1993 film "Groundhog Day" takes more dystopian view, where the 
protagonist remembers every day, but the people around him are unaware of the preceding 
identical days. I will assume that God can manage any difficulties associated with the potential ennui 
of infinite life, having (almost by definition) already dealt with them as part of his own eternal 
existence. 
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The hiddenness of God and decisions under uncertainty 
It is an essential precondition for the Wager that God is hidden, at least to some 
significant degree. Pascal believed that God was incompletely hidden, as we have 
seen. 
"If there were only one religion, God would be clearly manifest. [ ... J God being 
thus hidden, every religion that does not say that God is hidden is not true; and 
every religion which does not explain why does not instruct. If there were no 
obscurity, man would not be sensible of his corruption; if there were no light, 
man would not hope for a remedy. Thus, it is not only fair, but advantageous to 
us, that God be partly hidden and partly revealed; since it is equally dangerous 
to man to know God without knowing his own wretchedness, and to know his 
own wretchedness without knowing God. ,,231 
If God were to present some repeatable observable manifestation, then it would 
become possible for humans to find God purely by their own efforts. It would 
become a matter of scientific enquiry, rather than philosophical or theological. This 
would therefore be a process amenable to reason and could be encapsulated in a 
particular praxis and passed down from generation to generation. The existence of 
God in that respect would be no different from any other physical phenomenon. 
While it might be argued that identifying all the attributes of God might be too 
complex for such a project, I would reply that physical laws have proved somewhat 
tricky to pin down too. Newton's laws operate very well for everyday life, but they 
are found wanting when we consider the sub-atomic level. However, having a 
detailed understanding of quantum tunnelling and state superposition is not a 
prerequisite for driving a car to work. We manage perfectly well without that 
knowledge. 
In the same way, we might know enough of God to get ourselves into heaven, such 
that unravelling the minutiae could be left to specialist theologians. If such a thing 
were possible, the Wager would not apply, since its starting point is that "reason 
cannot decide this question".132 We would no longer have a decision under 
uncertainty, merely a methodical enquiry. 
At the same time, if we are to modify our behaviour such that we might be (more) 
acceptable to God, then fairness demands that we must have some means of 
knowing what it is that we must do. There is an essential tension between the 
hiddenness of God that allows free choice and the notion of culpability. Pascal 
writes: 
131 Pascal, Pensees: 74. l242 
132 Ibid., 123. l418 
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"If there is a God, he is in/initely beyond our comprehension, since, being 
indivisible and without limits, he bears no relation to us. We are there/ore 
incapable 0/ knowing either what he is or whether he is.,,133 
It could be that God is partially hidden and partially discoverable, or that he is 
perfectly hidden. If partially discoverable, there is an interesting question of how 
much is visible. This seems to be a fine balancing act. If too much of God's nature is 
exposed, then he becomes accessible to reason, but how little of God's nature can 
it be? Any visibility of a perfect God might be enough to constitute concrete 
evidence and this is something I will deal with on a case-by-case basis in the 
examples to follow. 
If God is perfectly hidden, how can we know what he desires of us? Accepting that 
there is a continuum of options available, I will attempt to simplify it by considering 
it under three headings: 
• God gives revelation to at least some people 
• God built intuitions into us so that we innately know what he wants 
• God is completely hidden 
This examination of the hiddenness of God is not designed to be exhaustive, as it 
requires much longer treatment than I can afford in this essay. I will attempt to 
cover what I see as the salient points, so that they may act as a reference when we 
consider alternative gods and theologies. 
God gives revelation to at least some people 
We start by considering Pascal's Christian model of God, where we can consider 
there to be three levels of revelation: the revelation of Christ in the Incarnation; the 
revelation given directly by the Holy Spirit; and the body of revelation which is 
deposited in the scriptures and in the traditions of the church. 
Christian doctrine generally holds that we cannot find God directly, but rather that 
he first finds us. In the traditional Calvinist approach, God's grace to save us is 
irresistible and we are incapable of any action in God's direction, but we will only 
consider Arminian theology here, as Augustinian predestination makes the Wager 
irrelevant. 
Although Pascal was Augustinian, we find areas of heterodoxy in Pensees, such as 
where he writes: "God's will has been to redeem men and open the way of 
salvation to those who seek it".134 This implies that he thought man could initiate 
133 Ibid., 122. l418 
134 Ibid., so. l149 
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the search and that God would assist the seeker in his quest. He portrays God as 
granting conditional revelation based upon our attitude. 
'7hus wishing to appear openly to those who seek him with all their heart and 
hidden from those who shun him with all their heart, he has qualified our 
knowledge of him by giving signs which can be seen by those who seek him and 
not by those who do not. ,,135 
This view of God is consistent with Pascal's methods in the Wager. Once we are 
convinced by the terms of the Wager, we need to seek for God and he will then 
cooperate with us in order to bring us to salvific faith. The Wager is thus simply a 
push to start us in the right direction and Pascal still expects God to bring it to 
fruition. This stance seems just, as the honest seeker is rewarded and encouraged 
further, but the uninterested or downright lazy are deterred. 
If we now consider any revelation to be given to us in the current age, we could 
subdivide this into immediate revelation, where we believe God has spoken to us 
directly, and mediated revelation where God has revealed himself to a third-party. 
In the case of immediate revelation, this ought to inform our reason. For example, if 
we were to witness Ita booming voice from above followed by, say, a proof of 
Goldbach's Conjecture written in the Sky"136 as Craig Duncan suggests, then we 
might consider ourselves to have at least some evidence of God's existence that 
ought to sway our decision.137 
There is mediated revelation located within religious traditions.138 Jordan sees such 
tradition as "standing on the shoulders of others,,139 so that we should be able to 
see further and make better decisions as a result. He accepts locke's concern that 
"there is much more falsehood and error amongst men, than truth and 
knowledge",140 but feels that the considered reflections of earlier generations 
should carry at least some epistemic weight. If we consider ourselves to be part of 
an ongoing community in which God's revelation has taken place, then we can 
135lbid.l149 
136 Craig Duncan, "Do Vague Probabilities Really Scotch Pascal's Wager?," Philosophical Studies: An 
International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition 112, no. 3 (2003): 281. 
137 I am aware that there is considerable discussion in the literature of whether any level of such 
revelation should be convincing to the individual, but it is not particularly germane to the discussion 
here. 
138 For example, any revelation of Christ in the Incarnation is necessarily mediated through the 
scriptures, since we have no access to it directly, nor to any first-hand observers. If we are to accept 
them as valid testimony then we must therefore believe the scriptures to be true, at least in this 
respect, and that they have been faithfully maintained within the Christian tradition. Whether we 
should believe these scriptures is a decision that is made outside of the Wager, although it could be 
seen as a consequence of deciding to bet on the Christian God. 
139 Jeff Jordan, Pascal's Wager (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006). 81. 
140 John locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1689; repr., 
1975).657 
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accord the accounts some place in our understanding. Tradition provides guidance 
in what others have believed God wanted of them and might steer us in the correct 
direction. It allows a middle way between the certainty of evidence-based faith that 
would arise from direct, personal revelation and the otherwise impenetrable fog of 
infinite possibilities. 
I believe that the Wager implies and depends upon this partial revelation. Pascal 
describes a God who is hidden, but who allows us fleeting glimpses. This will 
become clearer as we look at the cases to come. 
God built intuitions into us 
One way of God's ensuring that we follow the correct path, once we accept the 
Wager, is to build into us an innate sense of what is required. Richard Carrier 
writes: "God could reveal [what he wants from us] through our natural moral 
intuition, or through his secret inspiration ofthe world's cultures".141 
There is some Biblical support for this in Genesis 1:26, but we also have the idea in 
Genesis 2 that the knowledge of good and evil is an acquired characteristic. Either 
way, we might all be born with an inner moral compass that directs us in the way 
that God wants. This need not conflict with our freedom to choose another path, 
although there is a clear tension. If we know of an inner voice that continually 
guides us and tells us that what we are doing is morally wrong, does that not 
impinge on our freedom to believe that our actions are correct? 
Augustinian doctrine holds that we are incapable of doing the right thing on our 
own and Pascal echoes this, saying: "Men without faith can know neither true good, 
nor justice",142 although he also feels that man has the contrary possibility of being 
great. As he writes: "religion must necessarily teach us that there is in man some 
principle of greatness and some great principle of wretchedness.,,143 Yet Pascal 
does believe in some weak vestige of righteousness in man, although it is 
overwhelmed by concupiscence. 
''The senses, independent of reason and often its master, have carried him Off in 
pursuit of pleasure. [ ... ] [Men] retain some feeble instinct from the happiness of 
their first nature, and are plunged into the wretchedness of their blindness and 
concupiscence, which has become their second nature. ,,144 
141 Richard Carrier, "The End of Pascal's Wager?," (2006), 
http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/richard_carrier/pascalreply.html. 
142 Pascal, Pensees: 45. L148 
143 Ibid., 46. l149 
144 Ibid., 48. l149 
52 
If a deity does implant particular values, but still wishes to remain hidden, the 
values need to be disguised or be equivocal, or else their very existence may 
provide evidence for that deity's existence and thus undermine his hiddenness. 
God is completely hidden 
Let us move on to the case which is usually assumed within discussions of the 
Wager - the case where God is completely hidden from us. It is this hiddenness of 
God that allows opponents of the Wager to construct the bizarre and perverse 
deities that we will encounter in Chapter 3. If we had a better grasp of God's 
character, then many of these gross caricatures might be dismissed instantly 
without further ado. Jordan attempts this by using his Jamesian Wager to claim that 
none can be 'live' options for us. I believe that there is a simpler way to deal with 
them, which is to use risk-management techniques so that we can safely dismiss 
most of them from consideration. Although I will elaborate this in more detail in the 
following section, I can summarise it by stating that if God is so completely hidden 
that we cannot know what is required of us, then we cannot mitigate our risk and 
must simply accept it and move on to risks that we might be able to manage. 
Disintermediation 
In this thesis I shall assume that the individual is able to contract directly with God 
and does not require any intermediary to act on their behalf. I do not accept those 
who make claims on behalf of the deity, or who offer to improve one's chances of 
salvation by means of their own influence, or accumulated merit, with God. I would 
therefore exclude practices such as indulgences which have had a sorry history 
within the Christian church.145 I acknowledge that some strands within the church 
have long established practices of appealing to intermediaries, such as the Blessed 
Virgin Mary, or the saints. The underlying belief in this case (in very simple terms) is 
that the saints have some special access to God and who can intercede on our 
behalf. My reply is that the earliest saints themselves had no intermediaries to act 
for them, so it must be possible for people to follow sufficiently worthy lives, such 
that they are acceptable in their own right. If we allow that the saints were granted 
some particular additional grace to be able to do this, then we should reasonably 
expect a similar gift to be offered to us, if it is actually required for salvation. This 
follows naturally on from the principle of fairness that I articulated earlier. If we are 
to assume that God distributes the potential of being saved in a fair manner, then it 
should be possible for any given individual to meet the criteria without additional 
aids. 
145 To be fair to the Roman Catholic Church, indulgences are not claimed to grant salvation, merely 
to reduce the temporal punishment that would otherwise be due for a sin which has already been 
forgiven. 
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We might suggest that the route to salvation lies through the intermediation of the 
saint and that this actually is the path set out and provided by God, such that to not 
follow it would constitute disobedience and failure. I suggest that if this were to be 
the case, then we would have to have some revelation of this fact, or some innate 
sense that this is the valid path. Otherwise it would be unfair to expect us to know 
that we should use such an intermediary. There are such a wide range of potential 
intermediaries, that I fear that we might encounter a "many-saints" problem in 
addition to the "many-gods" one. I will therefore appeal to Occam's Razor, such 
that we should not unnecessarily multiply the entities required for salvation. If a 
single fair deity would be able to grant salvation, then there is no necessary reason 
to believe that we would do better with an intermediary.146 
I hold that no intermediary can demonstrate their ability to deliver an improved 
chance of obtaining the eternal reward and we would therefore view any such 
claims with suspicion. Under strict Pascalian logic, it could be argued that even a 
slight improvement in one's chances would lead to gaining an infinite reward and 
thus it would be rational to expend all one's resources in order to achieve this. 
However, there no reason to suppose that any given deity might not be offended by 
such an attempt and this might actually diminish (or even obviate) one's chances. 
We will cover this in more detail when we discuss Tabbarok's Wager on p173. For 
the purposes of this thesis, I will assume that no intermediary is required. 
2.7 The nature of God in the Wager 
Together, these attributes of being fair, good and able give us a picture of God 
which is largely consistent with an orthodox Christian view, although we have to 
take an Arminian perspective towards salvation itself, as we shall see later. In 
critiques of Pascal's Wager, however, many other potential deities are implied 
whose characteristics do not meet these basic criteria and Schlesinger argues that a 
God who does not meet Anselmian criteria is "not a fit deity to worship".147 It is not 
clear why an atheist should care about this particular topic, since they were not 
looking for a suitable target for their adoration, and would argue that the Wager is 
ultimately about personal rewards, not whether a given deity is worthy. I will take a 
slightly different approach and suggest that such deities are inferior and that even if 
they might possibly exist, they will lose out in any head-to-head comparisons with 
more attractive options. That is, if we include any properly Anselmian deities in our 
deliberations, they will always be preferred over lesser options. 
146 The intermediary need not be an individual, but a church, for example, and it could be argued 
that a faithful church might have greater influence with the deity than a single individual. However, 
space does not allow a fuller discussion and this is left as an area for further research. 
147 Schlesinger, "A Central Theistic Argument," 96. 
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I hold that if we are faced by equiprobable and equally valuable alternatives in 
terms of Expected Value, that it is logically acceptable to use other criteria as tie-
breakers when we can only select one of the available options, but we are obliged 
to take one. Risk management demands that we mitigate risk as far as we 
reasonably can. If we were faced by two equiprobable, but mutually exclusive 
choices, then it would not be sensible to act like Buridan's Ass and refuse to choose 
either. Thus, it is entirely reasonable to try and find the better choice (if we can) by 
using other criteria. In the case where an Anselmian deity competes against a non-
Anselmian one, ceteris paribus we will always choose the Anselmian deity.148 
In the following section, I very briefly discuss the current state of discussion around 
the philosophical formulation of what constitutes an Anselmian conception of God 
for the purposes of the Wager. I shall make a small contribution of my own to this 
understanding, but this is merely an adjunct to my main thesis and I am not 
intending that this should be a comprehensive account of what is now a vast and 
sprawling subject. 
Nothing greater 
In his Pros/ogion, St Anselm sets out an argument based upon his premise that "God 
is that, than which nothing greater can be conceived". In modern discussions about 
God, this often leads to use of words like omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent 
and so on. These words are philosophically charged and lead to a number of well-
known internal paradoxes. As many philosophers have found, we can continually 
develop thought experiments which break the working definition of omnipotence 
and require further qualifying sub-clauses to the extent that it becomes hard to 
visualise exactly what is being described. Once we try and add other divine 
characteristics, the picture becomes even more muddled.149 Merely redefining 
omnipotence to avoid the difficult cases makes it so bound up with qualifications as 
to be useless as a signifier of excellence. We can come up with thought experiments 
to defeat all of the omni- words, which make their use rather suspect, yet if we wish 
to remain true to St Anselm's definition, we require a being who is greater than 
anything else that can be conceived. An omnipotent being would seem to trump 
one who is merely very powerful, but if omnipotence is not actually conceivable, 
then we are free to allow something less. 
148 Note that if there really were no difference at all, then it would still be better to adopt a mixed 
strategy and toss a coin, than to choose neither. 
149 For example, the discussion as to whether God is necessarily morally perfect (or Impeccable) and 
is thus incapable of sin. If he cannot sin, it is argued, then he is clearly not omnipotent, as there is 
something that he cannot do, which is to sin. If he can sin, then he is not essentially morally perfect. 
This conflict can be found at least as far back as Aquinas, so we might assume than an early 
resolution to the problem seems unlikely. 
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The perfect God 
George Schlesinger tackles this problem by focusing on perfection instead. He 
argues that St Anselm's God is essentially perfect and that any of the divine 
attributes we see are merely aspects of that perfection. One way of looking at 
characteristics like omnipotence, omniscience and omnibenevolence is to treat 
them as independent unique properties exemplified by God. The other is to think of 
them as tightly interconnected and that each one is merely a different aspect of the 
same attribute, namely perfection. An important part of this argument is that God 
displays these properties to a degree no more, but no less than required by 
absolute perfection.150 
I suggest that we might consider the analogy of colour. A perfect light would be 
perfectly red, perfectly blue and perfectly green, all at once. However this means 
that it actually appears as none of those colours, rather it is the synthesis of them, 
being perfectly white. 
Schlesinger's treatment allows us a far more fluid and descriptive way of tackling 
the problems of the omni- words. Rather than needing God to be omnipotent as 
such, he merely has to be powerful to the degree required by perfection. If God 
were more powerful than necessary, then this would actually diminish his 
perfection, rather than increasing it. It is thus the combination of attributes in 
perfect proportion that gives rise to perfection, rather than anyone attribute on its 
own. Returning to our colour example, increasing the intensity of red in a perfectly 
balanced white light makes it less white, not more so. 
The Maximal God 
Yujin Nagasawa argues that is it perfectly consistent with the Anselmian view that 
God need not be an "OmniGod" as he calls him, but that a "MaximaIGod" would 
suffice. His definition of the MaximalGod is lithe being that has the maximal 
consistent set of knowledge, power and benevolence".151 This God is very 
knowledgeable, very powerful and very benevolent, but need not be omniperfect. 
Nagasawa suggests that considering each attribute independently on a case-by-case 
basis is often unhelpful and that we need to consider them all at once, if we want to 
avoid the problems that we have seen. He argues that this definition is consistent 
with Biblical revelation because it talks about the significant extent of God's 
knowledge, power and benevolence, but it says nowhere that God is 
omniperfect.152 The MaximalGod thesis is consistent with the OmniGod, because no 
upper limit is placed on the individual attributes and if the maximal consistent set is 
150 George Schlesinger, New Perspectives on Old Time Religion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1988; repr., reprinted 2001). 5. 
151 Y. Nagasawa, "A New Defence of Anselmian Theism," Philosophical Quarterly 58, no. 233 (2008): 
583. 
152 Ibid. 
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actually omniperfection, no conflict arises. However, this model does not demand 
that any of the divine characteristics are individually maximal. 
Nagasawa illustrates his case with a number of possible deities. Suppose we have a 
God who has maximal power and benevolence, but slightly less than maximal 
knowledge. This could be achieved if there were a single proposition which the God 
did not know. This God will satisfy the MaximalGod thesis in a particular scenario as 
long as there is no candidate deity available who has greater knowledge, even if it 
has equal power and benevolence. This succeeds with the Anselmian test, since 
there is no conceivable being in those given circumstances who is greater, even if 
we could imagine a greater single attribute.153 154 1 will assume for the purposes of 
this essay that only one MaximalGod can exist at a time.155Summary 
In Schlesinger's and Nagasawa's MaximalGod, I believe that we have an neo-
Anselmian model which is relatively immune to the problems of internal coherence 
that plague the OmniGod. The inherent paradoxes of the omni- words find suitable 
resolution, at least to a degree that will allow us to use the Anselmian model as a 
measuring stick when comparing candidate deities. I will rely upon this in the 
following sections as one means of deciding whether we should take a particular 
model of godhood seriously. Obviously, if a sub-optimal deity were the only one on 
offer, then sound risk management would indicate that we should take whatever 
we can get, but where we have competing options and a candidate deity would fall 
short of the MaximalGod thesis, then we can reasonably decide to eliminate that 
option from further consideration. I will search therefore, for a God who would 
satisfy both Pascal and St Anselm. 
153 Nagasawa considers Robert Merrihew Adams' connection between the omniperfection of God 
and his worthiness to be worshipped. For Adams, only the omniperfect God should be worshipped, 
because our worship depends on our acknowledgement of God's supreme degree of intrinsic 
excellence. Yet if God's excellence is the maximum possible and there is no greater, on what grounds 
would we withhold our worship? Surely it cannot be because we can conceive of a theoretical 
possibility that one or more aspects could be better. I contend that part of worship ought to be 
driven by love and it is entirely possible to love someone who is far from perfect. I am not convinced 
that we worship God because he matches our theoretical best; rather we worship because it is a 
right response to our creator and redeemer. That aside, it seems reasonable that we should worship 
the one who embodies the highest possible virtues and who holds them in perfect balance together. 
There can be no better candidates for worship, since any deity which excelled in one area, would be 
deficient to a greater extent In another. 
154 Robert Merrihew Adams, Finite and Infinite Goods: A Framework for Ethics (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2002).14. 
155 It could be argued that two or more MaximalGods might potentially exist with non-overlapping 
magisteria (to borrow a phrase from Stephen Jay Gould), such that each would be maximal in their 
mutually agreed areas of responsibility. However, space does not permit further exploration of this 
topic. 
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2.8 Summary of critical principles 
I have described some principles that we can employ in evaluating challenges to 
Pascal's Wager and I have set out what I believe to be the key ones below. 
I. Principle of Accepted Immitigable Risk 
If a scenario offers no mitigation, then its risks will be deemed to be 
accepted and the scenario dismissed from further consideration. 
II. Principle of Maximality 
Any deity to be considered must at least meet the criteria prescribed for a 
MaximalGod. 
III. Tie-break Principle 
If two options tie in terms of their expected utility, then other secondary 
factors may be used to decide between them. This includes a subjective 
assessment of the most likely to occur, even though this probability may 
already have been incorporated in the EV calculation. 
IV. Principle of Disintermediation 
We will only consider cases that deal with the deity directly and not via any 
intermediaries. 
These principles are intended to act as axioms within the set of problems that we 
are considering and they provide benchmarks for examination of the Wager. I will 
use them particularly in Chapter 3, where I will aim to narrow the possibilities 
sufficiently for us to make a rational decision. In general, evaluation will take place 
within a utilitarian framework of reference and a decision will be considered the 
best option, if it out-performs its competitors in terms of the net utility it delivers to 
the individual. 
I am not suggesting that these are the only possible criteria, but that as a set they 
make a contribution by providing a coherent framework in which we can consider 
options fairly and on an equal footing. They are intended to set out a methodology 
for evaluation, but are not framed to be water-tight, nor are they articulated in 
formal logic, because I believe that this would merely obfuscate the decision-
making, without providing any additional rigour in real terms. Developing them 
more fully would be a task for further work in this area. 
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2.9 Role ofCBT 
Before moving on to the objections raised against the Wager in greater detail, we 
need to briefly discuss Pascal's remedy for those who are convinced by the logie, 
but find themselves temperamentally unable to achieve the required level of belief. 
Christopher Hitchens holds that he is that sort of person whom Pascal described as 
being made so as to be unable to believe.156 Pascal suggests that such people 
should 
at least learn your inability to believe, since reason brings you to this, and yet 
you cannot believe. Endeavour then to convince yourseJt not by increase of 
proofs of God, but by the abatement of your passions. You would like to attain 
faith, and do not know the way; you would like to cure yourself of unbelief, and 
ask the remedy for it. 
Pascal is proposing that the genuine unbeliever should undertake a course of 
therapy to cure their unbelief. He approaches unbelief as if it were an illness that 
needs to be cured. Modern readers might find this assumption of the normality of 
faith as a rather disturbing concept. Indeed, religious faith is sometimes portrayed 
as a sort of mental illness, or intellectual deficit,lS7 as can be seen in some New 
Atheist writers, like Richard Dawkins, who compares it to a virus. iSS Pascal, by 
contrast, holds that unbelief is the malady and that a restoration of mental health 
will lead to natural, salvific belief in God. He therefore proposes that the unbeliever 
should study those who have taken the same path. 
Learn of those who have been bound like you, and who now stake all their 
possessions. These are people who know the way which you would follow, and 
who are cured of an ill of which you would be cured. 
One way of understanding the route that Pascal is offering is to regard it as a course 
of Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (or CBT), albeit a few hundred years ahead of the 
current practice. I will briefly summarise the main ideas within CBT and examine 
how Pascal grasps their essential benefits and how they might be applied in this 
case. 
CBT has its roots in the Behavioural Therapy of Wolpe and others in the 1950s and 
60s, together with the Cognitive Therapy of A.T. Beck, which arose in the 60s but 
156 Christopher Hitchens, God is Not Great: How Religion Poisons Everything (London: Atlantic 
Books, 2007). 6. 
157 Dawkins, The God Delusion: 16. This is accompanied by his suggestion that atheists should dub 
themselves "brights", which fellow atheist Hitchens described as "cringe-making" in Hitchens, God is 
Not Great: 5. 
158 Dawkins, The God Delusion: 191. 
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became more influential in the 70S. 159 CBT considers behaviour (Le. what we do) as 
crucial in maintaining and (more importantly for its use in Pascal's Wager) changing 
psychological states.160 It suggests that there are four main 'systems' with in the 
person that interact with each other and also with the external environment. These 
are : 
• Cognition 
• Affect (or emotion) 
• Behaviour 
• Physiology 
The cognitive principle of CBT is that it is the interpretation of events, not the 
events themselves which are crucial and its behavioural principle is that what we do 
has a powerful influence on our thoughts and emotions. It also holds that it is more 
important to focus on the here-and-now, rather than on the past.161 Thus it 
distances itself from event-based, backward looking therapies, such as 
psychoanalysis. 
Within the general idea of cognition, CBT suggests that there are distinct levels of 
cognition, which can roughly be grouped into three categories in a therapeutic 
context: Negative Automatic Thoughts (NATs), Core Beliefs and Dysfunctional 
Assumptions (DAs). In order to show how these apply within Pascal ' s model, I will 
briefly describe each. 
159 David Westbrook, Helen Kennerley, and Joan Kirk, An Introduction to Cognitive Behaviour 
Therapy: Skills and Applications (London : Sage Publications Ltd, 2011). 2. 
160 Ibid ., 5. 
161 Ibid., 8. 
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Negative Automatic Thoughts 
This term is used to describe the stream of thoughts that most of us can recognise if 
we pay attention to them. They are negatively tinged appraisals or interpretations 
that we take from what happens around us and they exert a direct influence over 
mood from moment to moment. They are usually specific, although they can 
become stereotyped in some chronic problems. 
Core Beliefs 
At the other end of the scale, a person's core beliefs are what they believe about 
themselves or the world in general. They are not usually accessible to conscious 
examination, even by the person concerned, and usually have to be inferred from 
that person's thoughts and behaviours. They are fundamental and absolute views 
about the world and are assumed to apply in all situations. CBT holds that these 
core beliefs (also known as 'schemas') are usually learned early on in life, but may 
sometimes develop or change later as a result of severe trauma, e.g. a previously 
well-adjusted girl may develop self-loathing after being raped. Christine Padesky 
offers the metaphor of prejudice as one way of understanding how core beliefs 
operate.162 
Belief in the existence of God could be considered to be a core belief, although it 
has traditionally received little attention from CBT practitioners according to Kirk 
Bingerman.163 This belief in God's existence may interact with core beliefs derived 
from other sources, such as the person's fundamental belief about the world, or of 
their own self-worth, to yield composite schemas; for example, the nature of God 
and whether God can be trusted.164 
Dysfunctional Assumptions 
Dysfunctional Assumptions bridge the gap between the core beliefs and NATs and 
usually take the form of condition if...then ... propositions, or are framed as 
should ... must ... statements. They may represent attempts to live with negative core 
beliefs. For example, someone who feels unlovable I may develop the DA that "If I 
always try to please other people, then they may put up with me, but if I assert 
myself, they will reject me". 
In diagrammatic form: 165 
162 Christine A. Padesky, "Schema as self-prejudice," International Cognitive Therapy Newsletter 
6(1990): 6. 
163 Kirk. A Bingerman, Treating the New Anxiety: A Cognitive-Theological Approach (Lanham, 
Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007). 65. 
164 Ibid., 68. 
165 Westbrook, Kennerley, and Kirk, Cognitive Behaviour Therapy: 9-11. 
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Negative Automatic Thoughts More specific More Accessible Easier to change 
"I'm being boring; I don't know what 
to say; They think I am stupid" 
t 
Dysfunctional Assumptions 
"If people get to know me, they will 
think I am useless" 
i 
Core Beliefs 
"I am unlovable" 
Less specific Less Accessible Harder to change 
Pascal understood this relationship between our core beliefs and their outward 
manifestation and wrote about it often in his Pensees. His whole discourse on 
diversion hinges on the way in which we engage in fruitless activity in order to 
prevent ourselves from examining our own core belief that we are wretched. 166 
167He also strongly believes that our behaviour conditions our attitudes: 
What are our natural principles, apart from our accustomed principles? ... A 
different custom will produce different natural principles. 16B 
He therefore suggests to the unbeliever that they should perform what in CBT is 
called a Behavioural Experiment (or 'BE') in which a client explores a situation in 
order to challenge their own dysfunctional assumptions. In a BE, the client is trying 
to obtain new information about a stressful situation that will allow them to test 
their beliefs about themselves, others and the world. The word "experiment" is 
chosen deliberately, because it is an attempt to gather information to confirm or 
refute the current working hypothesis.169 This is different from Behavioural Therapy 
(BT), in which clients may enter a situation in a controlled manner, so that they 
learn to decrease their stress by becoming habituated to it. 
The idea of a BE is that it is not simply to habituate the client to the stressful 
situation, but to incorporate a cognitive element. For example, in both BT and CBT, 
a client with agoraphobia might be encouraged to visit a supermarket. In BT, the 
aim would be to stay in the situation long enough (and repeated often enough) for 
the anxiety response to die away. The environment thus becomes less scary, 
166 Pascal, Pensees (tr. Ariew): 6. 533/L414 
167 Diversion actually forms part of the behavioural strategies of CBT and is used to direct a patient's 
thoughts away from NATs. 
168Pascal, Pensees (tf. Ariew) : 33. 5158/L125 
169 Westbrook, Kennerley, and Kirk, Cognitive Behaviour Therapy: 196. 
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because it is common-place. In CBT, the client is there to discover whether their 
negative thoughts are actually justified. Thus if the client believes that "If I become 
anxious then I will pass out, or go mad", the intent of the BE would be to explore 
whether this is actually true. Thus, when they discover that they do not pass out, 
they can challenge that belief with hard evidence. The intent of CBT is to alter 
beliefs, not to simply extinguish them and a BE is an attempt to gather empirical 
evidence about the problem and thus to be able to re-evaluate the client's 
assumptions and thus (indirectly) to alter their core beliefs.170 
It is fair to say that Pascal talks mainly about the behavioural aspects of the therapy 
in the Wager itself, since he suggests that doing as Christians do will make you 
believe "naturally and mechanically"l71 (as Roger Ariew translates the word 
s'abetira). However, he does not expect blind unthinking obedience, but rather that 
his patient should observe their own progress, for he is confident that they will see 
"such a great certainty of gain and so much nothingness in what they risked".l72 He 
is asking them to conduct an experiment to see whether they can believe and to 
challenge what he sees as their dysfunctional assumption that they cannot. 
Pascal recognises two sorts of people whom he respects: "those who serve God 
with all their heart because they know him and those who seek him with all their 
heart because they do not know him".173 For someone to be ignoring God entirely, 
he sees as a "monstrous thing" .174 Thus, he sees no recourse but to therapy in order 
to repair such defective thinking. 
Pascal knows that it is the core beliefs that need to change, but recognises that 
these are not amenable to reason alone. Although he has set out a cognitive 
element in his rationale by describing the utility of belief, he recognises that if he is 
to alter the core beliefs materially, then the treatment must incorporate a strong 
behavioural element. At no point is he suggesting that doxastic voluntarism is an 
option (contra Dawkins), but rather that therapy is required. Pascal's suggested 
behavioural experiment is not an attempt in self-deception, any more than it is an 
attempt to fool God and thus it cannot be immoral to pursue such a course, 
providing always that it is attempted within the agreed therapeutic context. He is 
not suggesting blind faith, nor unwitting obedience, but rather a conscious 
experiment. Pascal is ever the scientist. 
170 Ibid., 196-7. 
171 Pascal, Pensees (tr. Ariew): 214. S680/L418 
172 Ibid. S680/L418 
173 Ibid., 220. S681/L427 
174 Ibid., 222. S628/L428 
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Having discussed the four basic principles and the therapeutic nature of Pascal's 
solution, I will now examine some objections more systematically, using the 
framework which I have outlined. 
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Chapter 3 Arguments and Objections 
The bulk of this chapter examines some of the major classes of objection that have 
been made and selects the relevant principles that we should apply in each case. 
The wide range of attacks upon the Wager mean that I would necessarily need to 
cover a lot of ground if I were to treat each one comprehensively and while there 
are many similarities between them, each has nuances which would make for a 
rather fragmentary and repetitive account. I will therefore treat some of the 
objections in much greater depth, particularly those where attention has been 
focused in the literature, but with others I will merely indicate the principles that 
should apply in handling them. 
I focus particularly on the problems with the use of infinity, as this is a topic where 
there has been much recent interest. As part of this section I outline some attempts 
to resolve the problems and I make a contribution in this area by suggesting a 
solution of my own which is both intuitively attractive and mathematically robust. 
I tackle the many-gods problem in section 3.4, by sketching out how my risk-
management principles might be used to defeat the major classes of each 
objection. This cannot be a fully systematic account, because there are many 
variants of each argument, each with its own subtleties, but I show that the 
principles are sufficiently robust to be applied more widely against other exemplars. 
In section 3.5, I discuss difficulties that have been raised with probability 
assignments in the Wager, looking particularly at infinitesimal probabilities and 
whether one might rationally apply a zero probability, either explicitly or via Hajek's 
'vague' probabilities. I suggest that there is a lower bound on probability that a 
rational agent can apply and give an outline of a rationale behind such a bound. 
Various authors have suggested that God might be irrational or immoral and I 
investigate their claims critically in section 3.6, focusing specifically on Greg 
Janzen's and Terence Penelhum's objections in this regard. 
Section 3.7 examines some of the moral difficulties which have been raised, both in 
the act of wagering and in the Clifford ian suspicion that it may be morally wrong to 
make judgements in this fashion. Then in the final section I look at abuses of 
Pascalian logic, including Pascal's Mugger and the Persecutor's Wager. 
let us start by setting out the main arguments that have been identified within the 
Wager and the way in which von Neumann-Morgenstern decision theory applies to 
them. 
3.1 Decision Theory and Pascal's Wager 
In its popular formulation, Pascal's Wager appears to offer two choices: to believe 
or not to believe. If you believe and God exists, then you win an infinite amount; if 
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you believe and God does not exist then you lose nothing. In Pascal's words : 'si 
. d d ., 175 D' I d vous gag nel, vous gagnez tout; Sl VOUS per el, VOUS ne per ez nen . ISP aye as 
a matrix, the options would look as follows: 
Beton God 
Do not bet on God 
God exists 
Infinite gain 
No gain 
God does not exist 
Lose nothing 
No gain 
Or, if we convert to numbers, using 00 as our symbol for infinity, we get: 
God exists God does not exist 
Beton God 
Do not bet on God 
00 
o 
o 
o 
If we take the probability of God's existence to be P, then the probability of God's 
non-existence176 will be 1- p and the Expected Value (EV) is thus: 
EV(bet on God) = (p x 00) + ((l-p) x 0) 
= (p x 00 ) + 0 
= 00 
EV(bet against God) = (p x 0) + ((1- p) x 0) 
=0 
In decision theory terms, the row 'Bet on God' row dominates the other row since it 
never does worse and sometimes does better. It is thus the strategy that the 
rational person should pursue.l77 
Various authors, including Alan Hajek, have argued that there are costs associated 
with the bet, although these are agreed to be finite. So we might reformulate the 
matrix with three additional finite costs h hand 13: 
175 Pensees : 122-23. L418 
176 Probabilities are always a value between 0 and 1 inclusive. The total of all probabilities for a given 
situation must be 1. So, if we have just two possibilities and one has probability p, then the other 
must have probability 1-p 
177 Alan Hajek suggests that the argument from dominance may be flawed, but I am not entirely 
persuaded by his arguments and space does not allow for a fuller rebuttal. I will therefore follow the 
general acceptance of the argument from dominance by other writers. For further exploration see : 
Alan Hajek, "Blaise and Bayes," in Probability in the Philosophy of Religion, ed. Jake Chandler and 
Victoria S. Harrison (Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2012) . 
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God exists God does not exist 
Bet on God 
Do not bet on God 
EV(bet on God) = (p x (0) + ((1 -p) x fl) 
= 00 
EV(bet against God) = (p x f2) + ((1- p) x f3) 
For any value of p which is not zero or infinitesimal we will have an infinite payoff, 
which still dominates the finite reward for the bet against God. Ian Hacking 
summarises the position : 
... although we have no idea of the chance that God exists, it is not zero. 
Otherwise there would be no problem. There is a finite, positive chance that 
God exists. No matter what this finite chance is - no matter how small- the 
expectation of the pious strategy with infinite reward exceeds that of the 
worldly one. Hence, the pious strategy must be followed.178 
Hacking179 identified three arguments in the wager, which have been later slightly 
modified by Alan Hajek.l80 In this section, I describe each of the three arguments 
and their location in the text. The objections that naturally arise out of these three 
strands are manifold and varied, so I will deal with each of those separately. 
The Argument from Superdominance1 0 1 
We have already seen this argument in part, when we discussed decision theory. 
Here is the key text from Pascal: 
Let us weigh up the gain and the loss involved in calling heads that God exists. 
Let us assess the two cases: if you win, you win everything, if you lose you lose 
nothing. Do not hesitate then; wager that he does eXist.182 
Edward McCIennen183 summarises this argument in decision theory form as: 
178 Hacking, "The Logic of Pascal 's Wager," 27. 
179 Ibid . 
180 Alan Hajek, "Pascal 's Wager," ed . N. Zalta Edward, The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Phifosophy(2004), http://plato.stanford .ed u/ arch ives/spr2004/ entries/pascal-wager /. 
181 The term superdominance has been put forward to describe the situation where an alternative's 
worst outcome is as good as, or better than, the best return from the other option. 
182 Pascal, Pensees: 122-23. L418 
183 McClennen, "Finite Decision Theory," 117. 
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, 
I 
Bet on God 
Bet against God 
H 
God exists 
[Truth] 
'You win everything' 
(heavenly happiness) 
[Error] 
Wretchedness 
Or simplified further as: 
God exists 
Bet on God You win eve 
Bet against God Wretchedness 
T 
God does not exist 
[Error] 
'You lose nothing' 
(hence, status quo) 
[Truth] 
Status quo 
God does not exist 
The bet on God not only dominates the alternative, being better in its best case and 
never worse, but it superdominates, because its worst case is no worse than the 
best available for the alternative (status quo) and its best case is far better (you win 
everything). 
McClennen analyses these cases in detail and shows that, as long as we assign a 
probability greater than zero to God's existence, then betting on God always 
superdominates the bet against God. Hajek argues that assigning a zero probability 
to God's existence defeats this superdominance, saying "Rationality does not 
require you to wager for God if you assign probability 0 to God existing. And Pascal 
does not explicitly rule this possibility out until a later passage". 184 
It seems a weak argument to suggest that because Pascal had not already excluded 
a zero probability, that we can allow it in this passage. It is obvious that Pascal 
wrote the infini-rien in a hurry and it is full of amendments and additions. It is 
certain that Pascal would have set everything out clearly and with mathematical 
rigour in his final publication. In any case, Hajek is missing the point: even if we did 
assign a probability of zero, it does not yield a better outcome and it seems to be 
pre-judging the outcome. As I discuss on page 140, assigning a zero probability to 
God's existence would be a significant leap of faith and would surely be a dogmatic 
C . D 185 stance, as ralg uncan suggests. 
The second argument appears as Pascal addresses his imaginary opponent and 
deals with the issue that one might be staking something by believing in God. This 
could be self-respect, the feeling of complete personal freedom or even the chance 
to pursue worldly indulgence. Thus he imagines his adversary saying: 'That is 
184 Hajek, "Pascal's Wager" . 
185 Duncan, "Do Vague Probabilities Really Scotch Pascal's Wager?," 281. 
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wonderful. Yes, I must wager, but perhaps I am wagering too much.'186 Pascal then 
moves on to his next line of argument: the argument from expectation. 
The Argument from Expectation 
Pascal talks about the potential payoff for the Wager in terms of extra lives. This 
seems on the surface to be a rather odd concept, but he is talking about the typical 
model of wagers, where the gambler is paid as a multiple of the original stake. 
Since we have only our lives to offer as a stake, it seems reasonable to define a 
payoff in terms of extra lives, although Pascal is vague about how that might 
operate. 
Let us see: since there is an equal chance of gain and loss, if you stood to win 
only two lives for one you could still wager, but supposing you stood to win 
three? 
You would have to play (since you must necessarily play) and it would be unwise 
of you, once you are obliged to play, not to risk your life in order to win three 
lives at a game in which there is an equal chance of losing and winning.1.87 
Pascal is saying that, given there are only two possibilities and you cannot tell which 
to choose, the probability of either's being correct is Yz. This would seem to be an 
appeal to the Principle of Indifference which I discussed in the previous chapter and 
many critics baulk at its use in this context; Hacking calling it a "monstrous premiss" 
and claims that the argument "can work only for people who are, in the strongest 
sense, exactly as unsure whether God exists, as they are unsure whether he does 
not exist" .188 Certainly from probability theory, it is nonsense. The odds of winning 
the UK Lottery are around 14 million to 1.189 If I buy a ticket, then on the day after 
the draw I will either have won the lottery, or I will not. Given there are only two 
possible states, does that mean that they are equally probable? Certainly notl 
I believe, however that Pascal's point is more subtle. Let us look at how he 
continues ... 
[E]ven though there were an infinite number of chances, of which only one were 
in your favour, you would still be right to wager one in order to win two; and 
you would still be acting wrongly, being obliged to play, in refusing to stake one 
life against three in a game, where out of an infinite number of chances, there is 
one in your favour 
186 Pascal, Pensees: 123. l418 
187 Ibid. 1148 
188 Hacking, "The logic of Pascal's Wager," 189. 
189 More precisely: 13,983,816 to 1 for the UK lotto, in which players pick 6 numbers that range from 
1 to 49. 
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If we return to the lottery ticket analogy, it is like saying that you have paid a pound 
and you can either have a lottery ticket for your pound, or nothing. Although you 
are only slightly better off with the lottery ticket, with a 1 in 14 million chance of 
winning, it still dominates the alternative where you have no chance of winning at 
all. In this approach, Pascal is assuming that the cost in the wager is what 
economists call 'sunk cost' - it is already invested, since you cannot have your life 
back, nor use it anywhere else. Neither Hajek nor Hacking pick up on this and focus 
instead on the apparent statistical flaw of assuming equal probabilities, although 
Hajek is more suspicious in his 2004 summary and observes: 'Pascal realises that 
the value ofYz plays no real role in the argument,.190 McClennen admits:'1 can 
make little sense of the remarks [about an infinite number of chancesl'.191 Perhaps 
he had forgotten just how clever a mathematician Pascal was. 
It is certainly a novel idea that if there were 'an infinite number of chances, of 
which only one were in your favour, you would still be right to wager one in order 
to win two'. After all, it seems wrong to enter a lottery with an infinite number of 
tickets, but where the payoff is only twice your stake. We therefore need to 
unravel the mathematics a little. If p is the probability of winning and you risk one 
life to gain two then: 
EV(bet for God) = (p x 2 lives) + ((1- p) x 0) -1 life 
If we say that there are an infinite number of tickets, but only one winner, then we 
can calculate that p is.!. , so if we consider the equation in units of lives we have: 
00 
EV = (: x 2) + 0 - 1 
=':'-1 
00 
Thus the net outcome would be to lose one's life, albeit with what seems like an 
infinitesimal upside. If we compare this negative outcome with the payoff obtained 
by not playing (which is zero) then it would seem more attractive not to play at all. 
Pascal's point though, is that we do not have a choice about whether to play - we 
must gamble. 
Since we are embarked upon the game and the payoff if God does not exist is zero, 
then the EV for betting against God is to lose one's life with no chance of 
compensation at all. 
EV(bet against) = (p x 0) + ((1- p) x 0) -1 
190 Hajek, "Pascal's Wager". 
191 McClennen, "Finite Decision Theory," 120. 
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= -1 
So we can summarise the alternatives as: 
2 EV (bet on God) = -1 + -
00 
EV (bet against) = -1 
Even though the EV is only infinitesimally greater when betting on God, it is still 
greater and thus should be the rational choice. This becomes particularly pertinent 
if we consider the heavenly life received as being in any way superior to the earthly 
life staked. 192 
Ultimately though, this discussion of equal probabilities and limited payoffs is just a 
precursor to Pascal's main argument - he is simply setting the stage by arguing that 
if you could get two or three times your stake then you would be compelled to take 
it. He now introduces the infinite payoff. 
The Argument from Generalised Expectations 
This is Pascal's major argument and it is the strand which has provoked the most 
debate, as Pascal introduces the concept of infinity. As a brilliant mathematician he 
was well aware of the somewhat counter-intuitive properties of infinity and he uses 
these to support his argument by pointing out that the life offered is eternal life, 
which he calls an 'infinity of infinitely happy life'. 
[Tjhere is an eternity of life and happiness. That being so, even though there 
were an infinite number of chances, of which only one were in your favour, you 
would still be right to wager one in order to win two; and you would still be 
acting wrongly, being obliged to play, in refusing to stake one life against three 
in a game, where out of an infinite number of chances, there is one in your 
favour, if there were an infinity of infinitely happy life to be won. But here there 
is an infinity of infinitely happy life to be won, one chance of winning against a 
finite number 0/ chances of losing, and what you are staking is finite. That 
leaves no choice; wherever there is infinity, and where there are not infinite 
chances of losing against that of winning, there is no room for hesitation, you 
must give everything. 193 
Detailed exegesis of this passage can be difficult, as Pascal seems to be falling over 
himself in his excitement to reveal his great idea - that of infinite gain. Thus, we 
find references to two and three lives in ways that seem to go against the sense of 
192 Hajek had noted this point in his earlier 2003 paper that 'any infinitesimal probability for God's 
existence still dictates wagering for God, for even an infinitesimal amount of heavenly value trumps 
any amount of earthly value'. 
193 Pascal, Pensees: 123. L418 
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the passage (which we covered in the previous section). I shall concentrate here on 
its major idea - that there is infinite gain to be obtained from a finite number of 
chances. 
As we saw before, for any finite (non-zero and non-infinitesimal) probability p, we 
get: 
EV(bet on God) = (p x (0) + ((1- p) x 0) 
=(p x (0) 
=00 
There seem to be three major assumptions in this formulation : 
a) the stake is finite (one's life) 
b) the number of possibilities is finite 
c) the potential gain is infinite 
Nicholas Rescher194 draws these together into a decision table, by saying that if 
there are n losing tickets (or possibilities) in the lottery then we have a probability 
_ 1_ of getting the winning ticket and a probability...2:.... of getting a losing ticket . The 
n+1 n+l 
return is calculated in terms of 'life units' - that is in terms of your stake. If we bet 
against God, we are simply conserving our life for whatever purpose we choose and 
thus our EV is 1 life unit. 
God exists God does not exist 
Probability: _1_ 
n+1 
Probability: ~ ~
n+1 
Bet on God 00 Ir- Q 
Bet against God 1 Il 1 
At first glance it appears that the total EV for betting against God is 2, but that is 
because we have not multiplied through by the probability of each option . If we do 
so, we get the following: 
Bet on God 
I 
Bet against God 
God exists God does not exist _f.ifHiNi 
Q 
n 
'--_._ .. _ ' - ~ ~_ _ ~ _ ' 'n n + 1 
= = ~ ~ I = - - o o~ = : ! !
_---'J iL....-__ 1_-..... 
194 Nicholas Rescher, Pascal's Wager: a study of practical reasoning in philosophical theology (Notre 
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1985). 14. 
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Thus, although the bet on God does not dominate the bet against God, because it 
sometimes does worse, the EVs of the two choices are dramatically (infinitely) 
different. However, as we will see in Chapter 3, as n tends towards infinity (Le . that 
there are infinitely many possible gods to be considered), the mathematics 
becomes less clear. The result of dividing infinity by infinity is undefined, even if a 
common-sense understanding would suggest that the answer should be 1. Thus, in 
our matrix we have the following: 
God exists God does not exist 
00 
Bet on God -1 00+1- · 0 ? 
1 00 
-1 ? 
00 + 1 00+1- · 
Bet against God 
Since each option is indeterminate, we cannot make a decision either way. There 
are solutions to this particular problem and I set out my own on page 106. 
Having covered the basic decision theory of the Wager, we have already see some 
difficulties in its approach and particularly in the use of infinity within this context . 
We now move on to discuss the objections to the Wager in greater detail and will 
attempt to deal with the mathematical difficulties, as well as a wide range of 
attacks from other directions. 
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3.2 A taxonomy of objections 
Since Pascal's text first became available, commentators have raised objections 
against its logic. In the later part of the twentieth century, these became 
increasingly sophisticated and took a number of different lines of attack upon the 
Wager. I have attempted to classify them into families, by looking at what 
fundamental aspect of the Wager's logic is under attack. Critics often use multiple 
strands of argument in their approach and so I have attempted to separate out 
each class of objection separately, since if none of the strands holds on its own, it is 
very hard to make a case for their holding all together. Some attacks I have deemed 
to be not worth considering, because they do not fully engage with Pascal, or with 
the subtleties of his argument. For example, Richard Dawkins suggests that Pascal 
was "probably joking"195 when he proposed the Wager, but Dawkins' grasp of the 
text is so weak196 that we need not take him seriously either. 
Since modern critics have built upon the work of earlier attempts, I will generally 
deal with the most recent and/or best argument in each class, rather than showing 
a family tree of how each argument has evolved over time. My thesis is that none 
of these objections succeeds and so it seems appropriate to take what I consider to 
be the most developed version of each argument, rather than picking weaker 
exemplars. 
I suggest that we can categorise the broad families of objections as being based 
around problems with: 
• infinity 
• the decision matrix 
• probabilities (zero, infinitesimal and vague) 
• the nature or character of God 
• the process of wagering 
3.3 Problems with infinity 
The argument from superdominance relies upon the property of infinity that when 
it is multiplied by any positive finite number, the result is still infinite. Alan Hajek 
calls this reflexivity under multiplication197 and Pascal saw it as the key factor in 
favour of his Wager, because infinite reward always trumps any finite alternative. It 
is not a univocal argument, however, and there are attacks upon Pascal's Wager 
that use the properties of infinity in order to defeat the Wager's logic. In this 
section I consider arguments whose main thrust is focused upon the nature of 
infinity and its employment within the Wager. 
195 Dawkins, The God Delusion: 105. 
196 Dawkins raises an objection (doxastic voluntarism) which Pascal actually addresses in the text of 
the Wager. 
197 Hajek, "Waging War," 49. 
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Infinity is a slippery concept. Pascal was aware of many of the properties of infinity 
as a mathematician, although he predates Georg Cantor who developed much of 
our modern understanding of the nature of infinity. Nothing in our universe is 
infinite as far as we can tell. Our current understanding of physics leads us to 
believe that there are a finite number of particles,198 there is a finite maximum 
speed in the universe199 and there is even a finite amount of energy.200 Cantors 
main contribution to our understanding is that infinity comes in different 'sizes'. 
Some infinities, like the number of integers,201 are theoretically possible to 
calculate if you have infinite time; while others like the number of real numbers are 
uncountable, no matter how much time you have in order to try. 
Infinity, usually represented by the symbol 00, has odd mathematics. If you add to it, 
subtract from it or multiply it by another number, the answer is still infinity. Pascal 
gave a simple description of infinity in Pensees: 
Unity added to infinity does not increase it at 01/, any more than a foot added to 
an infinite measurement: the finite is annihilated in the presence of the 
infinite.202 
However, infinity also has a number of paradoxes, one of which - the St Petersburg 
Paradox - is usually cited whenever discussing the mathematics of Pascal's Wager. 
Paul Saka suggests that the unsettling nature of the St Petersburg Paradox might 
give us cause to doubt the efficacy of decision theory when infinite quantities are 
involved and thus by implication to be suspicious about Pascal's Wager.203 Hajek 
agrees, saying that the St Petersburg Paradox is particularly apposite in this area.204 
Some recent work, both theoretical and experimental, has shown that the St 
Petersburg problem may not be a paradox after all, so I will cover this in a little 
detail, in order to close off this particular line of objections to the Wager. 
The St Petersburg Paradox 
In this paradox, we are asked to imagine a game where a fair coin is tossed a 
number of times until it comes down heads. The prize doubles each time that the 
coin comes down tails before the final head. Let us look at a few sample games: 
198 There are estimated to be between 1071 (that is: a 1 followed by 72 zeroes) and 1087 particles in 
the universe. 
199 The maximum speed according to Einstein is the speed of light or 299,792,458 metres per 
second. 
200 The figure for this is contested. Some cosmologists, like Hawking, have argued that the total 
energy is zero as this makes some of their maths work, others pick a big number. 
201 An integer is a 'whole' number, like 1, 2 or 99. 
202 Pascal, Pensees: 121. L418 
203 Paul Saka, "Pascal's Wager," Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy(200S), 
http://www.iep.utm.eduJpJpasc-wag.htm. 
204 Hajek, "Blaise and Bayes," 177. 
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a) Comes down heads first time - we win £2 
b) Comes down tails the first time and then heads - we win £4 
c) Comes down tails twice and then comes down heads - we win £8 
We can represent our winnings mathematically as £2" where n is the total number 
of coin tosses. If we look at the probabilities for the above cases, we get the 
following picture: 
a) Probability of winning on the first toss = Yz so the EV is: Yz x £2 = £1 
b) Probability of winning on the second toss = Yz x Yz =}{ so the EV is: 
}{ x £4 = £1 
c) On the third toss it is = Yz x Yz x Yz = Ys, the EV is Ys x £8 = £1 
If we add all these expected values together we have an infinite series: 
EV(St Petersburg) = (Yz x £2) + (}4 x £4) + (Ys x £8) + ... 
= £1 + £1 + £1 + ... 
=£00 
The longer the run of tails, the more we win. The probability of such a long run is 
halving each time, but the payoff is doubling. Unlike most gambling games, we do 
not place an initial stake in this game, instead we have to decide how much we will 
pay in order to play it. Since the game appears to have an infinite EV (similar to that 
in Pascal's Wager), what is a rational stake? 
Most people would not pay very much, although theoretically we should risk 
everything we have. Daniel Bernoulli enunciates the St Petersburg problem in his 
1738 paper 'Exposition of a New Theory on the Measurement of Risk,2oS where he 
proposes that a number of factors are at work. One is risk-aversion, in that different 
people have a different attitude towards risk and to the sorts of risk which they are 
willing to take. For example, most people would not take risks that carry a 
significant chance of death or serious injury, although mountain climbers and 
extreme skiers do exactly that. Chris landry described extreme skiing with the 
phrase 'if I fall, I die.,206 Some people are willing to take risks with all their 
possessions, as seen on Sky TV's 'Double or Nothing' programme in 2004. The 
205 Daniel Bernoulli, "Exposition of a New Theory on the Measurement of Risk," Econometrica 
22(1954). 
206 http://www.thesierraweb.com/stories/extreme.html 
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contestant, Ashley Revell, sold all he had, raising about £80,000 and bet it all on a 
spin of the roulette wheel in las Vegas. He chose red, and won.207 
Bernoulli's main insight, which now forms part of economic theory, is known as the 
diminishing marginal utility of money. This means that the more money that you 
have to start with, the less you would value any additional money. If you could 
have a billion pounds, having two billion would not have twice as much utility to 
you. As the saying goes: 'You can only sleep in one bed at a time. You can only eat 
one meal at a time, or be in one car at a time.'208 Bernoulli did not say how quickly 
utility declines, but it is usually assumed to be logarithmic.209 I will return to this 
concept of decreasing marginal utility on page 102. 
Sorensen quotes Weirich,21o who shows that the St Petersburg paradox carries 
infinite reward, but it does so only at infinite risk and thus he proposes that we 
should consider a set of finite gambles with the St Petersburg bet as the limit on the 
series. He believes that 'there is some number of birds in the hand worth more than 
any number of birds in the bush'. 
Ian Hacking211 argues that the most that anyone should pay for the St Petersburg 
wager is £25, which is well short of 'all we have' for most of us. The paradox 
appears to be that while we perhaps ought to risk everything we have for a 
potentially infinite gain, no-one actually would do so in practice. The Marquis de 
Condorcet (one of Pascal's contemporaries) suggests that the bet would fail 
because of inadequate backing, because after the hundredth toss of the coin, the 
gambler would be entitled to a mass of gold bigger than the sun.212 Since no offeror 
could actually pay the possible winnings, the gambler would be entitled to refuse 
the bet. As we saw in Chapter 2, it is an essential precondition of Pascal's Wager 
that God is able to deliver infinite good to us, otherwise we would have legitimate 
grounds for objection. 
Such limits affect real-life gambling, as we can see if we consider the betting system 
known as a Martingale, originally described by levy.213 If we play roulette and 
207 http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/uk/3618883.stm 
208 Usually attributed to the singer Ray Charles. 
209 In a logarithmic curve, the value rises proportional to the power. So going from 100 to 1,000 is 
only an increase from 102 to 103 or a logarithmic Increase of 1. In this model, the utility for a million 
pounds would be only six times the utility of ten pounds. 
210 Paul Weirich, "The St Petersburg Gamble and Risk," Theory and Decision 17(2)(1984). 
211 Ian Hacking, "Strange Expectations," Philosophy of Science 47(1980): 563. 
212 Roy Sorensen, "Infinite Decision Theory," in Gambling on God, ed. Jeff Jordan (Maryland: 
Rowman & littlefield, 1984), 142. 
m Eric W. Weisstein, "Martingale," MathWorld--A Wolfram Web Resource(2012), 
http://mathworld.wolfram.com/Martingale.html. 
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choose either red or black, we have a 50:50 chance of winning.214 In the simplest 
form of the Martingale betting, each time we lose, we double the stake on our next 
bet. let us look at some scenarios. In each case we will start with £20, bet on black 
and stop playing after we win. 
1. We place our £1 stake on black which leaves £19 in our hands. It wins, so 
we get £2. We now have £19 plus the £2 making £21. 
2. We place our £1 stake, but it comes up red and we lose. We thus have 
£19. We now double the stake to £2, leaving £17 as the ball spins. When it 
stops, we find that we have won £4, which gives us £17 + £4 = £21. 
3. We place £1 and lose, then we place £2 and lose again. We bet £4, so we 
have £13 in our hands, but this time we win. Our winnings are £8, which 
together with the £13 left in our chip stack, makes £21. 
This system looks like an easy way to make money. We always end up with £1 more 
than we started with. Casinos are well aware that it exists, not least because they 
have seen thousands of hopefuls try it out. Mathematically it should work, but it 
relies upon two big assumptions. First/y, it assumes that the player has enough cash 
to double their stake each time. The player who loses n times must find £2n for 
their next bet. The player who loses a dozen times in a row will have already lost 
£4095 and must stake £4096 on the next spin, all to end up with £1 more than they 
started. Secondly, casinos generally impose a maximum bet size that they will 
accept for any given wager, known as a "table limit". This is usually a multiple of the 
minimum stake, so a table that allowed a player to bet £1 might well have a limit of 
£100 on a single bet. Casinos set such limits so as to manage their own risk 
exposure, since they may not be comfortable with a £lm bet on roulette that could 
lose them £36m on a single roll. Casinos make their money by taking lots of small 
risks, which are weighted in their favour, rather than taking one-off big risks which 
could go badly. In our scenario above, if we lose six times (making a total of £127 
lost), then our logical next stake would be 27 or £128. With a table limit of £100, 
however, we cannot break even, because we cannot stake more than £100 and 
even if we win, we will only get a net £100 back, which will not cover our losses to 
that point. Casinos are happy to accept a sequence of small bets, where they can 
afford to payout on any bet that they accept, because the more bets placed, the 
more likely the odds are to conform to the theoretical expectations (through a 
process known as regression to the mean).215 
214 For the purposes of this illustration I will ignore the green zero, which is neither red nor black and 
thus the bet loses when zero comes up. 
215 This phenomenon Is also known as the Gambler's Ruin. If we assumed a simple game where two 
players each have a finite number of pennies. They toss a coin and one person calls heads or tails. 
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We can see that no casino should logically offer the St Petersburg game as part of 
their portfolio, assuming that they wanted to, because they could not afford to pay 
out in the (admittedly rare) event that the sum earned exceeded the net worth of 
the casino itself. To offer the game is to open oneself to a potentially unlimited loss. 
It would also be unattractive to gamblers, because they may end up dramatically 
over-paying in order to play. This has been noted by a number of commentators 
including Benjamin Hayden and Michael Plate16 and which is particularly summed 
up by Colin Camerer who argues that loss-aversion explains the paradoxically low 
values that people suggest for the stake.217 He concludes that if the maximal payoff 
is £1 billion, a reasonably loss-averse person will not offer more than £17.55. Even if 
the maximal payoff is raised to £1 trillion, the bid will rise only to £22.71. Hayden 
and Platt suggest that these values are close to the 20 ducats that Bernoulli thought 
was reasonable.21s 
Ole Peters takes an entirely different tack. He argues that the St Petersburg game 
requires infinite time to play to its conclusion, in order to get the infinite reward. He 
makes the interesting point that he suspects that probabilities should not be used 
to guide one-off decisions and that any decision regarding a single event must 
resort to intuition or morals.219 Peters suggests that the calculation of the mean 
outcome using the ensemble-average system as proposed by Huygens, Fermat and 
others is inappropriate, because an individual in a one-off lottery does not care how 
he might fare in any number of parallel universes; he only has one chance to play 
and thus he is only interested in factors that affect his judgement in this single case. 
What matters to his financial well-being is whether he makes decisions under 
uncertain conditions in such a way as to accumulate wealth over time.22o Obviously, 
the player in Pascal's Wager is in a similar quandary. We have but one life to live 
and only one life to wager. It does not matter how we might do in another life, 
The winner gets one penny from the loser. If this process is repeated indefinitely, one player will 
always lose all their pennies to the other and the probability of which player It Is depends upon the 
number of pennies that each has. For each player, the chance of going bankrupt is: 
n2 P1 = -....;;;",,-
nl +nz 
nl Pz = --'--
nl +n2 
Thus, the player with the smallest number of pennies has the greatest chance of losing. Since 
gamblers usually have less money than casinos, the casinos always win in the long run. Casinos also 
bias the odds in their favour, so that even people who start off richer than the casinos will still lose 
In the long-run. 
216 B. Y. Hayden and M. L. Platt, "The mean, the median, and the St. Petersburg paradox," Judgment 
and Decision Making 4, no. 4 (2009). 
217 Colin F. Camerer, "Three Cheers - Psychological, Theoretical, Empirical - for Loss AverSion," 
Marketing Research 42, no. 2 (2005). 
218 Hayden and Platt, "The mean, the median, and the St. Petersburg paradox," 3. 
219 O. Peters, "The time resolution of the St Petersburg paradox," Philosophical Transactions o/the 
Royal Society a-Mathematical Physical and Engineering Sciences 369, no. 1956 (2011): 4918. 
220 Ibid., 4921. 
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because we must make our decision in this one.221 Peters concludes from his time-
based analysis that the player should risk any amount of money that does not lead 
to bankruptcy. This seems in accord with Bernouilli's belief that we should risk all 
that we have, albeit with some qualification. It is also consistent with Pascal's 
advice that we must risk our current life in the hope of more to come. 
Hayden and Platt suggest strongly that the root of the problem is in using any sort 
of mean in order to calculate the EV, because the mean of an infinite series will 
itself be infinite. They argue that the median gives a far better guide in this scenario 
and that if we use the median outcome, there is no paradox. 
Empirical experimentation shows a significant difference between the theoretical 
payoff and the reality. As long ago as 1777 M. Buffon hired a child to flip a coin until 
it came up heads and to do so 2048 times. Augustus De Morgan did a similar 
experiment in 1828 and added another 2048 data points.222 Since then, computer 
simulation has extended the data greatly, but with remarkably similar conclusions. 
The median payoff lies between £1 and £2 and Eric Weisstein suggests that we 
should fix it by convention at £1.50. Hayden and Platt conducted a survey of 200 
respondents who were asked to make their estimate of what they would pay to 
play.223 The results matched the simulations well, with a median result of $1.5 and 
strong modes at $1 and $2, although estimates ranged from $0 to $50,000. 
They identified that the median bid is lower than is commonly supposed and 
suggest that the payoff is not infinite, but rather that it is undefined. They postulate 
that faced with an infinite series, people are innately using the median payoff as 
their benchmark, rather than calculating the mean. They challenge the conventional 
calculation of EV, suggesting rather that EV is heuristically considered to be the 
central tendency of the distribution embodied in a given gamble. In a massively 
skewed distribution, such as in the St Petersburg Paradox, the median gives a better 
estimate of that central tendency than the mean does.224 
Summary o/the St Petersburg Problem 
As we have seen, the empirical evidence is that the St Petersburg Paradox is not 
directly comparable to Pascal's Wager, because it will typically fail on one of two 
grounds. It fails because it can only deliver infinite reward at the end of infinite time 
and pays out nothing in the interim. The empirical tests also show that most of the 
time, it pays very little. Thus, a lack of confidence in the St Petersburg game should 
have no bearing on our consideration of Pascal's Wager. 
221 I will consider the possibility of reincarnation and its effect upon Pascalian decision-making on 
page 133. 
222 Hayden and Platt, "The mean, the median, and the St. Petersburg paradox," 3. 
223 Their survey used dollars, rather than Sterling. 
224 Hayden and Platt, "The mean, the median, and the St. Petersburg paradox," 3. 
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That does not mean that we might not try to devise another game that pays out 
more quickly, or more reliably. However, any such game will fail unless we can 
assume that the offeror is able to deliver the infinite reward. I suggest that this 
assumption cannot reasonably be made without some concept of deity. 
Having dismissed the St Petersburg problem as being largely inapplicable to Pascal's 
Wager, we now need to move on to another objection, which also has its roots in 
infinity. 
Infinity and Mixed Strategies 
The special properties of infinity are what drive the argument from 
superdominance that we saw earlier. Any finite fraction multiplied by infinity 
becomes infinite, so no matter how small your estimated probability for God's 
existence, you still get infinite utility by wagering for God. This superdominance is 
the strength of the wager calculations, but it can also be a major weakness. Let us 
consider the application of a 'mixed' strategy, which we saw on page 42. 
What happens if we say that we find the argument moderately convincing, but we 
want to settle it by tossing a coin? We tell ourselves that If it comes down 'heads' 
we will wager on God, but if it is 'tails', we will wager against and (to humour the 
pedants225) if it comes down on neither, then we will toss the coin again. What 
effect does this have on the EV? The odds of a fair coin toss under these 
circumstances are Yz either way, so: 
EV(heads) = Yz x ((00 x p) + (fl x (1- p))) 
=00 
EV(tails) 
= finite 
EV(heads + tails) = 00 
The EV for choosing on the basis of a tossing a coin is infinite. It is still infinite if we 
roll a die and bet on God only if we roll a 6. It is infinite if we will bet on God if and 
only if we win tomorrow's lottery jackpot and next week's jackpot as well. In fact, 
the EV is infinite no matter how low we reduce the possibility of success. 
Various authors have argued that no special action is required on our part to accept 
the wager: whatever we do, there is a small chance that this will lead us to bet on 
God and thus we will obtain infinite utility. Even deciding to bet against God today 
might conceivably lead me to ultimately bet on God in the future. It seems that 
225 I number myself among such pedants. 
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bringing infinity into the calculations somehow breaks decision theory. I will briefly 
cover why that can happen, even outside Pascal's Wager. 
Problems of infinity in decision theory 
In order to try and regula rise the mathematics of utility theory, luce and Raiffa 
propose a number of axioms to be used in establishing comparisons.226 Their 
modelling is based upon the idea of a number of different lotteries in which we 
might place our stake. Since there is no skill involved in a lottery, we should choose 
the one that best reflects our preferences. Different people might use different 
criteria in making their selections: a cautious person might prefer the lottery that 
gives the highest probability of paying back, while a less risk-averse gambler might 
prefer the lottery with the highest possible winnings, even if it pays out less often. 
luce and Raiffa wish to establish axioms so that there is some level of consistency 
and true comparability between choices. 
They thus suggest a number of possible lotteries and establish rules for which 
lottery (if any) is the most attractive. If the two lotteries offer outcomes such you 
would not prefer one over the other, then you are said to be indifferent between 
them. I will not discuss all six axioms, but briefly cover the two axioms which are 
problematic when we involve infinite utilities. 
Continuity axiom 
In assumption 3, known as the continuity axiom, let us assume that we have three 
outcomes which we will call: 0 1, 02 and 0 3. We arrange them in order of 
preference, as before, using the notation a > b to mean "I prefer a to bN • let us 
assume that we strictly prefer 0 3 to O2 and strictly prefer O2 to 01 that is: 
We then postulate another lottery (which we will call G) where we have a chance of 
winning either the most preferred prize 0 3 or least the preferred prize: 0 1. let the 
probability of winning 03 be p (which must be greater than zero) and the 
probability of winning the least valued outcome 01 be (l-p). The axiom states that 
for some value of p, you would be indifferent as to whether to participate in the 
lottery G or simply to have the middle outcome 02. 
This is easier to see if we put monetary values on the three outcomes: let us say 
that 0 1 = £20, 02 = £50 and 03 = £100. Our lottery G thus allows us to win £20 or 
£100, based upon the value of p. If P were 1 so we were guaranteed £100, we 
would clearly prefer G to the guaranteed £50 from O2• likewise, if p were 
0.00000001 so we were nearly certain to only win £20 in lottery G, then we would 
226 Luce and Raiffa, Games and Decisions: 27. 
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clearly prefer O2• The average payout of G at any point is £20 x P + £100 x (l-p), 
while that of G is fixed at £30. Somewhere between the extremes of p must be a 
cross-over point where we would switch our preferences from G to O2 (or vice-
versa). 
If we plot them graphically, we can see the cross-over clearly : 
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The intersection of the two lines is the point at which we value the two lotteries the 
same, or where we are indifferent between them.227 In this case, it is where p is 
0.375. 
If we use infinity in the decision matrix, this axiom is violated. This is because if 0 3 
is infinite, but 0 1 and O2 are both finite, then there is no non-zero value of p, such 
that p multiplied by 03 is not infinite. Since this will always be greater than the 
finite value O2, there will be no point where we are indifferent between the two 
lotteries. 
M0110to11icity axiom 
Assumption 6 of Luce and Raiffa describes another two lotteries where we take the 
most preferred and least preferred outcomes as above: i.e. 0 1 and 0 3 . If the 
probability of getting outcome 0 3 in lottery A is p and the probability of getting that 
outcome in lottery B is q, then we prefer lottery A over lottery B if and only if p is 
greater than q. This seems reasonably intuitive: that we prefer the lottery which 
has the greatest possibility of delivering the most favourable outcome. 
However, if the outcome 0 3 is infinite, then no matter what non-zero values we 
assign to p and q they will both deliver infinite utility and thus we become 
indifferent between the lotteries in violation of the axiom. 
227 It is not quite so clear if we were to choose £100, £10 and death as the outcomes. Would we 
really be indifferent between receiving no, or a participating in a lottery where we might die? 
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Does this mean that decision theory is broken? 
The effect of the involvement of infinity is to break the fundamental rules which 
give order to decision theory. As we saw above, a mixed strategy abuses the 
properties of infinity in EV calculations and threatens to make the terms of the 
Wager meaningless. If we can achieve infinite utility without having to take any 
action whatever, or even to be aware of the bet, is there really any decision being 
made? 
We therefore need to consider whether there might be a way in which we can re-
formulate the wager in which to restore order. Alan Hajek makes a thorough 
attempt in his 2003 paper 'Waging War on Pascal's Wager' with four 
reformulations, although he concludes that his models fall short of a version of 
infinity that would meet what he sees as Pascal's own conceptions and he asserts 
that this problem probably cannot be solved. Frederick Hertzberg, a German 
mathematician, took up the challenge and demonstrates that there is a 
mathematically robust solution to Hajek's problem. 
I will cover Hajek's models in the next section, followed by Hertzberg's solution and 
will then move on, through another reformulation, to my own model that deals 
with mixed strategies and which also meets Hajek's demands. 
Trying to Resolve the Problems of Infinity 
As we have seen, it is the superdominance of infinity which drives the utility 
calculations in favour of belief, but can we resolve any of the difficulties that we 
encounter when using a mixed strategy? Hajek works through four reformulations 
of Pascal's Wager trying to deal with the problems posed by mixed strategies and in 
order to test whether his modelling succeeds, he proposes two requirements: 
Requirement of Overriding Utility 
The utility of salvation must completely override any of the other utilities that 
enter into the expected utility calculations, thus rendering irrelevant the exact 
probability one assigns to God's existence. (We impose this requirement in 
order to uphold the spirit of the original argument - for otherwise we would not 
have a reformulation of it, but some quite different argument.) 
Requirement of Distinguishable Expectations 
We must be able to distinguish in expectation outright wagering for God from 
the various mixed strategies ... In particular, the smaller the probability of 
winding up wagering for God, the smaller should be the expectation, so that one 
is rationally compelled to make that probability as high as one can.228 
228 Hajek, "Waging War," 34. 
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These two tests seem fair to me. The first requirement is to match Pascal's 
assertion that the utility of heaven overrides any earthly cost, the second is 
introduced so that tricks like tossing a coin will not distort the results. 
His reformulations adopt four different approaches: 
a) Using 'surreal' infinities ( a complex mathematical approach) 
b) Using vectors229 rather than scalars230 for value 
c) Salvation as having a finite value for infinite time 
d) Salvation as having finite (but very high) value 
Surreal infinities 
In this complex approach, Hajek draws upon John Conway's work on 'surreal' 
numbers231 where each surreal number is identified with two sets of previously 
constructed numbers: a 'left' set and a 'right' set. No member of the left set may 
be greater than or equal to any member of the right set. 
The number zero is represented by both left and right sets being empty: <0, 0>.232 
The next number '1' has a left set with 0 and an empty right set. e.g. ({ ),0). The 
number '-1' has an empty left set and 0 in its right set e.g. (0, ( )) This proceeds 
with each new number being formed according to the rules. After infinitely many 
stages, we reach our first infinity whose left set is (O,l,2,3 ... ) and whose right set is 
empty. This we call w, the first infinite number. We can work out W-l 233 and other 
useful numbers like 2.. The great value of this system, even if confusing to the non-
w 
mathematician, is that is possible to perform familiar arithmetic operations on W 
and the usual rules apply. So, if we use W as our infinite utility, we can re-cast the 
decision matrix as: 
God exists God does not exist 
Bet on God w 
Bet against God 
EV(bet on God) = (p x w) + fl x (l-p) = infinite 
229 A vector is a measure which has two components : a magnitude (or size) and a direction. Velocity 
(or speed) is a vector because it matters which direction you are going as well as how fast. 
230 A scalar is a simple one-dimensional value, like length . It does not matter whether you measure 
the length of a pencil starting at the sharp or the blunt end . 
231 John H. Conway, On Numbers and Games, 2nd ed . (Natick, MA: A K Peters, 1976). 3-22. 
23 2 0 is the empty set - a set w ith no members. 
233 It is ({O.1.2.3 ... }. {w}} 
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EV (bet against God) = (f2 x p) + (f3 x (1- p)) = finite 
So our basic equation succeeds - it is rational to bet on God. The next test is to see 
what happens when we toss a coin. 
EV(heads) 
EV(tails) 
= Yz x (p x W + fl x (1- p)) 
= Yz x (p x W + fl x (1-p) 
By eliminating the simple additions and subtractions offinite numbers, we see that 
the dominating value in this becomes Yz x (p x w), compared with (p x w) in the 
straight bet. In our surreal numbers, ~ ~ is smaller than wand thus tossing a coin 
reduces our utility. Hajek's second condition is met. 
Have we now solved the wager, albeit using some complex mathematics? Hajek 
thinks not. He sees no reason that an agnostic or atheist cannot assign an 
infinitesimal probability to God's existence, which in this case would be.!.. If we put 
w 
this infinitesimal value as p in the equation, we get the following: 
EV(bet on God) 
EV(bet against) 
The infinitesimal cancels out the positive infinity and we are back to a trade-off 
between the two finite costs fl and f3. If we were to follow the principle of 
indifference,234 then we might say that, in the absence of any evidence, we should 
assume that fl equals f3 and thus the EV of betting for God dominates betting 
against, albeit narrowly. 
Hajek acknowledges that Pascal may himself have excluded infinitesimal 
probabilities in the wording: 'But here there is an infinity of infinitely happy life to 
be won, one chance of winning against a finite number of chances of losing,.235 In 
other words, Pascal anticipates infinitesimal possibilities but excludes them. I agree 
with Pascal on this and I discuss on page 143 why I do not believe that infinitesimal 
probabilities can be rationally used as part of an argument. Hajek, however, 
challenges Pascal, seeing no reason to accept any such limitation and he concludes 
that infinitesimal probabilities might defeat the Wager. In order to answer Hajek, 
234 Discussed in more detail on page 48 
235 Pascal, Pensees: 123. L418 
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my own reformulation on p104 suggests a means of dealing with infinitesimal 
probabilities, even though I do not agree that they are applicable. 
Using vectors for utility 
In his second reformulation, Hajek wonders if the utility of belief could be 
expressed as two components - an earthly reward (e) and a heavenly reward (h), 
much as a graph can have an x and a yaxis. The two values are independent of one 
another, but they describe a plane in which each point of utility is described by a 
pair of (e, h) components. He postulates that the heavenly component of belief has 
the value 1 (Le. one life in heaven) with a certain amount of earthly reward. So the 
matrix looks like: 
God exists God does not exist 
Beton God 
Bet against God 
The EV calculation shows that only a bet on God can generate heavenly reward and 
that even an infinitesimal probability still yields more reward than a bet against (as 
we saw before with the argument from expectations). 
It apparently succeeds and meets Hajek's tests, but seems to take the discussion a 
little outside traditional decision theory. It has epistemic weight, I believe, since it 
is reasonable that heaven's utility may not be measurable in earthly units. Yet, I 
think its appeal to the incommensurability of earthly and heavenly rewards 
perhaps goes against the grain of Pascal's logic. It does not need to draw upon 
infinity at all and thus does not sit easily with a passage entitled "Infini, rien". 
Finite utility for infinite time 
In his third reformulation, Hajek postulates that heaven could consist of a finite 
amount of happiness, but for an infinite period. He introduces the notion of a limit 
over time, drawing upon Vallentyne's work on utilitarianism and "producing more 
utility" (or PMU*), which is defined as: 
PMU*: An action 01 produces more utility than action ab if and only if there is a 
time t such that for any later time t' the cumulative amount of utility produced 
by 01 up to t'is greater than that produced by action 02 up to t'. 236237 
I believe that John Byl238 does a better job of exploring this topic in a 1994 paper 
which Hajek does not cite. Byl proposes that we can model the infinity under 
236 Peter Vallentyne, "Utilitarianism and Infinite Utility," Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71(1993). 
m PMU. has been shown to be lacking (e.g. by James Cain in 1995) and Vallentyne has refined it 
subsequently, but I will not explore the topic any further here, because it is not central to the 
argument. 
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discussion (Le. eternal happiness) by considering it as a finite amount of happiness 
per day in heaven, for an infinite number of days. 
In Byl's model, if we have H units of happiness per day and T days of happiness, 
then the total happiness is H x T. If we simply substituted infinity for T at this point, 
then the Hand Twould disappear and we would be left with just infinity units of 
happiness. To bring infinity under control, Byl uses the idea of a limit.239 To give an 
example, let us consider a series of fractions, where each fraction is exactly half the 
previous one in the series. Le. 
111 1 
"2 + 4" +"8 + 16··· 
We could write this in mathematical terms as L ~ = l l 2 ~ ~ or more simply as: the sum 
of all the fractions of the form 2 ~ ~ where n is an integer greater than zero. As 
shown, the first four terms add up to ~ : : and for each extra term, it gets closer and 
closer to 1. If we took this sequence all the way to infinity, it would add up to 1. 
We say that this is a series whose limit tends to 1 as n tends to infinity. 
Byl argues that we can treat the infinite happiness as being the limit of H x T as T 
tends to infinity, but how does this help us in dealing with Pascal's Wager? The key 
advantage from a mathematical viewpoint is that we may be able to recast the 
equation so as to eliminate infinite quantities, even if it is derived from a series that 
is tending to infinity. 
Let us substitute this limit for infinity in our original formulation for the wager. We 
will write the limit as: limT-+oo(HT) 
Let us now consider the mixed strategy with a coin toss, which defeated our earlier 
formulation. Byl suggests that we can compare the two cases of a coin toss versus a 
straight bet on God by dividing one case by the other, or: 
238 John Byl, "On Pascal's Wager and Infinite Utilities," Faith and Philosophy 11(1994). 
239 Hajek also uses the concept of limit and describes is as being an economic concept dealing with 
the long-run-average. 
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EV(headsHails) 
EV(bet on God) 
We start by simply representing the relative EV in terms of HT alone I.e. 
~ x x p xHT 
P xHT 
Then we compute the limit in order to obtain our infinite reward as T tends to 
infinity: 
. tx P XHT 
= LLmT-+oo ( ) pXHT 
Both top and bottom values contain the expression p x HTwhich we can now cancel 
out. This leaves just the simple fraction. 
= lim T-+ 00 ( ~ ) )
We can see that the coin toss has now halved our expected value, when compared 
with a straight bet on God. The mixed strategy significantly reduces our expected 
value and the original formulation triumphs once more. 
Byl points out that this is similar to the case where we have two people: one earns 
£1 per day for eternity and another earns £2 per day. Although both theoretically 
sum to infinity and each becomes infinitely rich, at any given time the second 
person is always twice as rich as the first. If you were given a choice between the 
two, it would be completely rational to choose the second. 
Paul Bartha, develops a similar, but richer model of what he terms 'relative' 
utilities, using the extended real numbers (i.e. the real numbers with the addition of 
positive and negative infinity), which I will discuss shortly. like Byl, Bartha uses 
ratios to distinguish between potentially infinite outcomes. 
One complication of this new formulation might be that Pascal's definition of utility 
demands more than simply finite happiness per day: 'But here there is an infinity of 
infinitely happy life to be won,.240 We could deal with this in the same manner, by 
adding a limit for H as well as T as they each tend to infinity i.e. 
limH-+oo limT-+oo(HT). This will still yield the same result, which is in favour of the 
bet on God. 
Finite (but very high) utility 
In his fourth reformulation, Hajek discusses the idea of using a finite value to 
represent the utility of heaven. He starts by postulating the lowest probability 
which anyone has ascribed, or will ever ascribe, to God's existence and he calls this 
Pmin' He then imagines a value/such that/x Pmin is always large enough to 
240 Pascal, Pensees: 123. L418 
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dominate the decision matrix. The exact size off does not matter, it simply has to 
be large enough. 
The new finite value meets Hajek's two requirements (of overriding utility and 
distinguishable expectations) and he observes that it also parries the objections of 
decision theorists, like Jeffrey and McClennen who have qualms about the concept 
of infinite utility. 
Hajek's remaining problem 
Hajek believes that his four reformulations all succeed in validating Pascal's 
argument, at least to some degree, but he thinks that they each still fall short of 
Pascal's model of infinity. Hajek refers to the text in Pensees where it says: 'Unity 
joined to infinity adds nothing to it ... the addition of a unit can make no change in 
its nature,.24l Symbolically this means that: 00 + 1 = 00,00 + 2 = 00 ••• 00 + x = 00, for 
all positive x. Hajek calls this property reflexivity under addition. He holds that any 
salvation under Pascal's Wager must be the greatest possible and therefore it must 
have this reflexivity under addition. 
His surreal infinity, w, fails this test, since W + 1 can be computed and it is greater 
than w. The vector model fails the test initially, since the value 1 is a scalar and you 
cannot add a scalar to a vector. However, if we refashion the scalar as the vector 
(1, 0) and add it to our result: (el, 1) we get (el + 1, 1) which is still bigger than (el, 
1). The final two cases both work on finite values, so adding 1 to either case yields a 
utility which is slightly bigger, rather than the same. 
The related property, which Hajek calls reflexivity under multiplication, is that any 
number multiplied by infinity will still yield infinity as its result. That is: 00 x 1 = 00, 00 
x 2 = 00 ••• 00 x X = 00, for all positive x. The difficulty here is that if x is less than 1, 
this property allows mixed strategies to defeat the wager. 
Hajek states that if the utility is to be the best possible then it must be reflexive 
under addition (and also by multiplication by numbers greater than 1), yet it must 
not be reflexive under multiplication by positive numbers less than 1. He writes: '1 
believe that it is a problem that runs deep, not one that will go away with some 
clever tinkering' .242 
Frederick Hertzberg, a mathematician at the University of Frankfurt, takes up 
Hajek's challenge and develops a mathematical case using hyperreal utilities. The 
hyperreal numbers are an extension of the set of real numbers to include infinite 
numbers and infinitesimals and were originally developed by Abraham Robinson in 
241 Ibid., 121. L418 
242 Hajek, "Waging War," 49. 
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1966 as part of what he called "non-standard analysis".243 Robinson builds an ideal 
number system in which the infinitely small or infinitely large numbers playa part 
and where they have properties and can be ordered in a similar fashion to the real 
numbers. McClennan suggests that standard utility theory cannot deal with infinite 
utilities244 and so Hertzberg sets a mathematical model that allows for infinite 
utilities and which also satisfies Hajek's two requirements. 
Hertzberg's HyperreaJ decision theory 
Hertzberg's model operates on an internal *_convex245 subset of a *-linear space 
and uses the operator " ~ ~ " such that "x ~ ~ y" means "x is not preferred over y" or 
"either y is preferred over x, or they are equivalent". His Hyperreal von Neumann-
Morgenstern Theorem is that:246 
There exists a *-affine function247 U: X -+ ·IR such that Uex) ~ ~ U(y) ~ ~
x ~ ~ Y holds for all x, y E X if and only if x ~ ~ y possesses all of the 
following properties: 
(1) Completeness: for all x,y E X, either x ~ ~ y or y ~ ~ x 
(2) Transitivity: for all x, y, z E X, with x ~ ~ y and y ~ ~ z, one has x ~ ~
z 
(3) Infinitesimal Continuity: for all x,y, Z E X, with x -< Y -< 
z, there exist hyperreals p, q E ·eO,1) such that px + 
e1- p)z -< y -< qx + (1- q)x 
(4) Independence: 
for all x,y,z E X and every p E ·eO,1] the relation x ~ ~
y is equivalent to px + (1- p)z ~ ~ py + (1- p)z. 
Hertzberg develops his theorem and proves that it is consistent and mathematically 
sound.248 Having defined a suitable number space and operators, he develops 
further theorems to show how hyperreal preference relations lead to an internally 
243 Abraham Robinson, Non-standard Analysis (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 
1966). In F. Herzberg, "Hyperreal Expected Utilities and Pascal's Wager," Logique Et Analyse, no. 213 
(2011). 
244 McClennen, "Finite Decision Theory," 116. 
245 The star notation e.g. H·-convex" Indicates that it is an analogue of the corresponding function 
for real numbers, but using hyperreals. 
246 Herzberg, "Hyperreal Expected Utilities and Pascal's Wager," 5-6. 
247 Affine simply means "connected with". For example, an affine space is one where any point in 
that space can be represented by a tuple of its coordinates and each point In the space can be 
reached from any other, simply by applying a vector. By way of analogy, I can walk from my house to 
my church without needing to know the exact latitude and longitude of either. I merely need to 
know how far apart they are and what direction to walk in. 
248 I am not a professional mathematician, so I am unable to comment on whether his proof holds, 
but the paper appeared in a well-respected, peer-reviewed mathematical journal and so I assume 
that it has been examined with suitable rigour by those who are qualified to judge. 
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consistent hyperreal utility theory, which is an exact analogue of traditional utility 
theory. 
In Hertzberg's model he suggests that there can be a correspondence between the 
hyperreals and the reals which preserves the essential characteristics of 
comparability and ordering, even though there may not be a one-to-one 
correspondence between each real number and another hyperreal. His hyperreals 
are a superset of the real numbers that includes infinite quantities. 
He then constructs a set 5 (which is a subset of the hyperreals * ~ ) w h i c h h has a 
maximum value I that represents the utility of salvation. In this set, I represents the 
largest value in *1R and cannot be exceeded. I is infinitely large and multiplying by 
any non-infinitesimal probability p also yields an infinite value when multiplied by 1, 
which satisfies Hajek's requirement of Overriding Utility, in that no matter how low 
the probability assigned to God's existence, the bet on God still gives an infinitely 
large utility. 
However, in his hyperreals *1R there are many infinite values (an infinity of them), 
but they are not the same size and in our set S we can both compare and order 
them. I is a hyperreal infinitely large quantity, so if it is multiplied by any real value 
q, where a < q < 1, the result will still be infinitely large. However, in the hyperreal 
ordered set 5, the value obtained can be compared with I and since q is less than 1, 
the result qI will always be less than 1. Mathematically we can write this as: 
v q E (0,1): qI < I 
Since I multiplied by any non-infinitesimal probability q will always be less than I, 
any mixed strategy will always yield a lower utility than the pure bet, even though 
the utility obtained may still be infinitely large. Thus Hajek's requirement of 
Distinguishable Expectations is also met within this system. 
Hertzberg then shows that he can construct a set 5, such that its maximum I is also 
reflexive under addition. This deals with Hajek's insistence that the infinity under 
consideration must be the absolutely largest possible number, unlike his own 
surreal infinity w, which was not reflexive under addition as we saw on pBS. 
In an appendix, Hertzberg also questions whether reflexivity under addition truly is 
a requirement of the Wager. His exegesis of the phrase "unity jOined to infinity adds 
nothing to it" draws upon the immediately following sentence in Pen sees where 
Pascal continues: lithe finite is annihilated in the presence of the infinite". 
Hertzberg therefore argues that Pascal was simply comparing the finite to the 
infinite, where the finite value appears as if it were nothing compared to the 
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infinite.249 Hertzberg suggests that we might thus relax the requirement for 
reflexivity under addition. If so, then his model can be modified such that it can deal 
with infinitesimal probabilities as well as real numbers. As I do not consider 
infinitesimal probabilities to be rational, which I discuss on page 117, I will not go 
further into Hertzberg's proof here. 
Hertzberg's solution may seem entirely technical, since it requires that we adopt a 
rather abstruse understanding of numbers and probabilities, but we must allow 
that it is designed to counter a purely technical objection. Mixed strategies to 
defeat the Wager are themselves purely technical arguments. Could we really 
convince ourselves that it is believable that tossing a coin should yield the exact 
same result as making a pure wager? I do not believe that we could and I suggest 
that the use of mixed strategies appears to be much more an attempt at finding a 
loophole than being a genuine objection. By responding with a detailed proof, 
Hertzberg has provided a sound mathematical framework for dealing with infinite 
utilities in a decision-theoretical context, which may also assist with other ethical 
puzzles involving infinite utility. It meets both of Hajek's requirements and answers 
McClennen's concerns around the use of infinite utility within conventional decision 
theory. 
Bartha's Relative Utilities 
In a separate approach, Paul Bartha attempts to solve Hajek's dilemmas by using 
the concept of relative utilities. His key shift is to introduce the notion that we do 
not necessarily compare two outcomes against each other, but rather that we 
compare each against the worst possible outcome. He starts by suggesting a utility 
function u(x) that returns a real value and uses this to obtain a relative utility. He 
also introduces the notion of a worst outcome, which he refines later into a base 
point for comparisons. The use of the worst outcome derives from the idea that any 
outcome is preferable to W, no matter how remote the possibility of obtaining it. 
For example, if we considered W to be "eternal torture" then it is reasonably clear 
that we would rationally prefer any alternative, including our immediate death.250 
Let the utility of the worst outcome W be u(W), the utility for outcome A be urAl 
and the utility for outcome B be u(B). The relative utility of A and B (or U(A, B)) is 
obtained as follows: 
249 Herzberg, "Hyperreal Expected Utilities and Pascal's Wager," 17. 
250 While I am sure that the reader can think of worse things than eternal torture, I believe that there 
is a limit to that which anyone might reasonably postulate for a worst outcome. This is thus the 
antithesis of the Anselmian viewpoint in that it is the outcome which is worse than the worst thing 
which can be imagined. Whatever that outcome is for an individual, we designate it as 'W'. 
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• If urAl is equal to u(W) and u(a) is not equal to u(W) then U(A, B) = 00. 
That is, any case which is better than the worst-case is deemed to have 
infinite relative utility. 
• If urAl and u(a) are both equal to the worst-case u(W) then U(A, B) = 1. 
• If neither urAl nor u(a) are equal to the worst-case u(W), then we obtain the 
relative utility by subtracting u(W) from each and taking the ratio of the two 
sums. i.e. 
u(A) - u(W) 
U(A, B) = u(B) _ u(W) 
Bartha wishes to ensure that there is continuity such that if we had three 
outcomes: A, A' and B and that for either A or A' obtains with probability p, the 
following equation holds: 
Vp E (0,1): U([pA, (1 - p )A'], B) = pU(A, B) + (1 - p )U(A', B) 
Bartha's introduction of infinity may seem somewhat contrived and we might ask 
why a finite value would not suffice for a relative utility. He admits that any finite 
value would do as well at this stage in the problem-solving process and that it 
makes no difference whether U(A, B) = 00, or whether U(A, B) = 2, as long as we 
set urAl = 1 for any gamble where A is strictly preferred over W. However, as he 
wishes to dispense with the fixed worst outcome W, infinity will be required in 
order to preserve the relation above. Otherwise there would be values of p for 
which U([pA, (1- p)A'], B) '* pU(A, B) + (1 - p)U(A', B). 
Bartha's next step is to consider a three-place utility function, where he uses a 
base-point Z instead of the fixed worst-case W. In this new function, our relative 
utility for A is infinite relative to B (with base-point Z) in any case where we prefer a 
non-trivial gamble between A and Z over outcome B.ln other words, U(A, B; Z) = 
00 whenever we are willing to sacrifice B to obtain A instead of Z, no matter how 
slight the chance of achieving this.251 Thus: 
U(A,B;Z) = 00 +-+ B ~ ~ [pA, (1- p)Z] for all 0 < P < 1 
Thus infinity is not required for A, B or Z, which sidesteps some objections around 
the nature of infinite reward that we saw earlier. The definition merely takes a 
structured set of preferences, rather than requiring a utility function that takes 
infinity as a parameter. I am not entirely convinced that this approach is not 
begging the question, because it presumes that an infinite utility could be obtained 
from finite reward, which seems distinctly suspicious. Bartha is attempting to move 
away from a Pascalian view of heaven as the ultimate reward and turning instead to 
251 Paul Bartha, "Taking Stock of Infinite Value: Pascal's Wager and Relative Utilities," Synthese 
154(2007): 17-18. 
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some notion of an infinite utility which can be appropriated on earth. I think that 
such a construction could be more easily obtained by fixing a lower bound for p (as I 
do on page 151) and then using Hajek's model of an overwhelming but finite 
utility.252 
Bartha's approach does deal with infinite quantities and using a simpler number 
system than Hertzberg. Bartha is able to achieve his goal using only the extended 
real numbers and does not require the *-affine ordered set of Hertzberg. However, 
his utility function requires three parameters, including a notional worst-case, or 
base-point value, which is rather harder to establish . Its main contribution is that it 
is able to distinguish between multi-variate cases more easily and Bartha considers 
a limited version of the many-gods argument as part of his thesis. I will cover this 
briefly here, but I will return to it when I consider advances in non-EV-based 
decision-making systems in Chapter 4. 
If we consider our 2x2 matrix, Bartha's model looks at each of the four possible 
outcomes. 
God exists God does not exist 
Beton God 
Do not bet on God 
Since salvation is deemed to be the goal which we prefer over any alternative, the 
top-left corner of the matrix (or outcome 01) is denoted as having infinite utility. 
We can now compute the relative utilities of the other cells, using Bartha's rules 
e.g. 
12 
71(02,04; Z) = 14 
13 
11(03 , O2; Z) = 12 
We can also compare any of the cells with the optimal outcome, 0 1, and show that 
the relative utility of 0 1 over any other cell is infinite. Thus for any probability value 
we assign, we can show that betting on God is infinitely preferable to betting 
against. We are, of course, arguing in a circle, because we are simply replaying our 
earlier decision to prefer salvation over anything else on offer. Thus, if only one 
route could ever offer salvation, we would be bound to take it. 
252 Hajek, "Waging War," 43-44. 
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Where Bartha's formulation adds value is in its ability to distinguish between a 
mixed strategy and a pure bet. He proposes that we should calculate the weighted 
sum of utilities for each approach and then compare these to see which is the 
highest. This is similar to the EV calculation, but Bartha adds an interesting twist. In 
order to compare a mixed strategy against a pure bet, we should look at the highest 
possible outcome in either approach and then calculate the relative utilities of each 
cell against that benchmark. As we already saw, the optimum result is 0 1 which had 
infinite utility. Thus we build a table as follows: 
Beton God 
Bet against God 
God exists 
1 
o 
God does not exist 
o 
o 
The to-left corner has infinite utility and thus has a relative utility of 1 compared to 
0 1, while all the other cells have a relative utility of O. Thus, for all pure strategies, 
the optimal strategy is to bet on God. If we now consider mixed strategies of the 
form : [p(Bet on God), (l-p) (Bet against)] and a probability q that God exists, we get 
a similar result: 
Bet on God {pJ 
Bet against God {l-pJ 
God exists 
q 
pq 
o 
God does not 
exist 
{l-qJ 
o 
o 
For all non-zero values of p and q, the bet on God dominates. Bartha admits that 
this may be simply be projecting our preferences on to the highest plateau,253 such 
that any lower-order preferences are simply ignored. He answers this by using what 
he calls the "happy secular" outcome, that is where we bet against God and there 
turns out to be no God. 
God exists God does not exist 
Beton God 00 
Bet against God 
As before, the bet on God dominates the bet against. 
253 Bartha, "Relative Utilities," 26. 
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Bartha offers an interesting solution to the many-gods problem, by comparing a 
pair of candidate deities A and B, with our subjective probability for the existence of 
each: qa and qb, thus we yield the following table: 
Beton A 
Bet on B 
Bet against all 
gods 
A exists 
qa 
1 
o 
o 
B exists 
qb 
o 
1 
o 
No god exists 
l-(qa+qb) 
o 
o 
o 
In this case, we would make our choice based upon our subjective probabilities qa 
and qb. This is similar to the conclusion reached by Roy Schlesinger who argues that 
"in cases where two acts yield distinct probabilities for the same prize (or prizes of 
equal value), we ought to prefer the act associated with the higher probability".2s4 
Bartha recognises that this might be problematic for conventional Pascalians, since 
an atheist might assign a greater subjective probability to a deity who rewards 
atheists, or perhaps Mougin & Sober's X-theology which suggests that atheists 
might go to heaven and theists to hell, even though no deity exists. 2S5 
Bartha argues that this mathematical demonstration exposes the tacit assumption 
in the Wager that the notion that any other deity (or indeed any other state of 
affairs) might lead to infinite reward is awarded a zero probability by default. While 
I agree that this assumption exists, I do not accept that it is germane to the 
discussion, because we can only deal with risks that we recognise and for which 
there may be mitigation available. There may be an infinite number of alternative 
ways of obtaining salvation, but we can only mitigate against the specific cases that 
come before us. It is not acceptable to refuse to take any action because of the 
possibility of "unknown unknowns". Short of omniscience (which would make the 
Wager moot in any case), there will always be the possibility of an infinite number 
of unknown factors. I will return to this topic in my fuller discussion of the many-
gods objection in section 3.4. 
Deluxe salvation and relative utilities 
Bartha sets out a thought experiment regarding how to deal with the case of two 
competing deities, Argle and Bargle.256 Argle offers his followers eternal salvation 
which consists of an infinite number of days of happy existence. Bargle, however, 
offers deluxe salvation, which consists of an infinite number of days of infinite 
happiness. Bartha asks how we should behave, assuming that we assign a far lower 
254 Schlesinger, "A Central Theistic Argument," 90. 
255 Bartha, "Relative Utilities," 31. 
256 Ibid., 32-34. 
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subjective probability to Bargle's existence than to Argle's. The starting decision 
table is relatively simple when we set the base point to be zero. Let Sa be the 
salvation offered by Argle and Sb be the deluxe salvation of Bargle 
BetonA 
Bet on B 
Bet against all 
gods 
A exists 
qa 
B exists 
qb 
No god exists 
l-(qa+qb) 
Bartha asks what value we ought to assign to 1l(Sa, Sb; Z). If we assign the value 00, 
then we are saying that we would prefer Bargle's salvation over Argle's no matter 
how remote a possibility it might be. However, if we assign the value 1, then we are 
saying that we are indifferent between the outcomes and would thus decide based 
upon our subjective probability estimates of the likelihood of their existence. 
Bartha argues that infinite gains appear equally attractive from a finite viewpoint 
and he uses an analogy of stellar parallax to justify his approach. Stellar parallax 
refers to the angular displacement of a nearby star, relative to more distant stars. 
This can be used to determine the star's distance from Earth and for most practical 
purposes we can regard two distant stars as infinitely remote. If we were to look at 
two of these 'infinitely' distant stars A and B, we would see no angular 
displacement and they would remain fixed in the same place relative to each other 
as Earth traces its orbit around the sun. Bartha suggests that, by analogy, two 
infinite rewards look the same from our earthly perspective and that it does not 
strictly matter to us whether one is actually more distant than the other. Thus he 
considers 'U(Sa,Sb; Z) = 1 to be the most reasonable value.257 
I am not entirely convinced by this analogy, nor by Bartha's logic. If we were 
presenting this argument to a follower of Argle, who already perceives themselves 
as possessing an infinite reward, the base-point ought to be different. Such a 
believer might well see themselves as facing the very high probability of infinite 
loss, mitigated by only the minuscule chance of improving their lot.258 We might 
want to add a dimension of credibility, since a disciple of Argle might reasonably 
doubt that Bargle can deliver something which Argle cannot . I think that it also falls 
short of Hajek's Pascalian sense that salvation should be the ultimate good 
available. Argle clearly fails this test since Bargle's salvation is clearly better (even if 
is less likely). 
257 Ibid., 34. 
258 I shall discuss the asymmetry between the perception of gain and loss in Chapter 4. 
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Bartha offers a solution for the problems faced if we introduce the notion of 
damnation to our calculations. If we start with a basic matrix: 
God exists God does not exist 
Bet on God 00 
Bet against God -00 
We can compute the relative utilities by taking negative infinity as our worst case 
and then applying the rules to obtain the following: 
Bet on God 
Bet against God 
God exists 
1 
o 
God does not exist 
1 
1 
The bet on God dominates, because it always does better than the bet against God. 
If we now introduce 'harsh' versions of Argle and Bargle who damn anyone who 
does not believe in them we get: 
Bet on A 
Bet on B 
Bet against all 
gods 
A exists 
qa 
00 
-00 
-00 
B exists 
qb 
-00 
00 
-00 
No god exists 
l-(qa+qb) 
When we try to compute the sum of each row, we face the sum: 00 - 00 which is 
undefined. However, once reformulated with relative utilities and taking -00 as 
our base-point we obtain: 
Beton A 
Bet on B 
Bet against all 
gods 
A exists 
1 
o 
o 
B exists 
o 
1 
o 
No god exists 
1 
1 
1 
The bet against all gods is dominated by the bet for Argle and Bargle, so we would 
need to use subjective probabilities (or some other tie-breaker) to decide between 
them. 
Summary o/relative utilities 
Bartha's suggestions for relative utilities meet Hajek's demands and also provide 
additional rules to deal with cases of many gods and of harsh gods who penalise 
unbelievers as well as rewarding the faithful. However, it seems at heart that they 
are simply a device to keep infinity in the mix by means of treating it as an output, 
rather than an input to the decision-making process. It seems to be arguing in a 
circle, since any decisions it makes could be equally made just by invoking a 
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common-sense view of infinity, rather than a strict mathematical formulation. If we 
00 
were to allow a simple set of rules such as IR < - < 00 and 00 - 00 = 0, then we 
2 
could achieve the same results, albeit at the expense of strict mathematical rigour. 
In this respect Hertzberg's formulation is much clearer, although it requires more 
complicated mathematics in order to justify it. 
Where I believe that Bartha's model shows promise is that it recognises the 
importance of the base, or starting point, for decision-making. As I discuss in 
Chapter 4, the position that we currently enjoy makes a very large difference to our 
attitude to risk. Imagine for a moment that tomorrow you will have a net worth of 
Elm. How you regard that prospect depends entirely on how much you have today. 
If your current net worth is £1, then it looks very attractive, but for Bill Gates it 
would look disastrous. Bartha's angel,259 who already enjoys immortality, takes a 
very different risk in looking for Bargle's salvation (and thus risking Argle's 
damnation) from that of an ordinary mortal. Thus, Bartha's model could potentially 
be modified to incorporate elements of asymmetry, or of risk appetite. I will briefly 
discuss this as part of Chapter 4, but it is an area for further research . 
I will now go on to develop my reformulation of the wager which meets Hajek's 
conditions and also deals with the difficulties that he finds insurmountable, while 
still being capable of being understood by non-mathematicians. 
Perception of utility 
We are finite beings - each one of us is composed of a finite number of cells. Our 
brains may have 100 billion neurons and perhaps as many as 1015 inter-
connections, but it is still finite. There is no way for us to realise the concept of 
infinite anything, except in the fuzziest of terms. Any representation of infinite 
utility that we can recognise must, necessarily, be a finite quantity or a proxy. It can 
be no more than a symbol or sign of the infinite, rather than the infinite itself. 
There is necessarily a mapping between the external world and the space that our 
thoughts occupy. Our concept of number is particularly limited. For example, look 
at the two patterns below and decide (without counting) whether they have the 
same number of dots and if they differ, which one has the most. 
•• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
•• 
259 Bartha, "Relative Utilities," 35. 
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It is very rare for anyone to be able to do so instantly/60 although it is a talent 
associated with savant syndrome, with examples such as Kim Peek, who was the 
inspiration for the character Raymond Babbitt in the film "Rain Man". Our brains 
. are not geared to recognise number at a glance, although most of us could manage 
to say whether there were three, four or six spots on a die, although even that task 
is much harder if they are not organised into a recognisable pattern. 
E.l. Kaufman et al. coined the term "subitizing" in 1949 (from the latin word 
"subitus", meaning "sudden") for the ability to recognize a quantity at a glance.261 
They discovered that people could easily recognise 2, 4 or 6 dots, with a very high 
degree of confidence, but at 8 or more dots the subjects' confidence declined 
dramatically, as did their accuracy.262 
Recent research has shown that language plays a part in the recognition of 
quantity. The Piraha tribe who live on the banks of the Maici River in Brazil do not 
have words for specific numbers, just "bigger amount" and "smaller amount" and 
they show a greater inability to recognise quantities at a glance than people who 
speak English.263 Peter Gordon, an anthropologist at Columbia University, 
identified that the Piraha counting system consists of the words: "h6i" (falling tone 
= one) and "hoi" (rising tone = two). larger quantities are designated as "baagi" or 
"aibai" (= many).264 Michael Frank et al suggest that the Piraha truly have no 
linguistic method of expressing any exact quantity, even "one:,265 From an 
evolutionary viewpoint we might suggest that there was little advantage to our 
ancestors to know (or communicate) that there were precisely 478 attackers 
advancing on their group. It sufficed for them to recognise that there were "many" 
and to respond accordingly. 
Thus, I wish to propose that precise evaluations of infinity are rather a distraction 
when we consider Pascal's Wager. We simply cannot apprehend infinity, let alone 
infinity plus one, except symbolically. Infinity is a linguistic concept for most people, 
rather than a mathematical one and after Cantor we now understand that there are 
different 'sizes' of infinity, which is extremely hard for us to grasp at an intuitive 
. level. In many ways, we view infinity as a shorthand for "more than I can imagine" 
in the same way as the Piraha view any number bigger than two as being "many", 
260 It is the picture on the right which has 11 dots, while the one on the left has 10. 
261 E. l. Kaufman et aI., "The Discrimination of Visual Number," The American Journal of Psychology 
62, no. 4 (1949). 
262 To test one's own 'number sense', there is an online test available at 
bttp:Uwww.nvtlmes.com/lnteractive!2008/09/15/science/20080915 NUMBERSENSEGRAPHIC.html 
263 P. Gordon, "Numerical cognition without words: Evidence from Amazonia," Science 306, no. 5695 
(2004): 496. 
264 Ibid. 
265 Michael C. Frank et aI., "Number as a cognitive technology: Evidence from Piraha language and 
cognition," Cognition 108, no. 3 (2008): 820. 
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Diminishing utility 
Bernoulli's diminishing utility curve, as previously discussed, means that the utility 
associated with any amount of money, or happiness266 will eventually plateau and 
reach some limit value. 267 It might look like the curve below: 
Happiness 
However, it could be that the curve continues to increase, albeit at a slower rate 
and that we cannot see a finite limit. For example, the series: ~ ~ + ~ ~ + ~ ~ ... does not 
234 
reach a finite limit, although by the time we were adding the lO,OOOth term, it 
would be impossible for us to recognise any change in the graph with the naked 
eye. 
The dotted line on the curve above represents the effective limit on utility from our 
point of view. As happiness tends to infinity, our maximum visible utility will 
approximate to this value. This limit need not be the same for all people, nor even 
for the same person in different circumstances. However, there will always be a 
limit because we are finite beings. 
Limits are not a problem in themselves; we already recognise that our universe is 
finite and that it has a finite amount of energy, as we saw before. It is normal and 
natural that Pascal's Wager should use a limit when discussing the utility of 
salvation as seen from our perspective. However, it is an error to act as if this is the 
actual utility, rather than simply a proxy used for the convenience of a finite being. 
To follow Bartha's example and suggest an analogy, consider the visual angle of the 
human eye. 
266 It could be argued that happiness is synonymous with utility, but we are familiar with characters, 
like Jane Eyre, who give up happiness for morals, duty, or another noble ideal. 
267 We could also obtain such a curve by applying a discount factor for future utili ty, as in class ical 
economics. 
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An object 5, which is distance D from the eye, subtends the angle V at the lens and 
then casts an inverted image R on the retina. The formula for calculating the visual 
angle is V = 2 x arctan CSD). We can see that if the retinal image R is bigger than 
the macula of the retina, where the retinal cells which detect light are found, then 
the object cannot be seen in full. The macula is roughly 1.5mm in diameter and the 
width of the eye (n) is 17mm, so the maximum visual angle is roughly 0.3 radians, or 
16°. To see a one metre stick in its entirety, it must be held nearly 2m from the eye. 
At 1m from the eye, it is not possible to differentiate between a stick 1m long and 
another which is 100m long. They are both too big to see in their entirety. Of 
course, we can move our eyes and can thus perhaps gain clues about which is the 
bigger. However, if we place those same two sticks lOkm away it will not be 
possible to distinguish between them, assuming that we had sufficient visual acuity 
to see them at all. That is because the cells in the retina also have a size and we 
need to stimulate at least two adjacent cells in order to perceive anything more 
than a point. 
I am using this illustration, not to get into a discussion of the exact visual acuity of 
any given species, but merely to illustrate that we operate every day with imperfect 
information. Things that are very large, or very far away, may be impossible for us 
to perceive accurately, or to distinguish between two cases. We therefore operate 
routinely on a heuristic basis. If I am crossing the road, I merely need to know 
whether a bus is likely to hit me or not; I do not need its exact speed. 
I am therefore suggesting that utility is not a precise calculation but a heuristic one. 
I believe that each finite being has a valuation function in operation, which 
estimates an approximate utility figure from a presented value. It operates on a 
curve in a similar model to Bernouilli's marginal valuation and it also employs 
maximum and minimum values, such that a utility value might range from "too 
small to care about" to "too big to comprehend". It is imprecise enough that I will 
refer to it as "guesstimation". 
268 sou rce: http://u pload . wiki med ia .org/wiki ped ia/ com mons/2/23/EyeOpticsV400y.j pg 
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Guesstimation function 
In my model, this guesstimation function (which I shall call g) estimates a utility for 
each level of happiness. The largest possible utility, which we will call 0, is obtained 
when we pass infinity into the utility function: 
il = gCoo) 
This value 0 is effectively the biggest amount of utility that a given person could 
imagine or comprehend. Ordinary costs such as q(h), q(h) etc. are assigned the 
arbitrary value 1, because any cost cannot be greater than the utility of a single 
lifetime. 
I do not propose that this limit il is a universal utility of salvation, not least because 
it will vary by person, but il is the output of our guesstimation function for infinity 
(and also for all quantities that appear to be infinite from a finite perspective). 
If we plug this value into the standard matrix we get: 
God exists God does not exist 
Bet on God 
Bet against God 
Which yields the following results: 
God exists God does not exist 
Beton God 
Bet against God 
EV{bet on God) 
n 
1 
1 
1 
= (p x il) + 1 x (l-p) == pil 
EV (bet against God) = (l x p) + (1 x (1- p)) = 1 
This conforms with the common-sense expectation that betting against God is 
simply to retain one's own life and to forego the possibility of anything more. 
Since il is necessarily far greater than a single life's-worth of utility, 269 it will still 
dominates the decision matrix, as long as it overwhelms any reasonable probability 
p. We merely require that p ~ ~ ~ ~ and since have defined il as being our 
guesstimation of an infinite quantity, it therefore follows that ~ ~ must be our 
n 
guesstimation of an infinitesimal. That is: g ( ~ ) ) = ~ . . In which case, the bet 
becomes: 
269 They are inherently limited to the utility (or disutility) of a single lifetime 
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EV(bet on God) 1 1 = (- x il) + 1 x (1-) = 2 
n n 
EV (bet against God) = (1 x p) + (1 x (1- p)) = 1 
The bet on God still dominates, because it yields something beyond this life, even if 
we think that an unimaginable reward might be extremely unlikely to occur. In any 
case, I hold that it is not rational to ascribe an infinitesimal probability (or its 
heuristic proxy) to any possibility and I deal with this question more fully on page 
143. 
None of this looks very impressive; all we seem to have done is to swap the case of 
a Greek letter as compared with Hajek's reformulation, but this use of a utility 
function is a crucial part of dealing with the problems that Hajek envisaged. Let us 
turn to the problem of reflexivity. It is a requirement that salvation be the best 
possible result, even with infinite utility. So, what happens if we try to increase 
salvation by addition or multiplication? Since we are dealing with the quality of 
salvation itself, not our calculation of it, we need to pass this 'improved' salvation 
through the guesstimation function. i.e.: 
or 
utility = g{oo + 1) 
= g{oo) 
=0 
utility = g{oo x 2) 
=0 
or even: 
utility = q{oo x Yz ) 
=0 
In each case, the function (} returns il, so we have retained reflexivity under 
addition and multiplication by positive numbers. The value 0 is consistent with the 
Pascalian requirement that it be the greatest possible reward. 
The question is how well it deals with mixed strategies. The first thing to bear in 
mind is that a mixed strategy does not affect the actual utility of the outcome; 
rather it changes the probability that we obtain such an outcome. In the classic 
formulation, all the factors mUltiply out to yield the result, but here it has a 
different effect. 
If we put it into the mixed strategy we get: 
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EV(heads) 
EV(tails) 
= Y2 x (q (oo) x p + (0 x (1- p))) 
= Y2P 0 
=Y2 x(O x p+Ox(l-p)) 
=0 
EV(heads + tails) = Y2p 0 
Since 0 is not itself infinite, even if it dominates lesser utilities, Y2 pO is always less 
than the pO obtained from the straight bet and so we meet both of Hajek's 
requirements for overriding utility and distinguishable expectations. We can also 
show that the use of 0 does not violate either the continuity or monotonicity 
axioms of Luce and Raiffa.27o 
If there is a weakness in q it is that it cannot distinguish between ordinary and 
superior salvation. So, if we consider the salvation offered by Bartha's Argle and 
Bargle on p97, q(ooa) is the same as G(oob) and so we are indifferent between the 
rewards. Thus, we would make the choice based purely on the subjective 
probabilities of each. This is in accord with Bartha's own views on what one ought 
to dO.271 
Disutility of Hell 
If we consider Hell to produce infinite disutility, then it follows that my 
guesstimation function can handle it in a similar manner. 
utility = q(-oo) 
=-0 
Thus, if we wish to consider Hell in the matrix, we can proceed as follows: 
God exists God does not exist 
Beton God n 1 
Bet against God -0 1 ' - - - - - ~ - - - - ' '
EV(bet on God) = (p x 0) + 1 x (l-p) 
==pO 
EV (bet against God) = (p x -0) + (1 x (1- p)) 
== -pO 
270 The proof is left as an exercise for the reader. 
271 Bartha, "Relative Utilities," 34. 
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We can also deal with 'harsh' versions of Argle and Bargle too, who deal out 
damnation to everyone except their followers. We recall the table from earlier: 
Bet on A 
Bet on B 
Bet against all 
gods 
A exists 
qa 
00 
-00 
-00 
B exists 
qb 
-00 
00 
-00 
No god exists 
l-(qa+qb) 
Feeding these values into our guesstimation function and multiplying the result by 
our subjective probabilities we obtain: 
Bet on A 
Bet on B 
Bet against all 
gods 
A exists B exists 
EV(Argle) = qaD. - qbD. + 1 - (qa+qb) 
No god exists 
1- (qa+qb) 
1- (qa+qb) 
1- (qa+qb) 
EV(Bargle) = -qaD. + qbD. + 1 - (qa+qb) 
From this we can see that betting against all gods is likely to be a losing bet, since 
we are damned if either Argle or Bargle exists and thus our EV is approximately -no 
As before, whether we should choose Argle or Bargle depends on the relative 
probabilities that we assign to their existence. If we believe that qa > qb then we 
should choose Argle, otherwise we should select Bargle. 
Summary of my approach 
The use of a guesstimation function satisfies both the requirements of the Pascalian 
and Hajek while being relatively simple to comprehend. It does not require number 
systems other than real numbers and also remains firmly within the axioms of 
conventional decision theory. 
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3.4 Problems with the matrix 
As soon as any Pascalian presents the familiar 2x2 matrix of choices and outcomes, 
an objector asks why there are only two rows or co lumns. After all , there are more 
historical faiths than Christianity and others also have concepts of heaven for 
adherents and hell for unbelievers. 50 how is the religiously uncommitted person 
to decide between all the truth claims presented? Let us start with the familiar 
simplified 2x2 matrix: 
Believe in Christianity 
Do not believe 
Christianity is 
true 
ex) (Eternal life) 
o 
Christianity is 
false 
o 
o 
Only the bet on Christianity yields a positive outcome and it has infinite value.272 
However, as William Gustason writes: 
By having just one cansequence described as 'Christianity' is false and ascribing 
to it a value of zero, the wager tacitly assumes that competing faiths ... have a 
zero probability. 
Gustason wants us to include another faith with a heaven and a hell, in this case, 
fundamentalist Islam. 50 the matrix moves to 3x3 to include the extra possibilities: 
273 
Believe in Christianity 
Christianity is 
true Islam is true Neither is true 
o 
Believe in Islam 
I 
00 (Eternal life) 
o 00 (Eternal life) 
o 
o 
o 
o 
, 
Do not believe in either o 
Yet why stop at two faiths? Paul 5aka has a set of other faiths which he believes 
merit inclusion in the matrix, including the cockroach god, which stems from a joke 
made by Ellen DeGeneres: 
Sometimes I wonder what God is like. We picture God to look like us ... But... 
maybe God looks more like those drawings of aliens ... Maybe God is a giant bug, 
272 I am heavily simplifying the matrix here as its complications in terms of earthly cost etc. are 
covered 
273 As discussed earlier, I have removed Hell from the matrix as we would otherwise end up with 
sums like : 00 + _00 which are indeterminate. 
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and when we die we're going to have to account for every cockroach and ant 
we've killed. 274 
Saka supports the idea of a cockroach god as a genuine alternative to a traditional 
deity by appealing to the animal gods of the Egyptians and Hindus and by a 
quotation ascribed to JBS Haldane: liThe Creator, if he exists, has an inordinate 
fondness for beetles".275 While Saka recognises that DeGeneres was joking, he also 
believes that the idea has some resonance and that it would not work if there were 
not some truth in it. It is on this last point that I feel he over-reaches. Parody is a 
well-established form of humour whose only point of reference needs to be 
recognisable analogy. DeGeneres is mocking an anthropocentric view of God, which 
might be dealt with in more serious terms by, say, Emmanuel Levinas and his ideas 
of the 'otherness' of God. The cockroach is chosen by DeGeneres because of its 
potential to offend and is selected precisely because it is not credible. 
Saka also wants to include other faiths which have existed at some point in history, 
on the grounds that these have at least some warrant from tradition. This is to 
undermine Jordan's suggestion that we should prefer faiths which have some 
tradition behind them.276 Jordan's intent was to exclude what we might regard as 
parodies of religion, such as the Flying Spaghetti Monster277 or Invisible Pink 
Unicorns.278 Saka feels that there is no reason to exclude these synthetic creations 
unless we can confidently assign a zero probability to them. This action would open 
the doors for atheists to assign a zero probability to the Christian God, as they 
would argue that Christianity is equally synthetic, if somewhat older. He carefully 
brings in faiths which pre-date Christianity, thus hemming Pascal in between 
ancient and contemporary myths. 
Saka finds an ingenious way to include Satan in this pantheon, by presenting him as 
a Promethean hero and also looking to Manichean and Zoroastrian beliefs as 
support for theological dualism. He argues that there is some Biblical warrant that 
Satan has power as great as (or even greater than) God's. 
274 Ellen DeGeneres, My Point... and I Do Have One (New York: Bantam Doubleday, 1995). 129. in 
Paul Saka, "Pascal's Wager and the Many Gods Objection," Religious Studies 37(2001). 
275 This is possibly apocryphal in its exact wording, although the phrasing: liThe Creator would appear 
as endowed with a passion for stars, on the one hand, and for beetles on the other" appears in 
Haldane's 1949 book "What is life?" p2s8 according to 
http ://quoteinvestigator.com/2010/06/23/beetles/. 
276 Jordan, Pascal's Wager: 80-81. 
217 The Church of the Flying Spaghetti Monster can be found at http://www.venganza.org/ and 
wherever his noodly appendages extend. The Flying Spaghetti Monster was invented to challenge 
the Kansas School Board's ruling on teaching Intelligent Design alongside scientific evolution. 
278 Invisible Pink Unicorns are another parody of religious belief. See: 
http://www.invisiblepinkunicorn.com/The concept originated in alt. atheism on UseNet but 
references can now be found more widely, including Dawkins (2006). 
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Notice that despite God's command against eating of the tree of knowledge, it 
is Satan's mere suggestion to do otherwise that prevails.279 
While admitting that this particular idea is flatly contradicted by other biblical 
passages, Saka claims that Satan ism is a live, if minority, option in modern society 
and must thus be taken seriously. He writes: 
I/[TJhere is no excuse for any citizen of a pluralistic society to dismiss, out of 
hand, exotic religious hypotheses . ... There are versions of Judaism, Christianity 
and Islam which make it foolish to risk believing in any of them, and 
furthermore these versions are not ad hoc (they were not concocted for the sole 
purpose of refuting Pascal); they are traditional (we can find multi-generation 
populations in actual history who have held them),,280 
Many Gods Objections 
As Jeff Jordan observes,28i this "many-gods" objection to Pascal's Wager is one of 
the most frequently employed. It is also one of the earliest referenced, with 
Thomas Diderot writing in 1762: 
Pascal has said that if your religion is false, you have risked nothing by believing 
it true; if it is true, you have risked all by believing it false. An Imam could have 
said as much. 282 
Voltaire was similarly unimpressed,283 asserting that Pascal was not covering all the 
relevant possibilities and that there were a "hundred religions in England, all of 
which damn you if you believe in your dogmas, which they call absurd and 
impious". More recently, Anthony Flew writes that "the central and fatal weakness 
of this argument as an argument is that Pascal assumes, and has to assume, that 
there are only two betting options".284 Critics claim that a major weakness of the 
Wager is that, even if it may demonstrate theism to be the only rational choice,28s it 
does not specify which deity to follow. In other words, in proving too much, it 
proves nothing at all. 
In this section I will set out different forms in which the many-gods objection has 
been framed and will discuss some of them in detail. I will look at how other 
Pascalians have defended the Wager against the many-gods argument and will 
assess their relative success in that project. Then I will set out the assumptions 
which I believe are relevant to this particular objection and that will guide us 
279 Saka, "Pascal's Wager". 333. 
280 Ibid. 
281 Jordan, Pascal's Wager: 73. 
282 Denis Diderot, "Additions to Philosophical Thoughts," Oevres 112(1875): para LlX. 
283 F.M.A Voltaire, Philosophical Dictionary, ed. T. Besterman (London: Penguin Books, 1971).280. 
284 Anthony Flew, The Presumption of Atheism (London: Elek Books Ltd, 1976). 66. 
285 I recognise that most of the Wager's critics admit no such thing. 
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towards a proper resolution. I agree with Schlesinger that opponents of the Wager 
have had the tendency to "magnify the gravity of the problem by over-calculating 
the number of alternative deities".2s6 1 will demonstrate, by using the principles 
which I established on page 58, that there are actually very few categories which 
need to be addressed and that each of these has a relatively simple answer. In the 
course of this examination, I will also show that one God who satisfies the 
requirements of the Wager is the Christian one, but not the Augustinian (or 
Jansenist) understanding of God that Pascal appeared to hold personally. 
I will not deal much with the topic of Hell for two reasons: firstly, it complicates the 
maths without affecting any of the outcomes;287 secondly, as Christoph Lumer 
notes, people who do not believe in a deity, do not believe in her hell either.28s 
Jordan2s9 categorises these alternative faiths into two major classes which he calls 
possibilist and actualist. The possibilist faiths are ones where the deity in question is 
merely a possibility, quite often where no rational person would consider such a 
deity at all seriously and some where the god is deliberately designed to be 
maximally implausible. By contrast, actualist faiths are centred on deities in which 
some people have actually believed at some point in history, as demonstrated by 
the existence of sacred scriptures, temples and other such artefacts. We shall 
discuss Jordan's analysis and attempt at resolution in the next section, but let us 
continue first with a few more exotic possibilist examples, namely: 
• Number-based gods - where salvation depends upon a hidden number and 
thus there is an infinite quantity of them 
• Evidentialist gods - who prefer atheists/agnostics if evidence is equivocal 
• Perverse gods - who deliberately reject theists (and proponents of Pascal's 
Wager) 
Number-based gods 
Richard Gale proposes a 'sidewalk God,29o who rewards with infinite bliss those who 
make a point of stepping on every third crack in the sidewalk (or 'pavement' for 
British readers) and metes out infinite punishment to those who do not. This could 
be logically extended to include any number of cracks, or any given sequence. 
Graham Oppy is one of the most prolific of the "many-gods" proponents. He writes: 
286 Schlesinger, "A Central Theistic Argument," 87. 
287 Although Batha's relative utilities offer ways of dealing with this, as would my own utility 
guesstimation function. 
288 Christoph Lumer, "Practical Arguments for Theoretical Theses," Argumentation 11(1997): 339. 
289 ' Jordan, Pascal's Wager: 73-101. 
290 Richard Gale, On the Nature and Existence o/God (Cambridge: University Press, 1991). 350. 
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Now, perhaps it will be objected that, although this argument does show that 
there are further possibilities which Pascal ought not to have discounted, 
nonetheless it does not serve to establish that there is really an infinite set of 
possible deities. No matter; we can establish this quite directly. For consider the 
following: 
1. For each natural number n there is the deity Sn who is much like the 
traditional Christian God, except that s/he rewards all and only those people 
who live for exactly n years (rounded down to the nearest whole year). 
2. For each natural number n there is the deity Tn who is much like the 
traditional Christian God, except that s/he rewards all and only those who are 
among the first n people to die. 
3. For each natural number n there is the deity Un who is much like the 
traditional Christian God, except that s/he rewards all and only those who are 
not among the first n people to die. 291 
4. For each natural number n, there is a world Wn in which there are n deities 
(all much like the Christian God) who reward all and only those people who 
believe that there are n deities who are much like the Christian God. 
His intent is to create an infinite pantheon of gods who are all theoretically possible 
and he suggests that since we cannot rule them out and we cannot decide between 
them, then our task of finding the correct one is impossible. While he certainly 
succeeds in creating his notional pantheon, it seems an empty achievement. By way 
of analogy, let us remember that for the simple arithmetic sum of 2 + 2 there are a 
non-denumerable number of wrong answers. If we were to conclude that there was 
therefore an infinitesimal probability of obtaining the correct solution, no-one 
would take us seriously.292 
Jordan does not accept that these possibilist cases, which he refers to as 
"philosopher's fictions", are equiprobable with any actualist gods; however Saka 
insists that they should merit some consideration, even if it is very small. Oppy and 
others' logic is that since there is an uncountable infinity293 of these fictions, it 
becomes theoretically impossible to pick anyone as being definitive, assuming that 
we assign a non-zero probability to each one's existence. I will propose a solution to 
this problem on page 117. 
291 Oppy, "On Rescher on Pascal's Wager." 
292 Determining the correct answer is left as an exercise for the reader. 
293 It is easy to postulate a god who accepts only those who can name his favourite real number. 
Since there is an uncountable infinity of such numbers, we have an uncountable infinity of possible 
gods. 
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Evidentialist gods 
The next class of deity to consider is the one who values evidential ism. As J.L 
Mackie suggests: 
There might be a God who looked with more favour on honest doubters or 
atheists who, in Hume's words, proportioned their belief to the evidence, than 
on mercenary manipulation of their own understanding. Indeed, this would 
follow from the ascription to God of moral goodness"294 
W.K. Clifford suggests with a strong sense of moral outrage that "it is wrong always, 
everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence.,,295 
Perhaps an evidentialist god will reject all those who did not avail themselves of 
Bertrand Russell's proposed defence on Judgement Day that there was insufficient 
evidence for God in order for anyone to be a believer. For the Clifford ian, if a god 
does turn out to exist after all, then they will not (or perhaps should not) judge the 
unbeliever harshly, as long as any decision was based purely upon the evidence 
available to them. For the deity to do otherwise would be fundamentally unjust and 
thus it would fall short of the MaximalGod and not be worthy of worship. It would 
therefore be rejected under my Principle of Maximality. 
Such Cliffordian arguments are frequently employed against the Wager and it is 
hardly surprising that Jordan constructs an elaborate Jamesian defence in response, 
which I consider on page 121. I believe that the Cliffordian challenge is inherently 
flawed for other reasons and I will elaborate on this on page 135. 
Perverse gods and theologies 
A number of authors have designed possibilist deities who deliberately frustrate the 
terms of Pascal's Wager by turning the bet on god from a winning to a losing 
proposition. Oppy suggests a Perverse God who "infinitely rewards all and only 
those who fail to believe in any God". Likewise, Michael Martin suggests one who 
"punishes with infinite torment after death anyone who believes in God or any 
other supernatural being (including himself) and rewards with infinite bliss after 
death anyone who believes in no supernatural being".296 Jordan also references 
Walter Kaufman and Leslie Stephen who put forward similar models and which 
Jordan collectively terms "deviant theologies" .297 
William James is a profound critic of the Wager on moral grounds and writes: 
294 J.l. Mackie, The Miracle of Theism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982). 203. 
295 W.K. Clifford, "The Ethics of Belief," in The Ethics of Belief and Other Essays (London: Prometheus 
Books, 1879). 
296 Michael Martin, Atheism: A Philosophical Justification (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 
1991).231. 
297 Jordan, Pascal's Wager: 74-75. 
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We feel that a faith in masses and holy water adopted wilfully after such a 
mechanical calculation lacks the inner soul of faith's reality; and if we were of 
the Deity, we should probably take pleasure in cutting off believers from their 
infinite reward. 298 
James proposes that God would be offended by anyone who came via Pascal's 
Wager and would reward them with nothing. As we will see, it is ironic that James's 
formulations of pragmatic reason will contribute to one of the strongest defences 
against the many-gods objection to Pascal's Wager. 
Mougin & Sober propose X-theology, where there need not be any deity at all, but 
"atheists go to heaven and theists go to hell, regardless of whether God exists or 
not".299 This neatly sidesteps an obvious flaw in Oppy's and Martin's formulations, 
for theists in those systems are actually correct, because God and/or supernatural 
beings do exist, and atheists are as wrong as they can be. We shall return to this on 
page 129. 
Summary of the many-gods objections 
The wealth of examples we have seen, has led a number to suppose that the 
"many-gods" problem is particularly intractable for the Pascalian. There seems to 
be no limit to the number of philosophers' fictions, particularly as philosophers are 
so creative in producing objections to other people's theories. 
Franklin weakly tries to protect Pascal by suggesting the wager was possibly only 
aimed at the 1 i h century homme moyen sensuel who might only have known 
about, or considered a straight choice between French Catholicism and atheism.3OO 
Simon Blackburn makes the same error301 and Saka rightly dismisses both, pointing 
out that this view is profoundly mistaken because it misrepresents history: 
"sophisticated Parisians in 1660 knew of the existence of Greek paganism, 
Roman paganism, Judaism, Islam, Protestantism, new world paganism and 
probably even the Satanism that was imputed to the freemasons and Knights 
Templar"302 
Saka contends that even if Franklin's claim were true, it would have little bearing 
for us today. "[T]he real problem is that any given deity is less probable than the 
combined probabilities of all other deities".303 In such an untamed universe of 
298 James, The Will To Believe: II. 
299 Gregory Mougin and Elliott Sober, "Betting on Pascal's wager," Nous 28(1994): 385. 
300 James Franklin, "Two caricatures, I: Pascal's Wager," International Journal for Philosophy of 
Religion 44(1998): 111. 
301 Simon Blackburn, Think: A Compelling Introduction to Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford Paperbacks, 
2001).175. 
302 Saka, "Pascal's Wager". 339. 
303 Ibid. 
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gods, how can the agnostic or atheist possibly select just one to wager upon? I 
would argue that it is still irrational to pick none at all. Any god is better than none, 
unless one gives greater weight to the possibility of ending up in hell for making the 
wrong choice, rather than reaching heaven for the right one. It would seem that 
such atheists are actually backing the evidentialist God which, as I shall 
demonstrate later, is a very poor bet indeed.304 
It is usually assumed by proponents of the many-gods objection that God will care 
exactly which name is used for him and that a Muslim could never reach the 
Christian heaven, simply because he worshipped under the wrong appellation. This 
runs against a lot of scriptural examples, the notion of "Anonymous Christianity" 
espoused by Karl Rahner and even the doctrine of the Roman Catholic Church. For 
example, in the papal document Dominus /esus we find: 
"Nevertheless, God, who desires to call all peoples to himself in Christ and to 
communicate to them the fullness of his revelation and love, "does not fail to 
make himself present in many ways, not only to individuals, but also to entire 
peoples through their spiritual riches, of which their religions are the main and 
essential expression even when they contain 'gaps, inSUfficiencies and errors'" 
Therefore, the sacred books of other religions, which in actual fact direct and 
nourish the existence of their followers, receive from the mystery of Christ the 
elements of goodness and grace which they contain. 11305 
CS lewis gave an example of such tolerance in his allegorical book "The last Battle" 
where Emeth, a Calormene soldier (the enemy of Narnia), finds himself after death 
face-to-face with Asian, whose name he has hated in his lifetime. Asian surprisingly 
says to Emeth that "all the service thou hast done for Tash, I account as service 
done to me".306 In other words, God may be less bothered about strict 
nomenclature as long as our actions are pure. Saka doubts that this is a real 
possibility, arguing that "different religions do not merely prescribe occasionally 
conflicting modes of worship; they usually prescribe conflicting codes of 
morality.,,307 That having been said, this is not an essay on comparative theology 
and most critics of the Wager assume strict enmity between named gods. 
The essence of the many-gods objection is that there are simply too many deities to 
choose from and we become like Buridan's ass, paralysed between the alternatives. 
304 I allow that they could also be hoping that a benevolent God would value their demonstration of 
the free will that they had been given more than having their slavish and feigned obeisance. 
30S Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Dominus lesus, (Rome: Offices of the Congregation for 
the Doctrine of the Faith, 2000), 
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_2000080 
6 dominus-iesus en.html. 1.8. 
306 C.S. lewis, Th; Last Battle (london: Grafton, 1956; repr., reprinted 2002). 154. 
307 Saka, "Pascal's Wager". 331. 
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I believe that we can narrow that search considerably using the toolkit which I 
developed Chapter 2, but before doing that I will briefly consider how Jordan and 
others attempt to deal with some of the questions we have just raised. 
Defending against many gods 
Jordan identifies three themes within the panoply of options: 
• What he terms 'engulfing' wagers 
• That the non-denumerable number of possible gods makes the probability 
of any individual god infinitesimal. 
• The actualist argument that there are multiple gods on offer in the modern 
world with genuine adherents. 
I shall cover each of these in turn, followed by a discussion of Jordan's Jamesian 
Wager. 
Engulfing wagers 
Jordan defines an 'engulfing' wager as follows: 
A wager W is engulfing just in case there is another wager, W', which 
recommends inculcating belief in deity a, while W recommends inculcating 
belief in deity 6 who rewards all and only those who believe in 6, and punishes 
all and only those who believe in a.308 
Jordan is thus suggesting that for any deity under consideration there could be 
another deity who offers a similar reward, but who punishes the other's adherents. 
While this relies upon the ability to create suitable philosophers' fictions for each 
and every possibilist or actualist god, it seems reasonable to believe that we could 
do so, just as we did for the harsh version of Argle and Bargle on page 99. Jordan's 
reply is to suggest that for engulfing wagers to succeed, there must be in existence 
the underlying premise that the ability to think of a logically possible proposition 
automatically grants it a non-zero probability of being true. Jordan then 
demonstrates this assumption to be false by suggesting propositions like "I did not 
have parents". While this may not be biologically possible,309 the statement itself 
does not involve any logical contradictions and there is no logical necessity that I 
should exist. Thus, although we might intuitively understand that the sentence is 
wrong, we cannot fault it on purely logical terms. By showing a proposition which 
we know to be logically coherent, but still false, Jordan challenges the assumption 
that merely to think of a possible deity means that it needs to be assigned a non-
zero probability of existence. Thus attacking the premise at its origin, Jordan 
justifies his assignment of a zero probability to the existence of the sidewalk god. As 
308 Jordan, Pascal's Wager: 79. 
309 Except perhaps for Adam and Eve 
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he says: "No one who sincerely reflects on the matter will find the philosophers' 
fictions live hypotheses".310 He goes on: 
"being cooked up, the philosophers' fictions are maximally implausible. These 
gerrymandered hypotheses are so bizarre that one is justified in assigning them 
a zero possibility, or perhaps, if it is possible, an infinitesimal probability 
assignment. ,,311 
Jordan suggests the analogy of tossing a coin. When we discuss a coin toss, we do 
not usually allow for the possibility that the coin may land on its edge,312 or be 
swallowed by a passing crow or to vanish into thin air. All of these are theoretically 
possible, yet in standard decision theory we would only look at the 'heads' and 
'tails' outcomes. Paul Saka is unhappy with this analogy, arguing that if a coin were 
to land on its edge, we would not consider the toss to have been successful and we 
would simply toss the coin again.313 He suggest that this is why we would exclude 
the aberrant results from the probability matrix. However, we must allow that no 
such opportunity exists in the Wager. There is no chance to toss the coin again; 
indeed this becomes a major support for Jordan's Jamesian formulation of the 
Wager, which we shall consider shortly. 
The weakness of Jordan's rejection here seems to be that he could be accused of 
privileging his own judgement as to what should be considered as a valid possibility. 
Strict atheists could (and do) claim that they find the Christian God to be 
"maximally implausible". If they sincerely believe that God to be fictional, then they 
feel justified in putting him in the same category as the Flying Spaghetti Monster. It 
is not clear how Jordan's view trumps theirs. As Saka observes: "The privileging of 
one's own culture [ ... ] is unjustified ethnocentrism".314 
Infinitesimal probability a/finding the right god 
The generation of an infinitely large pantheon of possibilist gods is pursued because 
it is alleged that this reduces the probability of finding the correct one to an 
infinitesimal quantity. Some authors (e.g. Gale315) have suggested that if we 
multiply an infinite value by an infinitesimal one, the result is infinitesimal and thus 
Pascal's Wager will fail to deliver an infinite reward, because the infinitesimal 
probability will dwarf the infinite reward received. This is not true. let us consider 
two infinite series: 
A=2x2x2x2x ... 
310 Jordan, Pascal's Wager: 80. 
311 Ibid., 81. 
m Ibid., although the wilder examples are my own. 
313 Saka, "Pascal's Wager". 325. 
314 Ibid., 340. 
315 Gale, On the Nature and Existence o/God: 350. 
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111 B=- x - x - X ••• 222 
We might suggest that A x B = 1, but the actual result is undefined because we 
could bracket the individual elements in an infinite number of ways. e.g. 
~ ~ x (2 x D x ~ ~ x (2 x D... = infinitesimal 
2 x G x 2) x 2 x G x 2) ... = infinite 
In Robinsonian non-standard analysis, the product of an infinite and an infinitesimal 
is known as an indeterminate form.316 We cannot determine the product, unless we 
know what the infinity and the infinitesimals actually are and how we should 
combine them. 
The implied argument from Oppy et al. is that if there are a non-denumerable 
infinity of possible gods, of whom only a finite number can offer infinite bliss, then 
our chances of receiving that reward are infinitesimal and thus so is our expected 
utility. As we have just seen, this assumes that the infinity of reward will necessarily 
be less than the reciprocal of the infinitesimal probability. We might counter that a 
suitable deity should be able to offer a reward which is greater than the number of 
possibilist alternatives, which is itself necessarily limited by human imagination. 
leaving aside pure mathematical objections about the relative sizes of infinity, if we 
accept that there are a non-denumerable infinity of gods to consider, then it is clear 
that we cannot ever make a decision, because it would take an infinite amount of 
time to consider all the alternatives. It would not be considered rational to make a 
choice without considering each option fairly and thus the infinite pantheon 
effectively stifles Pascal's Wager, even if it does not defeat it on decision-theoretical 
grounds. 
I believe that the problem posed by number-based deities should be decomposed 
into two separate tasks: 
(a) Is there a deity who uses a number-based criterion as the determinant of 
salvation? 
(b) .What is the actual number? 
If we are able to reject proposition (a), then proposition (b) has no force. The fact 
that the number space is infinite does not constrain us to postulate an infinite 
316 H Jerome Keisler, Foundations of Infinitesimal Calculus, (2007), 
http://www.math.wisc.edu/ ... keisler/foundations.pdf. 31. 
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number of possibilist deities. It only requires us to postulate a single deity whose 
criterion is unknowable, but which is selected from an infinite set. Since the 
demands upon us are unknowable, there is no way for us to knowingly mitigate our 
risk and, according to the Principle of Accepted Immitigable Risk, if we cannot 
mitigate it, then we must accept it. We have no choice therefore, but to accept this 
residual risk of all number-based deities, which then leaves us free to ignore them 
and concentrate on the risks that we might be able to mitigate. 
Jordan's approach to this problem is suitably pragmatic. As we saw earlier, there 
are always a non-denumerable number of wrong answers, but that does not make 
each wrong answer as probable as the correct one. For the objection to hold, it has 
to assume that all possible gods are equiprobable with the real one, although there 
is no reason to believe that this is true. We saw on page 42 that the Principle of 
Indifference, which suggests that we might treat them as equiprobable, is itself 
deeply flawed and should not be held up as any sort of yardstick. 
By analogy, let us assume that you wish to find Kevin Grumball in the UK. We can 
easily postulate an infinite number of possible Kevins as well as (at least) one real 
one.317 However, this does not inflate the task in the slightest, since we will not 
actually search through that imaginary set. While Kevin may require effort to find, 
the work will only be finite. 
Jordan's approach here is to repeat his earlier rebuttal that mere logical possibility 
does not require assignment of a non-zero probability. Just as with our task in 
finding the real Kevin, Jordan holds that we do not need to search through fictitious 
imaginings. Paul Saka is not so sure and thinks this may be begging the question. 
If a religious proposition P currently numbers among our background beliefs, 
then (assuming methodological conservatism) we already have a reason to 
believe P; Pascalian calculations are beside the point, as they won't affect P's 
status for us. On the other hand, if P does not currently count as one of our 
background beliefs, there is no reason for us to be conservative about it.318 
He wants us to be open minded and suggests that excluding the sidewalk god might 
be pre-judging the question. While we may choose to exclude the fictions, we need 
to have sufficient reason to do so and we cannot presume that everyone else 
should do likewise. "In order legitimately to assign a probability of zero to a 
proposition, one needs to have a reason for doing SO".319 
317 1 know of at least one other Kevin Grumball in the world, but he does not live In the UK. 
318 Saka, "Pascal's Wager". 325. 
319 Ibid., 326. 
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I do not entirely agree. It seems just as valid to demand that I should assign a 
probability of zero unless I have a reason to do otherwise.32o Thus, I am only obliged 
to consider one of the fictions if I have a reason to believe that it might be true and 
if there is an opportunity for me to mitigate my risk in that case. In the case of 
actualist options, the presence of at least one genuine believer might require me to 
assign a non-zero probability, but for the fictions, no such obligation exists. This 
immediately reduces the search space from an infinite proposition to a finite one, 
which we will now consider. 
Actualist options and Jordan's Ecumenical Wager 
The earliest critics of the Wager like Voltaire and Diderot saw no reason to invent 
gods, as they could find enough contradictions in the actual religions around 
them.321 let us assume that there are two competing religions, A and B, where each 
offers similar infinite rewards for belief. If we assume that we cannot believe in 
both, then we face 3 choices: believe in A, believe in B or reject both. If each option 
is considered equiprobable, the outcomes are as follows: 
EVs = 1/3 X oos 
EVNeither = 1/3 x 0 
So it becomes irrational to reject both A and B, because choosing either of the 
other options has equal infinite utility; any god will do, but atheism will not. Jordan 
calls this his 'ecumenical' version322 of the Wager. 
Although I will discuss some actualist examples in this essay, including non-deistic 
belief systems, I do not explore them in any detail, because critics of the Wager 
generally reject all religions, rather than anyone in particular. In addition, merely 
identifying all the variants of actualist faiths and assembling them into a suitable 
systematic framework would be a significant task in its own right. The intent of this 
thesis is to develop a toolkit which can be used to decide between competing faiths 
with respect to Pascal's Wager, rather than to identify the one which I consider to 
be the most successful in that regard. That would be an area for future research. 
320 De Finetti might not agree with me here, because he holds that we should only assign a zero 
probability if we believe it to be impossible. However, I am faced with a pragmatic decision based 
upon my finite resources. I cannot consider all the options, so I believe that I can assign a 'pragmatic 
zero' to the probability of such deities. I will return to this when I discuss zero probabilities on p146. 
321 Contra Blackburn, Dawkins et al who suggest that lih Century thinkers were only aware of 
Christianity. 
322 Jeff Jordan, "The Many-Gods Objection," in Gambing on God, ed. Jeff Jordan (lanham, Maryland: 
Rowman and littlefield, 1984), 110. 
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Jordan's Jamesian Wager 
William James argued that a decision could legitimately be made under uncertainty, 
even if there were no conclusive evidence either way, as long as three conditions 
prevailed: 
• It should be a 'live' option, by which James means that it must contain only 
hypotheses that you might reasonably consider to have some chance of 
being true. 
• It should be a 'forced' decision, where there is no opportunity to suspend 
judgment pending proper evidence. 
• It should be 'momentous' by which James means a once-in-a-lifetime 
opportunity: 
"if I were Dr. Nansen and proposed to you to join my North Pole expedition, 
your option would be momentous; for this would probably be your only similar 
opportunity, and your choice now would either exclude you from the North Pole 
sort of immortality altogether or put at least the chance of it into your 
hands. ,,323 
It is clear that at least two of these pre-conditions are met within the Wager. It is 
certainly 'momentous', since the decision affects our eternal destiny. It is also 
'forced', since we have to decide before we die and we have no opportunity to 
suspend judgment until later. As Pascal notes: "Yes, but you must wager. There is 
no choice, you are already committed".324 
Jordan's innovation in relating it to objections to Pascal's Wager is to insist that any 
of the choices to be considered must be living options in James' terms. 
"A living option is one in which both hypotheses are live ones. If I say to you: "Be 
a theosophist or be a Mohammedan, " it is probably a dead option, because for 
you neither hypothesis is likely to be alive. But if I say: "Be an agnostic or be 
Christian," it is otherwise: trained as you are, each hypothesis makes some 
appeal, however small, to your belief ,,325 
Jordan therefore dismisses the philosophers' fictions en masse, as none of them 
could be living options for anyone rational. 
"If one finds a hypothesis maximally implausible, even if logically pOSSible, and a 
pure fantasy, one will find that the hypothesis 'refuses to scintillate with any 
credibility at all".326. 
323 James, The Will To Believe: I. 
324 Pascal, Pensees: 123. L418 
325 James, The Will To Believe: I. 
326 Jordan, Pascal's Wager: 96. (the last phrase in inverted commas comes from James) 
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Oddly, Jordan ignores to the probable counter from the hard-line atheist. I would 
expect a New Atheist to reply that she finds the Christian God just as implausible as 
any of the possibilist alternatives and that Christianity is therefore not a live 
hypothesis for her. 
We might rebut this argument to some extent by pointing out that the atheist 
needs to start by admitting that as a resident of the UK, her own noetic state could 
be either theist or atheist, depending on a wide range of factors, and that this state 
should be considered to be mutable. After all, we can see examples where even 
hard-line atheists, such as Anthony Flew, can reconsider late in life327 and we also 
know of famous British theists (e.g. the triple-jumper Jonathan Edwards328) who 
have lost their faith. As Craig Duncan notes, it is irrational that an atheist should 
remain so if she encounters suitably convincing evidence, even if such evidence 
would not necessarily be available to anyone else.329 It must be allowed that an 
atheist living in a Christian country might have been Christian instead, had certain 
things been different in her life. It is difficult to avoid any encounter with the 
Christian faith in the British education system, not least because it is a statutory 
obligation on all state schools. It is also unlikely that any given atheist has never 
encountered a single Christian who is both rational and articulate. Although the 
atheist may be reasonably sure that such a Christian is wrong-headed, it would be 
dogmatic to assume that she could never have been like that person. Thus it can be 
argued that her current faith stance is simply a matter of probability, rather than an 
immutable fact, and Christianity should be allowed as a live option in the Wager, 
even if the atheist currently believes it to be false. 
The question, therefore is whether a British atheist can successfully claim that 
Christianity is truly not a live hypothesis. I can quite accept that such an atheist 
could claim that Odin is a fiction, just as much as the animist deities observed in 
what we would consider to be primitive cultures. I am less convinced that it is a 
fully defensible stance for a British national to take an immovable stance on the 
existence of the Christian God. Too much of our culture is bound up in its Judeo-
Christian origins for these to be simply extracted, as if our current value system 
were not rooted in a religiously-inspired one. Nietzsche is particularly scathing 
about what he saw as a typically English attempt to remove Christianity from our 
Western European world-view. He writes: 
"When one gives up the Christian faith, one pulls the right to Christian morality 
out from under one's feet. This morality is by no means self-evident: this point 
has to be exhibited again and again. despite the English flatheads. Christianity is 
327 Anthony Flew, There Is A God (New York: Harper Collins, 2007). 
328 http://www.scotsman.com/sport/interview-jonathan-edwards-record-holding-athlete-l-1S60S08 
329 Duncan, "Do Vague Probabilities Really Scotch Pascal's Wager?," 281. 
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a system, a whole view of things thought out together. By breaking one main 
concept out of it, the faith in God, one breaks the whole: nothing necessary 
remains in one's hands . ... it has truth only if God is the truth - it stands and 
falls with faith in God. ,,330 
I suggest that the atheist's claim to be able to extricate themselves from the 
Christian culture in which they are immersed is therefore particular difficult task, 
yet it is one that must be absolutely achieved before it would be legitimate to 
assert the Christianity could never be a live hypothesis in any degree. 
James offers more hope, though, since his definition of a live hypothesis "is one 
which appeals as a real possibility to him to whom it is proposed". To be live in 
James' terms is thus for something to be a 'real' possibility, which I think might 
require a greater epistemic weight that a mere outside possibility. If we adopt 
James' stricter requirement, then we might allow the atheist's claim to hold in this 
regard, despite my own reservations. Jordan uses the term 'live hypothesis' in the 
rather weaker sense that it is something which ought to be at least considered, 
without being dismissed out of hand. 
For our atheist to escape the ecumenical version, combined with the Jamesian one, 
however, she would require the denial of the possibility of any and all post-death 
reward systems and an assertion that all actualist faiths are wrong, but without any 
evidence to actually support this belief. I would suggest that this takes her rather 
further into the realms of dogma, than those of argument. 
Where there might be more room for manoeuvre is in the sort of quasi-deistic faith 
that Dawkins and others have allowed as a possibility. While denying that any of the 
traditional religions are correct, Dawkins accepts that it might be permissible to 
believe in a form of what he calls "Einsteinian religion". However, he would 
strenuously deny that any such deity would take any interest in the affairs of 
mankind, and would reject the idea of earning an afterlife through such a belief.331 
Pascal would have had little time for such a stance and he condemned Descartes for 
what he saw as an attempt in that direction: 
"/ cannot forgive Descartes. In all his philosophy he would have been quite 
willing to dispense with God. But he had to make Him give a fillip to set the 
world in motion; beyond this, he has no further need of God,,332 
330 Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight a/the Idols, Or, How to Philosophize with the Hammer, trans. 
Richard Po It (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1889). 80-81. 
331 Dawkins, The God Delusion: 18-19. 
332 Blaise Pascal, Pensees, trans. W.F. Trotter (1944). B77 (NB: this fragment does not appear in 
lafuma's or Sellier's editions.) 
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Jordan's Next Best Thing 
Jordan attempts to bring these objections together and recasts a single traditional 
deity, a deviant theology (i.e. one where the deity favours atheists) and atheism 
into a 3x3 matrix, arguing that any other cases are simply variants of those primitive 
options. 
Deity exists 
Accept deity 
Accept atheism 
Accept deviant theology 
Atheism is correct 
, 
Deviant theology 
is true 
Three of these cells (Fl' Fa and Fg) yield infinite reward and we can assume that we 
are indifferent between them. Each row has one chance of achieving the infinite 
bliss and we should note that even the atheist receives infinite bliss if the deviant 
theology turns out to be true, by virtue of having rejected all deities. 
Jordan argues that his Jamesian Wager offers a reward that is at least as good as 
the best of the other outcomes available and has no outcome worse than the worst 
of the other two outcomes. If we want to accept the deity, therefore, we simply 
need to establish that Fl is as good as the best outcome in the other two rows, 
which it is, because it is infinite. We next need to show that F4 and F7 are no worse 
than the worst outcomes of the other options. Jordan holds that this is the case, 
since the deviant theology's hell is no worse than the deity's (although I think that 
this might be open to debate) and that atheism has no downside after death. 
Having established this, he then observes that in the event of a tie we are still 
obliged to make a decision. Since we have exhausted the EV calculations, he 
suggests that we may use other criteria in order to make a choice. His solution is to 
use what he calls the "next-best thing",333 which is to look at the finite costs of 
each. This is in accord with my Tie-Break Principle. 
Rescher (and others) hold that there are costs to belief/34 and it is orthodox 
doctrine that Christian faith may involve sacrifice and suffering. Jordan, however, 
draws on sociological studies which demonstrate that religious faith may improve 
lifespan and increase the level of happiness among believers, as compared with 
unbelievers. Thus, he argues that it is rational to choose Christianity because it does 
no worse in the worst case, does at least as well in the best case and appears to 
grant benefits in this life too. Personally, I think this simply reflects the society in 
which the surveys were conducted. If we had interviewed Christians burning at 
Nero's parties, the statistics might have given a significantly different picture. 
333 Jordan, Pascal's Wager: 89. 
334 Rescher, Pascal 's Wager: a study of practical reasoning in philosophical theology: 31. 
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Jordan runs the risk of making Christianity a fair-weather faith, to be abandoned 
when adversity threatens. I suggest that it runs counter to the Pascalian spirit for us 
to be relying on positive returns in the material world. 
Solving the many gods problem by a process of elimination 
In moving on to my own solution to the many-gods objection, we will draw upon 
the principles outlined on page 58 and also upon my discussion around hiddenness 
on page Error! Bookmark not defined •. Many of these have been taken for granted 
in other models, much like the hidden assumptions of the Wager which I discussed 
on page 45. 
It is my contention that we can eliminate the vast majority of possible gods. For 
some of these cases it will be because we cannot change our behaviour in order to 
meet their criteria. In others it will be because the proposed god is actually 
internally incoherent. By eliminating a lot of the distractions, I believe that we can 
focus more clearly on those that actually matter. Mine is to be a pragmatic 
approach. 
Predestination 
My first partitioning of candidates is between those cases where our actions can 
realistically change the outcome and those where they cannot. If we cannot 
reasonably meet the god's criteria for acceptance then no mitigation is possible for 
the risks we face. Under my Principle of Accepted Immitigable Risk on page 58, we 
agreed that that if a scenario offers no mitigation, then its risks will be deemed to 
be accepted and the scenario dismissed from further consideration. Thus, for any 
predestining deity, we must simply accept the risk of not having been selected and 
not spend any further effort in considering whether or not it may apply to us. 
To show no favour, we should start with Pascal's own Christian orthodoxy. Pascal is 
heavily influenced by the Jansenists, an austere Augustinian sect, and his writings 
reflect their teaching. In his Writings On Grace, we find passages like: 
"That God, by an absolute and irrevocable will, wanted to save his elect, in a 
purely gratuitous act of goodness, and that he abandoned the others to the evil 
desires to which he could have justly abandoned all men." 335 
Jordan writes: "Although a Catholic in allegiance, Pascal was Calvinistic regarding 
grace and free will". Voltaire spotted this at the time and complained: 
"It is in my interest no doubt, that there is a God, but it in your system, God only 
came for so few people, if the small number of the elect is terrifying, if I can do 
335 Pascal, "Writings on Grace," 222. 
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nothing at all by my own efforts, tell me, please, what interest I have in 
believing you ?,,336 
Jordan, however, sees no problems with predestination and declares "the doctrine 
of predestination is no part of the Wager and one can endorse and employ the 
wager without subscribing to that doctrine".337 While I agree one can employ the 
Wager if one does not subscribe to predestination, I am not sure how one could do 
so in the other case. Jordan's defence of this point seems weak, saying that 
inculcating belief may still have value and besides, the doctrine may be wrong. I 
contend that it would be on very dubious moral ground to encourage people to risk 
all that they have, in pursuit of something which they could never achieve. 
I hold that for all gods who predestine people, the Wager is irrelevant. No matter 
what they do, they cannot get themselves either into (or out of) the elect and no 
mitigation of risk is feasible. Thus, using the Principle of Accepted Immitigable Risk, 
we simply ignore predestining gods from our calculations and focus our attention 
on risks which we may be able to mitigate. 
Of course, we must remember that no one can know for certain whether they are 
predestined or not, so they must behave under the Wager as if predestination did 
not apply. While this may seem a belt-and-braces approach, it may be a prudent 
one. 
Universalism 
The universalist god is like the predestining god as far as the Wager is concerned. 
No-one will actually be rejected by such a god, so actions make no difference and it 
is another case where the Principle of Accepted Immitigable Risk applies. No 
mitigation is possible (or necessary), because no actions of our own can expose us 
to the risk of rejection. 
Bartha notes an interesting corollary when we are considering a choice between a 
universalist god A and a less forgiving one B. In this case, we have nothing to gain by 
believing in A, since we will be admitted to A's heaven, even if we choose B. 
Therefore, we should choose B, because we win if B exists and still get to A's 
heaven, even if we are wrong. As Bartha says, "Nice gods finish lastl,,338 
Saka observes: "If the universalist God exists, it doesn't matter what you believe 
now because your payoff in the long run will always be infinite.,,339 The existence of 
a universalist god does not affect any of the other choices in the Wager and thus we 
336 Voltaire, Pascal's Thoughts, 127. 
331 Jordan, Pascal's Wager: 145. 
338 Bartha, "Relative Utilities," 38. 
339 Saka, "Pascal's Wager". 337. 
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should always act as if such a God does not exist, even if that might seem a little 
churlish. 
Reincarnation 
Saka argues that we need to include Buddhism in the matrix and that "Buddhist 
practice not only isolates one from the joys and sorrows of earthly life, it precludes 
theistic worship.,,34o As Buddhism is clearly not a philosophers' fiction, it cannot 
simply be discarded on those grounds, so we need to consider what effect it has. I 
propose that one key can be found in Buddhism's doctrine of reincarnation, which 
suggests that if we do not achieve nirvana in this life, we will re-enter the wheel of 
reincarnation and try again in another Iife.341 
Thus we have an option which is not available to the traditional theist - a second 
chance. Richard Carrier suggests that the "best kind of God" would "include 
reincarnation in alternate (sic) universes: so those not saved get to try again and 
again until they learn.,,342 In this model all souls would eventually attain nirvana and 
Buddhism will behave more like a universalist god in its payoff. If everyone gets 
salvation eventually, we need not waste what might be our only shot at immortality 
by selecting an option which has inbuilt mitigation.343 
Many believers in reincarnation report some knowledge of their previous lives, so 
they might argue that this constitutes sufficient evidence in order to remove the 
uncertainty which is a fundamental precursor of the Wager. Pascal says: "Reason 
cannot make you choose",344 but if reason could make you choose, then the Wager 
is not required. Let us assume that there is a finite probability p in each life that you 
will acquire enough knowledge of previous lives to properly believe In 
reincarnation. The probability that you will believe after your nth life can be 
calculated as 1- (1- p)n and this will tend towards unity very rapidly as the 
number of lives increases. It is also affected by the probability that you will attain 
nirvana in a given life; once you do this, by whatever means, you will no longer 
need to believe anything. This model of progressive improvement operates in a 
similar manner to the universalist case, albeit over several lifetimes rather than just 
one. We would therefore dismiss it from our risk management strategy, since it acts 
a safety-net, without our needing to consider it further. 
340 Ibid., 331. 
341 1 admit that this description is heavily over-simplified, but space does not allow a fuller 
discussion. 
342 Carrier, "The End of Pascal's Wager?". 2. 
343 We should note that this argument will hold true for every incarnation in the absence of any 
deciding information, so the soul should rationally choose to support a deity rather than Buddhism 
on each occasion. The corollary of this strategy is that, if pursued for eternity, no soul would ever 
actually attain nirvana, except by accident, such as ifthe deity chosen requires a religious practice 
close enough to Buddhism as to provide the desired effects. 
344 Pascal, Pensees: 122. L418 
127 
No god and/or no after-life 
If atheism is correct and there is no deity, or if there is a God, but there is no 
afterlife for us, as is suggested by some strands of Judaism, then this is another case 
where there is no mitigation available. We cannot achieve infinite bliss, whatever 
we believe and so the Principle of Accepted Immitigable Risk excludes the option 
from further consideration. 
This is a very similar case to the universalist god, but a lot less cheerful, because no 
one gets to heaven. There is therefore no pragmatic reason to ever believe in 
atheism (or no after-life), except in the hope that there are gains to be made in 
earthly existence. As we have already seen, there is no good evidence that this is 
the case, at least in modern Western democracies. 
In these four models of predestination, universalism, reincarnation and no after-
life, we have very briefly examined cases where a change in behaviour will not grant 
us an infinite reward (except perhaps in progress towards nirvana). We have seen 
there is no mitigation available to us in any of these situations and thus, under the 
Principle of Accepted Immitigable Risk, we must accept the risk that they may be 
correct and dismiss them from further consideration. 
I would now like to move on to look at the options when our behaviour will have a 
direct bearing on our heavenly reward. The key point of my analysis here will be to 
examine how we are to know what behaviour the deity values. If our eternal 
reward is conditional upon our behaviour, then successful mitigation of the risk will 
depend entirely upon our ability to behave in the approved manner. Pascal's 
suggestions of what we should do once we are convinced by his logic are framed in 
terms of French Catholicism and it seems safe to assume that Pascal expected us to 
believe in the Christian God. If we are to consider theological alternatives, these 
will necessarily come with their own demands upon us. If these demands turn out 
to be not achievable, or knowable, then it will not be possible to mitigate our risks 
in respect of those deities and thus we will exclude them under the Principle of 
Accepted Immitigable Risk. 
Arbitrary gods 
Many of the philosophers' fictions fall into the category of being arbitrary in their 
demands. The requirement imposed matches no known ethical system and is 
selected purely to frustrate the decision theory of the Wager. We find here the real-
number god, Oppy's multiple variations on a theme and Gale's "two-crack" god 
about whom Jordan wryly observes that if anyone were to profess belief in such a 
god, listeners would "properly think that sidewalks are not the only things 
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cracked".345 The essence of each is that the god's demands are unknowable by 
human means. 
This unknowability proves to be the gods' downfall under the Wager. We should 
start by properly excluding from consideration any cases where we cannot perform 
the required action. If a god only accepts elephants, then it is beyond my abilities to 
be one. Such a god has already predestined me to rejection. This can naturally be 
extended to the case where we cannot know what the action is. We might stumble 
across the solution by blind luck, but that is necessarily unlikely given the 
construction of these arbitrary gnostic gods. I have an infinitesimal probability of 
doing so, therefore it is unlikely that anyone gets to heaven. 
Our only real chance is either that we innately have the ability, or that the god 
reveals the solution to US.346 If knowing the solution is an innate skill, then there 
cannot be a non-denumerable infinity of such solutions, as we are finite and must 
be capable of knowing and/or articulating the single value. Pragmatically, we would 
also expect to see real-life examples of such religions, because this innate desire or 
knowledge would surely manifest itself into action 
If the required information is to be given by direct revelation, it is solely up to the 
god to choose to whom she will reveal the solution and that action becomes 
indistinguishable from predestination. 
If we do not have either available to us, then we have no realistic chance of success 
and should therefore treat them all as if they predestined us to failure. As we have 
seen, such cases have no mitigation and thus miscarry under the Principle of 
Accepted Immitigable Risk and we can dismiss them from further consideration 
with impunity. 
Perverse gods and/or theologies 
Within the pantheon of perverse gods, there are subtle distinctions. I will, therefore 
deal with the general case and then highlight how the principles apply to specific 
cases. 
Let us start with the anti-Pascalian god, who rejects all those who believe in god 
because of Pascal's Wager. It is unclear why the deity (or mechanism) should take 
. such a pathological dislike to Pascal's Wager that they will cast its supporters into 
stygian darkness. Nonetheless, the theme occurs often enough in anti-Pascalian 
writing that we need to give it proper consideration. 
Firstly, this fails the test of understanding the text of the Wager, since it is clear that 
Pascal does not think that faith can be achieved in this way. Such a god is objecting 
345 Jordan, Pascal's Wager: 81. 
346 As discussed on pSS. 
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to doxastic voluntarism, but that is a straw man, as Pascal agrees. Accepting the 
Wager to be true means behaving in the same way as believers until genuine faith 
arrives, which Pascal expected would be by grace. I consider it exceptionally 
unlikely that there is anyone at any time who would meet the criteria for rejection, 
so I suggest that we can safely dismiss it as another case without mitigation and 
deal with it under the Principle of Accepted Immitigable Risk. 
A specific instance to consider is Leslie Stephen's objection: 
"[God] may choose - it is not a very wild hypothesis - to damn me for lying or 
deliberate self-deception. If, as we are supposing, He has not supplied me with 
evidence of a fact, He may be angry with me for deliberately manufacturing 
beliefs without evidence"347 
The damnation is here for self-deception, even though it has led to the correct 
conclusion - after all, Stephen's God does exist in this scenario, so the believer has 
reached the right answer. It therefore seems that Stephen's god values correct 
process more than correct results and I personally would not be too enthusiastic 
about spending eternity with such a pedant. It might be argued that it is not 
unreasonable to value the process more than the results. We would be 
unimpressed by someone who merely guessed the answer to a complicated 
mathematical problem, because it is a requirement of that discipline that a person 
should be able to show their working. A deity might be more interested in how the 
results were obtained, than in whether the person obtained the correct result. Yet 
has the believer actually committed the offence which Stephen suggests? To do so, 
she would have to manufacture belief, but that is not a requirement of the Wager 
at all. As we have said, accepting the Wager is about changing one's behaviour as 
part of a therapeutic experiment. 
For Stephen's objection to succeed, it must therefore entail that it is invalid to use 
any form of behavioural experimentation. Pascal is not insisting that we deceive 
ourselves, but rather that we perform the sort of behavioural experiment which is 
routinely employed in Cognitive Behavioural Therapy as we saw on page 58. While I 
might accept that to deliberately deceive oneself might be seen by God as being a 
wicked action, I am hard put to agree that a simple experiment should also be 
outlawed by any deity who can measure up to our MaximalGod requirement. We 
must bear in mind that the God does actually exist in this scenario and thus it must 
be defensible to believe that this God exists. 
let us examine the two possible outcomes of our behavioural experiment. If we 
perform the various ritual actions, but nothing works for us and thus we do not 
347 leslie Stephen, "Pascal," in Studies of a Biographer (london: Duckworth &Co, 1898), 274-5. in 
Jordan, Pascal's Wager: 75. 
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form a belief in God, we are apparently safe (if wrong). On the other hand, if the 
experiment succeeds such that we now believe that God exists, then since God 
does exist, this is actually a true belief. What course of action would be open to us 
now? In order to not believe that God exists and thus satisfy the requirements, we 
will need to deceive ourselves and deliberately embrace a falsehood. It must surely 
be a greater sin to deliberately embrace a lie than to believe in the truth. 
It might be that we wish to suggest that the deity rejects everyone who believes for 
the 'wrong' reasons, in which case, there must be a duty of care on this god to 
make us aware what the 'right' reasons are, such that we can be in no reasonable 
doubt as to the procedure to be followed. As in my mathematical example above, 
we could not condemn a student for using the wrong method, unless we had made 
it abundantly clear what the right method is.348 Ultimately this sort of reasoning 
becomes moral, rather than the utilitarian basis that we agreed would govern 
discussions and I will discuss moral objections in more detail on page 165. 
The only safe state in this particular scenario appears to be the one where the deity 
does not exist, in which case we have nothing to fear anyway. Although Stephen 
asserts that it is "not a wild hypothesis", I rather believe that it is. 
Martin's 'Perverse Master' 
The next class is the god who rejects everyone who believes in him, or any other 
supernatural being. Martin suggests a Perverse Master who "punishes with infinite 
torment after death anyone who believes in God or any other supernatural being 
(including himself)".349 Oppy's Perverse God "who infinitely rewards all and only 
those who fail to believe in any God" is very similar. 
Why does the god do this? Is it for lack of evidence (often tacitly assumed in various 
formulations) or sheer contrariness? If it is because of lack of evidence, we will 
come to this in the Cliffordian god presently. If it is just perversity, then proponents 
might take the opportunity to recite "God moves in mysterious ways" at this point 
and refuse to explain further, claiming that this is a favourite ploy of theists when 
faced with questions of their god's motivations. 
Yet, what is it that this god wants? Apparently, she wants us to believe a falsehood. 
She does exist, but she wants us to act as if she does not. Rationally, we therefore 
need to deceive ourselves and to avoid any study of anything which might lead us 
to belief, which would probably include religion and philosophy. She effectively 
348 I will explore this line of thought further when I discuss the Clifford ian God on p141. 
349 Michael Martin, "Pascal's Wager as an Argument for Not Believing in God," Religious Studies 
19(1983). 
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desires liars and/or fools. To parody Graham Oppy, what is so great about getting 
very stupid people not to believe in God?35o 
Such a God wants her followers to be deceivers (of at least themselves, if not of 
others), so it seems foolish to assume that such a god will be good. Any god who 
wants only the dishonest and/or stupid in the after-life does not seem to be a god 
who can be trusted in the slightest degree. A promise of eternal life from such a god 
looks like a very dubious proposition indeed. We should therefore reject such a 
deity under the Principle of Maximality (that any god to be considered must at least 
meet the criteria prescribed for a MaximaIGod). 
Finally, how could we meet these requirements if we genuinely were to believe in 
such a perverse god? We have already ruled out doxastic voluntarism and any 
effective study of science in such a universe might point towards the existence of 
that god, simply because that is the true state of affairs. That is, unless the deity is 
also prepared to falsify the origin of the universe to such an extent that it would be 
unreasonable for anyone to believe that it was divinely made. Unless the deity is a 
perfect forger/liar/trickster, it would seem that the diligent enquirer will find it 
difficult to escape from belief and thus hellfire. The only logical approach would be 
to avoid any pursuit of knowledge, lest the inadvertent discovery of the deity's 
existence should cost the seeker all that they have. I suggest that this case has no 
mitigation for intellectually honest people and thus we should reject it under the 
Principle of Accepted Immitigable Risk. 
Kaufman's God 
As a variation on this theme, Walter Kaufman suggests a god who "punishes all and 
only those who endeavour to engage in religious activity to please him and who 
rewards those indifferent to religion" .351 This is slightly different, in that the sin is 
engaging in religion, rather than simple belief in his existence. Yet what constitutes 
'religion'? The anthropologist (and atheist) Clifford Geertz suggests that religion is: 
"a system of symbols which acts to establish powerful, pervasive, and long-
lasting moods and motivations in men by formulating conceptions of a general 
order of existence and clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality 
that the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic. ,,352 
He claims that "religious symbols formulate a basic congruence between a 
particular style of life and a specific (if, most often, implicit) metaphysic, and in so 
350 Oppy, "On Rescher on Pascal's Wager," 4. 
351 Walter Kaufman, Critique of Religion and Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1978). 
352 Clifford Geertz, "Religion As a Cultural System," in The Interpretation a/Cultures (New York: Basic 
Books, 1973), 90. 
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doing sustain each with the borrowed authority of the other".353 Geertz focuses 
not on the reality of the deity, or even of the truth of the underlying metaphysical 
concept, but rather that religion consists of a series of behaviours, or at least the 
tendency to perform them. He suggests that to be pious is not to be performing 
something that we would call an act of piety, but to be liable to perform such an 
act.354 
Geertz's definition seems quite wide-reaching in including non-deistic religious 
activity as well as conventional faiths. I believe that I could argue that many 
believers in scientific naturalism, such as Dawkins, Hitchens et al would also be 
caught up in its net (although space does not permit fuller discussion here). If their 
attempts to use symbols such as "selfish genes" to "establish powerful, pervasive, 
and long-lasting moods and motivations in men", might the deity also class them as 
religious? If, as Geertz suggests, it is sufficient to merely to have a tendency to do 
so, then it would seem that few humans could escape damnation under Kaufman's 
god. To be fair, Geertz does draw a distinction between secular and religious 
motivations when he observes that a "man can indeed be said to be 'religious' 
about golf, but not merely if he pursues it with passion and plays it on Sundays: he 
must also see it as symbolic of some transcendent truths.,,355 Whether the New . 
Atheists go that far with their regard for natural selection is debatable, but I would 
suggest that Clifford ian evidential ism, which I will discuss next, does show elements 
of the same sort of mutual reliance and reinforcement. 
There does seem to be an essential contradiction within Kaufman's theology. It 
seems reasonable to believe that, if a deity exists and wishes a certain form of 
behaviour, then they will embed that desire (or at least the knowledge of that 
required behaviour) into their creation. The created being might feel virtuous when 
obeying the deity's will and experience discomfort, such as pangs of conscience, 
when they are not. Presumably the deity will also endue a sense of the non-
existence of gods or perhaps the values an agnostic world-view, in order to ensure 
that their subjects are informed enough in order to be morally culpable. That Is, the 
god would take steps to "establish powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods and 
motivations in men by formulating conceptions of a general order of existence". 
Under Geertz's definition, this makes the deity guilty of religious behaviour and 
thus self-damned I 
There is an irresolvable tension between the deity's need to be completely hidden 
(in order to avoid giving evidence for the existence of a god, which could reasonably 
lead to the emergence of religious behaviour) and the desire that humans should 
353 Ibid. 
354 Ibid., 95. 
355 Ibid., 98. 
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follow a particular behavioural code, but without that code's becoming a religious 
system in itself. If there is to be a taboo on religious activity, then it seems that 
there needs to be some sort of rationale against religion which is intuitively obvious 
to all creatures. It must be self-evident or axiomatic, such that any individual would 
be morally culpable if they defied it. Yet, surely an intelligent, self-aware creature 
within that universe would ask why there was such a taboo and potentially reason 
their way to the god and thereby to their own destruction. 
Kaufman's god condemns those who engage in religious activity to please him, but I 
would argue that doing what God wants (or at least what the believer thinks God 
wants) is the very essence of theistic religious behaviour. In Christian belief, 
adherents are continually exhorted to listen to God and to do his will. The Lord's 
Prayer includes the wish that God's will should be done on Earth. Yet Kaufman's 
god leads to a paradox if we include doing the deity's will as part of religious 
behaviour. By which I mean that not engaging in religion will necessarily be 
religious, because it is performing that action at the behest of the deity, rather than 
for personal gratification, or other reasons (although I allow that it might have 
concomitant motivations) . 
Thus, by requiring his followers to avoid religion, the deity is commanding them to 
disobey him, because religion is attempting to do what that deity desires. His desire 
is that they should not do what he desires, but if they do not, then they will be 
doing what he desires. In other words, this is self-contradictory and no-one can 
ever succeed. Although superficially attractive (see the section on types of thinking 
on p207 for why these suggestions appeal) it is another case where no mitigation is 
possible and is therefore excluded under the Principle of Accepted Immitigable Risk. 
X-Theology 
In an attempt to head off such self-contradiction, Mougin & Sober's X-theology 
states that "atheists go to heaven and theists go to hell, regardless of whether God 
exists or not." 356 On the face of it, this escapes the circularity of Kaufman and the 
perverse gods, because it does not rely on any sort of deity. Yet Mougin & Sober are 
positing a theology which fails in the case where God does exist. Let me briefly 
sketch why this is the case. 
If God exists and is to meet the requirements of the MaximalGod hypothesis, he 
cannot be subject to X-theology because God must be the greatest thing in that 
universe. If the force behind X-theology were more powerful than the deity, then 
God clearly could not be a ~ a x i m a l G o d d and we would exclude him under the 
Principle of Maximality. 
3S6 Mougin and Sober, "Betting on Pascal's wager," 385. 
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A MaximalGod will protect theists from any consequences of X-theology, not least 
because it would be fundamentally unjust for them to go to hell when they are 
actually correct. Thus X-theology will necessarily be defeated in the case where God 
exists, at least in any case which we would consider. 
If God does not exist in this scenario, then the theists are indeed wrong, but they 
fare no worse than in any other case where they have believed in the 'wrong' harsh 
deity, which we have covered at length already on page 97. 
X-theology is thus simply a variant of Argle and Bargle, or any other pair of 
competing deities. We would deal with it by using tie-break criteria, such as our 
relative probabilities. I doubt that even Mougin & Sober regard X-Theology as 
having any possibility at all of being true and I suspect that the uncommitted would 
see it as far less likely than any conventional deity. 
In summary, not one of the perverse gods or theologies defeats the Wager. 
Cllffordian god 
Our final discussion on other gods will be to consider the evidentialist, or 
Cliffordian, god who arises from W.K. Clifford's statement: "it is wrong always, 
everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence.,,357 
Saka says: "Imagine a god who rewards intellectually scrupulous sceptics and 
punishes fawning worshippers.,,358 Various authors including Kaufman and Martin 
have suggested very similar variants to J.L Mackie's "professors' god": 
There might be a God who looked with more favour on honest doubters or 
atheists who, in Hume's words, proportioned their belief to the evidence, than 
on mercenary manipulation of their own understanding. Indeed, this would 
follow from the ascription to God of moral goodness,,359 
Space does not permit a complete examination of evidentialism and it is a task 
which the "Reformed Epistemologists" like Alvin Plantinga, Nicholas Worlterstorff, 
William Alston and others have tackled far more comprehensively than I am able to 
in this thesis. 
There are perhaps two separate concerns being put forward here and I would like 
to deal with them separately. There is a dimension to the Cliffordian objection 
which suggests that it is morally wrong to attempt to manipulate one's noetic state 
in pursuit of personal gain. I would like to deal with this more fully as part of the 
discussion around moral objections to the Wager on page 165. In this section I 
357 Clifford, "The Ethics of Belief." 
358 Saka, "Pascal's Wager". 328. 
359 Mackie, The Miracle 0/ Theism: 203. 
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focus more upon the logical difficulties in coherently describing a Cliffordian deity 
who might be able to provide a robust challenge to Pascal's Wager. 
I would like to highlight two other immediate problems that I see with the 
Cliffordian deity: 
• What constitutes evidence? 
• How much is 'enough'? 
Despite its popularity as an objection to the Wager,360 none of its supporters 
satisfactorily engage with these two essential points. Plantinga observes that 
evidentialists seem to take it for granted that the evidence in question must be 
propositional evidence, by which he means evidence from other propositions that 
we believe and that we derive our evidence for the current proposition by 
argument from those axioms.361 Plantinga dismisses this approach at great length 
and starts by arguing that it is self-contradictory, which seems apparent from 
Clifford's own words. For if it is always wrong to believe something without 
evidence, then what evidence and arguments does he offer to support this 
proposition? If none (and there can be none), then we must have a duty not to 
believe Clifford and thus reject this proposition as being morally wrong. 
Plantinga then discusses what he calls classical foundationalism, which he describes 
in the following terms: 
A belief [in classical foundationalismJ is acceptable for a person if (and only if) it 
is either properly basic (i.e. self-evident, incorrigible, or evident to the senses of 
that person), or believed on the evidential basis of propositions that are 
acceptable and that support it deductively, inductively, or abductively.362 
Plantinga both rejects this as the sole ground of rational justification (because it 
does not meet its own standards) and he also questions whether any such 
argument can, or even should be used in theistic discussions. He accepts that 
Christianity does not meet the requirements of classical foundationalism, but 
argues along with Thomas Reid that the majority of our beliefs do not conform to 
this pattern and are none the worse for it.363 While it may be quite clear from 
Plantinga's arguments that evidentialism is insufficient as a total belief system, 
perhaps our Clifford ian deity wishes it to be applied in the area of theistic beliefs, 
whatever we might use in other areas of knowledge. 
360 I think it also underpins some of the perverse theologies in that there is an assumption of 
Cliffordian logic, although it is usually hidden. 
361 Alvin Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000). 70. 
362 Ibid., 84-85. 
363 Ibid., 97. 
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If the Clifford ian deity wishes to be discoverable by an evidential route, I argue that 
he must endue his creation with either a properly basic belief in the existence (or 
non-existence) of himself, or must provide other properly basic beliefs and 
evidence which would rationally lead to a decision on this subject. It is apparent 
that the main proponents of evidentialism do not believe that a deity exists 
(Cliffordian or otherwise), otherwise they could accept Plantinga's arguments that 
his own theistic beliefs are properly basic to him. After a", if a deity exists and 
implants properly basic beliefs, then it would be reasonable that some people could 
legitimately claim to hold such beliefs. 
Since evidentialists are rejecting the notion that belief in a deity can be a properly 
basic belief, then it follows that an evidentialist god would need to place other 
foundational beliefs in humanity which we could rely upon as properly basic and 
that from those beliefs we could establish whether a deity exists or not by means of 
reason. Yet, if we could do such a thing, we would immediately run into the 
fundamental premiss of Pascal's Wager: that reason cannot decide. 
Thus, if we accept the premiss that reason cannot decide and simultaneously reject 
the notion of properly basic beliefs in a deity, then the evidentialist god must be 
perfectly hidden. Any evidence that exists wi" necessarily be equivocal and thus the 
Clifford ian would suggest that we should apportion belief equally between the 
existence or non-existence of the deity. It is not clear how one might achieve this 
and Pascal points out that to suspend judgment is to actually bet against God, 
because we are embarked upon the journey already. We therefore need to ask how 
we might mitigate our risk. 
If we accept that the evidence is equivocal and we feel that we cannot suspend 
judgement on such a momentous issue, then I argue that it is entirely reasonable to 
conduct a behavioural experiment, if only in order to obtain further evidence. If the 
Cliffordian god requires us to use evidential reasoning, then he must allow us to 
conduct experiments, without punishing us for doing so. Thus, the rational course 
would be to follow Pascal's prescription. 
I believe that Plantinga's approach comprehensively dismisses the truth claims and 
deontological responsibilities entailed by evidentialism and although this implies 
that no further work need be done here in addressing a Clifford ian deity, I would 
like to briefly sketch a different solution which tackles the issue based upon 
observable evidence and our own logical processes. 
Life in the Cliffordian universe 
let us consider the state of the universe in which the Cliffordians live. There is a 
god and the universe is created. Therefore the Argument from Design is not only 
true, but logica"y valid. The competent Cliffordian will assess the evidence and 
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should invariably conclude that the universe is created and that there is a god. 
Thus, all the Cliffordians will be theists, if they are to go by the evidence. 
If the Cliffordian god wishes to avoid this conclusion, although it is unclear why he 
should, then he must conceal himself completely. This is problematical, as he must 
not only conceal himself, he must also cover up all the evidence that he created the 
universe. Yet, this is only possible if he can create a universe which would appear 
that it could have spontaneously generated itself, or perhaps was created by an 
entirely different deity. Even if the physical laws of the universe allow for such 
spontaneous generation when examined by physicists, that will not stop the 
question of why those laws exist.364 There is an infinite regress of causality, of 
which the simplest solution is the correct one - that the Cliffordian god is the 
creator. If the god is to avoid this, he must deceive his creations and become an 
actor.365 Thus he stops being a good god and therefore fails the Principle of 
Maximality. How can people be expected to make valid judgements, if they are 
being manipulated to get the 'right' answer, which is, paradoxically, the wrong one? 
The Cliffordian god also has a problem with the advance of science. As people know 
more about the universe, their views on creation may change. Does the evidence 
required for salvation change with it? If so, then this may privilege the people of 
different eras, which is unjust. If not, then the number of people being saved over 
time may also vary, which is also unjust. 
It seems that we cannot construct a coherent universe for the Cliffordian god at all, 
let alone one which even vaguely resembles our own. What is the Cliffordian god to 
do with the theist whom he deems to have insufficient evidence? How could such a 
person even exist, unless the deity failed to give her an adequate sense of 
evidence? If he condemns her, then he is condemning someone who actually has 
the right answer, despite his best attempts to mislead. If he does not, how can he 
condemn any at all? 
Another wrinkle for the evidentialist deity is how one should apportion belief. After 
all, religiOUS belief is rather binary in nature and, as we have discussed, is not under 
our conscious control. If we are 70% sure that God exists, should we pray about 
70% of our concerns? If I think there is a 25% chance that God exists, am I 
allowed/required to go to church once a month? 
Let us consider a final paradox of the Cliffordian god by imagining that we are in this 
Cliffordian universe where the god has so ordered affairs that there is no conclusive 
evidence that he exists. In this universe I can confidently assert that I do not believe 
364 Remember that the Strong Anthropic Principle is also completely correct in the Cliffordian 
universe. 
365 The Greek word for actor is the root of our English word 'hypocrite'. 
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that there is enough evidence that the Cliffordian god exists and that I also do not 
believe in an uncountable infinity of gods, whom I can list until I get bored. I will 
then assert that the Christian god does exist. 
If the Clifford ian god exists, I should arguably be accepted into heaven, since I made 
the correct decision about him and about an uncountable infinity of gods. 
Admittedly, I made one slip about the Christian god, but it would be clearly unjust 
to condemn me for one error, when I got an uncountable infinity correct, including 
the question of the Cliffordian god, which is surely the most important. It seems 
unfair that he should privilege errors about the Christian god over all others, unless 
he supplied me with evidence that the Christian God does not exist. Thus, if the 
Cliffordian god does not exist, I should still get a second chance with the Christian 
god (or any other of my choosing). 
All these examples demonstrate that the possibility of a Cliffordian god is irrelevant 
to the Wager. Unless there is undeniable evidence for his existence, it suffices to 
deny him. 
Summary 
In this section I have demonstrated that all the possibilist cases of the many-gods 
objection fail, either because they are incoherent in themselves, or because they 
actually have no effect on the Wager. I support Jordan's Jamesian Wager, but it 
relies upon any objector's accepting Jordan's restriction to 'live' options. I have 
shown that the many-gods objections fail for other reasons beyond their being 
merely philosophers' fictions. Jordan hoped that "philosophers might be spurred to 
discard the many-gods objection onto the proverbial ash heap of philosophical 
history".366I believe I have removed any choice in the matter. 
366 Jordan, Pascal's Wager: 101. 
139 
3.5 Problems with Probability 
In the earlier sections, we have discussed different values of probability (p) in the 
expected value (EV). 
EV = p x reward 
If the reward is infinite, then any non-zero finite value for p will result in an infinite 
expected value. Yet what of the cases where p is zero, or an infinitesimal? In this 
section I will discuss why I believe that neither value is allowable for the rational 
person and I will also dismiss the possibility of an alternative pragmatic zero 
probability which might be suggested by opponents of the Wager. 
Does nothing beat the Wager? 
If the probability is zero, then clearly the expected value will also be zero, no matter 
what reward is offered. Several authors have proposed that it might be valid for 
someone to assign a probability of zero to God's existence and thus be exempt 
from the Wager. As Nicholas Rescher observes: "[Pascal's] argument will certainly 
fail to touch the convinced atheist. Someone who sets the probability of God's 
existence at zero will obviously not arrive at the argument's conclusion".367 Yet is it 
legitimate to assign a zero probability? Alan Hajek argues that "strict" atheists could 
do so with no violation of the norms or rationality.368 However, he acknowledges 
that such strict atheists are few and far between, because to assign a zero 
probability is in effect saying that it is impossible for God to exist. Hajek admits that 
"most professed non-believers would not be quite so skeptical". 
Having said that zero probabilities are probably not permissible, Hajek promptly 
attempts to smuggle them back into the argument, by disguising them within a 
range of what he calls "vague" probabilities. His claim is that we cannot ascribe a 
value accurately for many events, so we phrase it within a range of possible values. 
No-one would say that there is a 13.645% chance of rain tomorrow, but we might 
say that there is a10-20% chance of rain tomorrow, without having to pick a specific 
value. Our estimate is thus vague over a range of values. 
The difficulty here is that phrases like "a 10-20% chance of rain tomorrow" are not 
plucked out of the air. Rather they are derived from the output of computer 
models. The weather forecasting system computes a number of scenarios for 
tomorrow's weather, varying the parameters slightly for each model. Weather in 
temperate regions is extremely complex and the output of the model can vary 
widely for very small changes in the input values. The forecasters therefore run the 
scenarios many times and give their estimate based upon the range of the output 
values obtained. If all the models predict rain, then they would say that rain was 
367 Rescher, Pascal's Wager: a study of practical reasoning in philosophical theology: 24. 
368 Alan Hajek, "Objecting Vaguely To Pascal's Wager," Philosophical Studies 98(2000): 3. 
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almost certain, but if only 10% of the models said that it will rain, then they would 
adjust the forecast accordingly, If the models differ massively in their predictions 
such that some are forecasting bright sun, while others offer only thunder, lightning 
and hailstones the size of golf-balls, then the Met Office will usually talk about the 
weather's being "unsettled", These values are therefore not 'vague' at all. They are 
the result of systematic calculations and are obtained from the aggregation of a 
large number of estimates. Hajek is over-simplifying the task. 
We might allow that humans do make vague estimates of probability, for example 
in betting on horses. If a punter believes that a given horse has a 25-50% chance of 
winning the race, but the bookmakers are offering odds of 10 to 1,369 then the bet 
ought to be worthwhile on an EV calculation. That is because in the case of either 
the low or high estimates, it always has a positive payoff. 
EVlow = 25% * £10 - £1 
= £1.50 
EVhigh = 50% * £10 - £1 
=£4 
Our expected payout is thus 'vague' over the range £1.50 to £4. Of course, we are 
assuming that our subjective estimate of the horse's chances are accurate and this 
disparity between our beliefs and the bookies' might lead us to reasonably 
conclude that perhaps the bookies are better informed than we are. Nonetheless, I 
accept that we can use vague probabilities in this way, such that we have a range of 
values in which the true value is expected to fall. We could also qualify this by giving 
a confidence level, such as by asserting that we are 90% sure that the value will lie 
within the specified range. 
While allowing that it may be admissible to use a vague range in this way, I would 
not consider it to be meaningful if this range were to be particularly wide, nor if it 
were to involve making radically different statements in quality. If we claimed that 
there was a 10-90% chance that a horse called Free Will would win the 3:30 at 
Kempton Park, it is unlikely that we would ever make a bet on it, unless the odds 
were exceptionally attractive. 
Hajek puts forward Bas van Frassen's concept of agnosticism suggesting that one's 
probability for God's existence could well be vague over an interval that includes 
zero.
370 Hajek admits that he does not believe this to be correct, but labels it 
"skeptical agnosticism" and identifies it as the sort of agnosticism which cannot 
369 That is, it returns £10 for a £1 stake. 
370 Hajek, "Objecting Vaguely," 6. 
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turn into belief although it can turn into strict atheism.371 In order to justify this, he 
draws upon Jeffrey conditioning (part of Bayesian learning from experience) which 
entails that assignments of zero probability are never to be updated to non-zero 
probability, no matter what new experiences one undergoes.372 
This attempt to include zero as a probability within a set of non-zero values is self-
contradictory. If a zero probability means that an event is impossible, then how can 
it be validly included with values which require that the event is possible? If the 
skeptical agnostic will always believe that God's existence is impOSSible, how can 
she allow any other possibility and expect to be taken seriously? While I might allow 
a range from say 0.0000001 to 0.1, these are still what I would consider to be 
qualitatively the same, but to include zero in the range would introduce an entirely 
different quality, because assigning a zero value is a different class of probability 
from very small values. In our horse race above, a zero probability would imply that 
the horse would not run at all; because if it completes the course there is always a 
small probability that it could win, even if that is by all the other horses falling 
during the race. We would probably have to insist that the horse were dead to 
assign a zero probability, as if it were merely ill, it still might get better and run after 
all. To be on the safe side (and to exclude being raised from the dead miraculously), 
the horse should not ever have existed! 373 
Craig Duncan thinks that the skeptical agnostics have a further problem: 
"if Hajek is right ... he will have shown that skeptical agnostics can escape 
the Wager, just as strict atheists can. This result, however, wi/l be of little 
significance if it turns out that no one ought to be a skeptical agnostic. And 
indeed I think this is the case. For consider again that no sort of conceivable 
experience could get the skeptical agnostic to change her mind and become 
a believer. Now, I am not a believer myself, but I can conceive of some 
possible experiences that might get me to change this stance of mine. A 
booming voice from above followed by, say, a parting of a sea, witnessed by 
me and many others (including some with cameras) would do quite 
nicely. ,,374 
Duncan therefore decides that such agnostics should be called "dogmatic" 
agnostics375 rather than skeptical, because they can never be convinced by 
evidence. 
371 Ibid., 7. 
312 Ibid., 13. 
373 In fact, the pedant in me baulks at even that, because if there is a logical possibility that the horse 
might exist, then I cannot legitimately assign a zero probability. 
374 Duncan, "Do Vague Probabilities Really Scotch Pascal's Wager?," 281. 
375 Ibid. 
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Bruno de Finetti provides further doubt of the validity of assigning a zero 
probability in this case. He observes: "if we do not know whether something is 
possible or impossible, then by definition, it is possible.,,376 Thus, in the case where 
we do not know whether God is possible or not (which is the Wager's first 
premiss),377 it is begging the question to assign a probability value which claims that 
we certainly do know. Unless we are certain that God is impossible, we must always 
assign a non-zero value to the probability of his existence. 
In summary, zero probabilities make zero sense in the Wager. 
Infinitesimal probabilities 
If we accept that assigning a zero probability should be reserved for logical 
impossibilities, then we next need to consider infinitesimal probabilities. Graham 
Oppy proposes that it is epistemically allowable that the probability that God exists 
is infinitesimal.378 One immediate problem is mathematical; if we allow infinitesimal 
probabilities and infinite rewards, then the expected value becomes impossible to 
compute. While it might seem to the layman that infinity multiplied by an 
infinitesimal should equal one, it does not, as we saw on page 117. 
1 
-x 00 *1 
00 
If we use infinitesimal probabilities, we break the EV calculation whenever it 
involves infinite rewards. Oddly, a number of authors from Gale379 onwards assert 
that the product of an infinite value and an infinitesimal is infinitesimal,38o but as 
we have seen, that is incorrect; the result is indeterminate. Oppy is more accurate 
in his mathematics and recognises that using infinitesimals means that the 
argument from expected utility does not go through in all cases.381 He dismisses 
objections that infinitesimals are "dubious entities" in this context,382 stating that 
measure theory supports the use of infinitesimals as valid probabilities when there 
are infinitely many choices. However, as we saw earlier, there are not infinitely 
many choices to consider in the Wager, because the number-based gods proposed 
by Oppy can be shown to be far more limited in their scope if we break them into 
their component parts. Even if there were an infinite number to consider, it would 
not necessarily legitimise the use of infinitesimal probabilities in other contexts. 
376 Bruno de Finetti, Theory of Probability: a critical introductory treatment, vol 2, 2 vols., vol. 2 
(London: John Wiley & Sons, 1970).279. 
317 Pascal, Pensees: 122. L418 
378 Oppy, "On Rescher on Pascal's Wager," 3. 
379 Gale, On the Nature and Existence of God: 350. 
380 Jordan, Pascal's Wager: 82. 
381 Oppy, "On Rescher on Pascal's Wager," 4. 
382 Ibid., 7. 
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Sauce for the goose? 
We might ask whether the use of infinitesimals is merely levelling the playing field 
for agnostics. After all, theists continually lay claim to the infinite, so it might be 
reasonable that their opponents should also have a counter-argument. We could 
suggest that there is no reason to privilege theistic approaches. If theists are 
permitted to draw upon characteristics that we do not observe in our universe, 
then it seems only fair to allow the same license to agnostics. The weakness here is 
that the agnostics' essential claims are that there is no infinite being and that we 
can only argue from what we observe. Thus, they would undermine their central 
empirical argument by drawing upon a wholly theoretical construct in order to 
support it. As I shall show, we cannot construct an example of an infinitesimal 
probability which could exist in the real world. 
For theists with an eternal God in their system, the infinite becomes accessible as 
part of that paradigm. There are long-held traditions of eternal life within religious 
thought and we see just such an argument within the Wager itself. If agnostics wish 
to use infinitesimals, I believe that it is up to them to propose a working 
infinitesimal, which does not break their existing world-view, before it should be 
admitted as a legitimate objection to the Wager. In this next section I will discuss a 
couple of possible models and will demonstrate why they cannot be properly held 
by agnostics. 
Are there any real world analogues? 
If we are to allow infinitesimals as estimates of probability, we need some solid 
grounds for doing so. One favourite way of modelling probabilities amongst 
statisticians is to try to construct a fair lottery which reflects the situation under 
consideration.383 We might take inspiration from some of Oppy's examples384 and 
propose a lottery where the winner is the one who correctly guesses an unknown 
randomly selected real number. On the surface, this seems extremely reasonable, 
but is it possible to offer such a lottery in the real world? I do not believe that it is. 
How would one enter a guess? If we were to tick boxes on a form, such as in a 
standard UK lottery ticket, then we would need a ticket which is infinitely large. 
Setting aside the issue of how we would handle such an object, finding the correct 
boxes in order to complete it could take infinite time. Even if we simplify the task 
down to just writing out the digits of our guess, there is a limit on how many digits 
we could write out in a finite lifetime. 
I would like to adapt Bruce Schneier's thermodynamic argument from cryptography 
in order to demonstrate why this is so. If we were to try to encode the information 
383 Lotteries are typically used because they operate on a purely probabilistic model, which does not 
reply on skill, knowledge or preferences. 
384 Oppy, "On Rescher on Pascal's Wager," 5. 
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in binary, then the Boltzmann constant sets a limit on the minimum energy 
required in order to set a single bit to either one or zero. Schneier estimates that 
there is insufficient energy in our universe to even enumerate all the possibilities 
for a 2512 bit number,385 which seems to sets a rather low limit on the size of our 
lottery. If we cannot even count the tickets for a lottery with just 2512 possibilities, 
how could we rationally discuss a lottery with infinitely more? 
If this lottery is to be fair, then it must be possible to enter any value in the possible 
range for our lottery, otherwise the lottery would be inherently weighted in favour 
of those who have the longest lifespan (or live in a universe with more energy than 
ours). It is also a requirement of fairness, that the lottery should remain open long 
enough for anyone to reasonably enter a ticket. Since it could take infinite time in 
order to enter one's guess, the lottery can never actually close. Any attempt to 
enforce an earlier cut-off would necessarily limit the range of possible answers and 
thus render the lottery unfair once more. As we have seen, our universe simply 
would not have enough energy to print the winning number,386 so the winner 
would never know the result. 
It seems that we cannot have a fair lottery along those lines, so are there other 
alternatives? We could propose a lottery with an infinite number of tickets, but 
then we hit the problem of what to use for our entries, since there are only a finite 
number of molecules in the universe to draw from. 
As another alternative, we might try taking a frequentist approach in order to 
construct an infinitesimal probability. If we have an event which occurs a finite 
number of times within infinite time, then that might be a way of constructing an 
infinitesimal probability. That is, what is the probability of each event at a given 
time? This looks initially promising, but runs straight into the earlier objection; as 
far as we can tell, our material universe had an origin and it will eventually die. We 
simply do not have access to infinite time. Even if we were to take the age of the 
universe in attoseconds,387 we would still have a finite (if large) number of time 
slots.388 
There is another difficulty with this formulation; the mean time between 
occurrences will also be infinite, so the frequentist cannot establish the probability 
385 Bruce Schneier, Applied cryptography: protocols, algorithms, and source code In C (New York; 
Chichester: New York; Chichester: Wiley, 1996). 157-58. 
386 While it could be argued that our lottery might 'get lucky' and select a number for which there is 
enough energy, we should be clear that there is only an Infinitesimal chance of this. The set of 
numbers that we can choose from is finite, but we will be drawing that set from an Infinite set of 
possibilities and for every element in the finite set, there will be an infinite number of elements 
which are not. 
387 One attosecond is 10.18 seconds 
388 If the universe is 13.7 billion years old and there are 31.6 billion seconds per year, then we have a 
universe which is approximately 4.3 x 1038 attoseconds old. 
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with any certainty. In order to establish the number of occurrences, she would have 
to observe the whole of infinite time and without such observation, it is not 
possible for her to establish that the number is finite. If an observation is made over 
finite time, it cannot be extrapolated safely across an infinite possibility space and 
the average interval between such events will also be infinite, which poses 
problems for a mortal observer. 
In each of these constructions, we have had to draw upon the reserves of infinity, 
whether it be infinite time, or infinite energy. These could only be available to an 
immortal and infinitely powerful being. It seems ironic that we would need God in 
order to establish that he does not exist. 
Do we need injinitesimals at all? 
De Finetti discusses very small probabilities (and conversely, those very close to 
one). He writes: 
"Approximations which are adequate ... in the vicinity of p = M (e.g. 50%:t 5%, :t 
l%,:t 0.1%) are differentfrom those required in the case of very small 
probabilities: here the problem concerns the order of magnitude (whether, for 
example, a small probability is in the order of 10-3, or 10-7 or 10-12, ••• ). In this 
connection it is convenient to recall Borel's suggestion389 of calling 'practically 
i m p o s s i b l e ~ ~ with reference to human, earthly, cosmic and universal scales, 
events where probabilities have the orders of magnitude of 10-6, 10-15, 10-50 
and 10-1000." 390 
This notion of small probabilities has far better grounding in reality, even if it leaves 
the objector at the mercy of infinite quantities within the Wager. De Finetti talks 
about Good's "device of imaginary observations" with which to test our subjective 
probabilities. Let us imagine that we have someone who comes to us and claims to 
be able to guess which of our hands is holding a small coin. How many trials would 
we have him perform before we believed that he had such an ability? On each trial, 
he has a Y2 chance of guessing correctly, so his chance of guessing correctly on n 
trials is Y2 n which is approximately 10-0.3". So, after ten trials, he would have 
approximately 10-3 chance of guessing each correctly, or one in a thousand. After 
fifty trials, that chance has fallen to 10-15 or one in a quadrillion. Would anyone 
seriously doubt our savant after fifty consecutive right answers under strict 
laboratory conditions and with trained magicians observing from every angle? I 
suggest that anyone who continued to doubt after such a demonstration would 
have strayed from rationalism into blind dogma. 
389 Borel, Valeur Pratique, in Bruno de Finetti, Theory of Probability: a critical introductory treatment , 
vol 1, 2 vols., vol. 1 (London: John Wiley & Sons, 1970). 
390 Ibid., 180. 
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Borel's suggestion is that something with a probability of less than 10-1000 is 
"practically" impossible on a universal scale, that is, we can safely assume that it 
will never happen. The universe is only 1020 seconds old and has maybe 1080 
particles in it but both those numbers are completely dwarfed by Borel's practical 
impossibility. So is it rational to postulate something even less possible, except as 
an attempt to wriggle out of the Wager? I contend that infinitesimal probabilities 
are simply another philosopher's fiction.39i They are invented purely to frustrate 
the mathematics of decision theory, rather than as a genuine estimate of likelihood. 
De Finetti considers infinitesimal probabilities as being useful only to deal with the 
occasional oddities, such as occur with an infinite lottery (if one could exist). He 
discusses how, in a lottery with an infinite amount of tickets, the probability of any 
particular ticket's winning is zero, if we restrict probabilities to real numbers. 
However, one ticket clearly will win in such a lottery, so it is not actually impossible. 
Thus, if we sum the real number probabilities, we might get: 
0+0+0+0 •.. =1 
which looks instinctively wrong. However, if we allow infinitesimal probabilities 
(using @ as a symbol for the positive infinitesimal closest to zero) , then we would 
get: 
@+@+@+@ ••• =1 
which looks more sensible, such that an infinity of infinitesimals adds up to one. 
Thus De Finetti suggests that "consideration of probability as a non-Archimedean 
quantitl92 would permit us to say, if we wished, that 'zero probabilities' are in fact 
'infinitely small' (actual infinitesimals), and only that of the impossible event is 
zero.,,393 De Finetti is unconvinced that the use of infinitesimals adds much value in 
probability and thinks that it has its own problems, as "it is a useless complication 
of language, and leads one to puzzle over 'Ies infiniment petits",.394 
De Finetti's rejection of infinitesimal probabilities does however offer a small ray of 
hope to the agnostic, in that it might revive the possibility of assigning a zero 
probability. If an infinitesimal probability is simply a pragmatic version of a zero 
probability, could the strict atheist therefore legitimately say that she assigns a zero 
probability to God's existence, while allowing that such existence is not actually 
impossible? let us consider that option further. 
391 Jordan, Pascal's Wager: 75. 
392 An Archimedean property is one which has no infinitely large, or infinitely small elements. 
393 de Finetti, Theory of Probability: a critical introductory treatment, vol 2, 2: 347. 
394 Ibid. 
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Pragmatic zero 
Pascal's Wager is an exercise in pragmatic ethics, so we need to allow pragmatic 
considerations at each point within it. I will discuss how we might formulate a 
pragmatically zero probability. By this I am suggesting that there may be a 
proposition which we believe has no likelihood of being true, but which we still 
allow that it is not logically impOSSible. For example, the agnostic might assert that 
there is no chance that God exists, while allowing that it is not impossible. 
We need to examine whether this pragmatic zero probability helps us. Can we 
resuscitate strict atheism by re-Iabelling it "pragmatically strict atheism"? I do not 
believe that we can, but to show that, we need to look first at De Finetti's 
subjective probabilities. He holds that "subjective probabilities are realities in the 
minds of people,,39s and that in fact we never deal with objective probabilities at all, 
because we rely all the time on assumptions and observations. If we roll a six-sided 
die, we assume that it is formed so that the probability of landing on each side 
would be e x a c t I Y ~ , , yet it is impossible for us to make such a perfect die. All dice will 
be slightly imperfect or non-homogeneous, even if only at the molecular level, and 
we also lack a perfect table to throw it upon. Each time we throw the die, we will 
distort it slightly and also wear the edges. Even our act of throwing will not be 
random either, each person will deliver the die within a certain range of 
parameters. This sort of predictability has been exploited many times in various 
gambling coups. 
One scam in Las Vegas involved observing exactly which number was passing a fixed 
point as the croupier released the ball in a game of roulette. The cheats noted that 
each croupier propels the ball at roughly the same velocity each time, so they could 
anticipate a range of numbers on the wheel in which the ball was most likely to 
land.396 They could then bet on those numbers while the ball was still spinning. This 
was not guaranteed to win every time (which would have been suspicious anyway), 
but the gang merely needed to move the odds in their favour.397 The typical house 
advantage398 for roulette is 2.7%, so just a 3% improvement in selection would 
395 Theory of Probability: a critical introductory treatment, vol 1, 1: 197. 
396 I am simplifying the sophistication of the techniques which the cheats actually used. 
397 There are 37 numbers on a European roulette wheel (0-36), but you cannot bet on zero. The right 
number pays out 36 times the stake. American roulette has a zero and a double-zero, but still pays 
out only 36, 50 the house 'edge' is over 5% in that case. 
398 The casino (or house) always has an advantage over the gambler, otherwise they would be 
gamblers themselves and not businesses. The level of the advantage depends on the game (or even 
different bets within a game). Some games like Blackjack or Craps may have a low house advantage 
(under 2%) while others are 'sucker bets' where the house has a big advantage. Roulette is pretty 
much a sucker bet, since it has a reasonably large house advantage which cannot be mitigated by 
any amount of player skill. 
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provide potentially large wins.399 After discovering the coup, casinos modified 
roulette tables to introduce more baffles in the path of the ball. These deflect the 
ball more randomly and widen the range of numbers that the ball will fall into, thus 
removing the cheats' advantage. However, there is still little true randomness in the 
process and they cannot exclude the possibility that a more sophisticated analysis 
might still show a trend. 
Thus, even in a situation like a casino table, where we believe we have access to 
raw probability, we still have to make lots of assumptions about fairness and 
randomness. It is these assumptions, De Finetti believes, that make our belief in 
objective probabilities worthless. He goes further still, with his bald statement that 
probability does not exist.40o He writes: 
'7he abandonment of superstitious beliefs about the existence of Phlogiston, 
the Cosmic Ether, Absolute Space and Time ... or fairies and Witches, was an 
essential step along the road to scientific thinking. Probability too, if regarded 
as something endowed with some kind of objective existence, is no less a 
misleading conception, an illusory attempt to exteriorize or materialise our true 
probabilistic beliefs. ,ADl 
In so doing, De Finetti is not simply privileging subjective over objective, but 
declaring that we only have subjective probabilities. If we were to adopt a 
pragmatically zero probability, what would it mean as a subjective probability? De 
Finetti gives some guidelines about subjective probabilities, saying that: 
"probability is not an external fact, relating to the event, but, instead relating to 
your state of information regarding the event and the previsions you derive 
from this information,AD2 
The key here, I think, is "your state of information". By asserting that God's 
existence has zero possibility, we are also claiming that we have enough 
information to make that assessment. I can see that an agnostic might try to justify 
this claim along the following lines: "At present I can see no evidence for God's 
existence, but I can see good reason to suppose that he does not exist. While I 
might change my mind at some point in the future, if better evidence came along, 
at present I believe that there is zero possibility that this will happen". 
399 If you have a 0.5% advantage, you simply need to bet enough money enough times. If you stake 
$lm then you will make $50,000 profit on average. In order to avoid tipping off the house, gamblers 
vary the bet size and use other obfuscation techniques. 
400 de Finetti, Theory 0/ Probability: a critical introductory treatment, vol 1, 1: x. 
401 Ibid. 
402 Ibid., 204. 
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That still seems like hubris to me. It is effectively a claim that we have better 
information (and/or better understanding of the information) than every theist in 
the world and that we can definitively prove them wrong. I think it absurd that 
anyone could make such a claim in good conscience. In any case, this built-in 
provision for changing one's mind later undermines the claim for a zero probability. 
Instead, I think we need to represent the doubt that we may change our mind as 
part and parcel of the previsions. 
We can decompose the claim into its two constituent parts, namely: 
(a) The probability that God exists 
(b) The probability that, at some point in the future, I will believe that God 
exists 
Seen in this light, it seems obvious that our subjective probability estimate should 
be the sum of those two components. Upon closer examination, however, we can 
see that (a) may be redundant, since it will not be properly knowable before death. 
It is also ridiculous to claim that (b) could ever receive a zero probability, even a 
pragmatic one, from a rational person; it would simply be dogma, as Duncan 
observes. 
Thus, zero probabilities, like lazarus, have enjoyed a brief revival, but suffer the 
same eventual fate as they are consigned back to the grave. 
Confidence intervals in the real world 
If we were to develop a new drug, we would be expected to test it carefully in 
properly conducted clinical trials before releasing it to the public at large. These 
trials are conducted all the time and they use control cases to ensure that (a) the 
drug has some real benefit and (b) that it does no harm. The commonest technique 
is the double-blind trial where patients are divided into two groups; one group is 
given the active pill and the other is given an inert pill which looks exactly like the 
active one. Neither the patient, nor the person administering the pills knows which 
regime the patient is on. After the pills have been taken for some time, physicians 
then examine the patients, looking for improvements in the disease and/or any 
side-effects. They compare the group taking the active drug with the ones taking 
the inert pill, using a number of statistical measures. To decide that the drug has a 
real benefit, they would normally look for what is known as a confidence level of 
statistical significance. A confidence level of 5% means that there is only a 5% 
possibility that the results seen could have occurred by chance. levels of 1% and 
0.1% would be described as extremely statistically significant and would be seen as 
very strong evidence for the drug's efficacy. 
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Let us look again at those numbers; doctors consider a 1 in 100, or 1 in 1,000 
chance as being significant enough to give a drug to patients. As we saw earlier, 
that is similar to our magician guessing in which hand we hold a coin ten times in a 
row. It is clear that 10-3 is deemed a "good enough" measure, even for life and 
death situations, so why should we ever need infinitesimal probabilities? It is my 
view that Borel's measures are more than adequate for any real-world estimate of 
probability, subjective or otherwise. 
A lower bound on probability 
I am suggesting that no-one can rationally use an infinitesimal or zero probability, 
but a critic might reasonably ask what the lower bound might be. In this case I 
believe that Borel's values are perhaps too conservative. Assigning a probability of 
10-1000 does not make any real sense to us; it is simply a number plucked out of the 
air. Instead I wish to offer a statistical model. I believe that we need to start by 
recognising that we are not a special case with respect to theistic belief. Whatever 
our current beliefs, we need to admit that they are the product of mUltiple factors, 
including culture, parental influence, genetic predisposition and personal life 
experience. If those had been different, then we might believe differently. Now let 
us agree that our subjective probability of whether God exists or not depends upon 
that noetic state. Thus, our subjective probability should never be lower than the 
possibility that we might personally be a theist. 
The question therefore devolves to the probability of any individual in the world 
taken at random holding theistic beliefs. There is no reason to believe that we 
might not have been that person, had our life followed a different path to theirs. If 
we take the YouGov poll from 2011 conducted on behalf of the British Humanist 
Society, 61% indicated that they had a religious belief, although only 29% identified 
themselves as 'religious,.403 Thus a random UK citizen is more likely to be a theist 
than not, even though they may not be practising. Even if we take a very 
conservative view of the figures, it seems unreasonable to assign a value any lower 
than 1%. 
The atheist will no doubt argue that most people are part of an unthinking herd and 
that they have decided their views upon the available evidence, rather than being 
societally conditioned. Apart from the obvious special pleading here, let us consider 
the truth claim that the atheist is making. In asserting that people only believe 
because of conditioning, the atheist is claiming that each and every theist in the 
world is a) wrong and b) incapable of rational decision making. This seems a rather 
bold claim, without much evidence to support it. 
403 http://www,humanism.org.uk/campaigns/religion-and-belief-surveys-statistics 
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I would like to suggest an alternative thought experiment. Do we believe that there 
could be a rational person, who has examined all the evidence available and has 
concluded that there is a God? That is, to ask whether there might be a single 
rational theist, even if we might believe them to be mistaken in their theism. If we 
allow that there might be a theist who is as rational as we are {or at least not 
completely irrational}, but who has decided differently on this issue, then our lower 
bound must be the probability that such a person might be ourselves. 
If we only allow that there is only one such theist in the whole population of the 
world, then our lower bound should be no lower than one in six billion. It makes no 
sense to assign a subjective probability that is smaller than this, unless we are 
resorting to some special pleading. 
Summary of small probabilities 
As we have seen, the lower bound on small probabilities is much higher than critics 
suppose and neither a zero probability, nor its cousin the infinitesimal, has any real 
place in the discussion of Pascal's Wager. They are both fictions which could not be 
rationally held by an agnostic or an atheist. Being close to nothing, they have 
nothing to add and, in this case, nothing does not defeat the Wager. 
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3.6 Problems with God 
Having discussed difficulties arising from the mechanics of probabilities and EV 
calculations, let us move on to objections which focus on the nature of the deity 
under discussion. In this section I will concentrate mainly upon two writers, Greg 
Janzen and Terence Penelhum who I believe provide the best exemplars in this 
space. 
An irrational God 
Greg Janzen argues that the Pascalian proposition implies that God is irrational and 
that since an omniscient being could not be irrational, we should therefore 
conclude that God does not exist.404 Janzen's argument follows a number of stages, 
starting with the premiss that theistic belief traditionally holds that believing in God 
is a necessary condition for salvation.4os He allows that belief may not be sufficient 
for salvation, but insists that it is at least necessary. His second premiss is that God, 
if he exists, has the power406 to bring it about that every person believes that he 
exists,407 but that we know that it is not the case that God has done so. Thus, 
Janzen argues, God, if he exists, has elected to hide. 
Janzen uses an argument by analogy which involves a rich eccentric who offers a 
reward to anyone who is both fond of painting and who also believes in his 
existence. The eccentric hides himself, but makes it an absolute condition that any 
recipient of his largesse must not only be fond of painting, but must believe in the 
eccentric's existence as well. Janzen suggests that this highly contrived example is 
analogous to God's behaviour; for, despite hiding, he makes belief in his existence a 
condition for salvation. Janzen therefore suggests that because we would consider 
the eccentric to be irrational, we should consider God to be irrational as well. 
Janzen's argument is somewhat confused. We might accept that the eccentric's 
desire to hide could be irrational, because we are unable to see good reasons for 
why someone might do such a thing; particularly as Janzen has written his example 
to ensure that no good reason can reasonably be suggested, but it does not follow 
that God would be in the same position. As I observe on page Errorl Bookmark not 
defined., if God were fully visible to us, then it would have dramatic effects upon 
our behaviour. To draw my own analogy, I would suggest that speed cameras do 
exactly this. Near where I live there is a speed camera on the main road and it is 
noticeable that its presence significantly changes the behaviour of drivers. Before 
the camera was there, few cars travelled within the speed limit, but since its arrival 
I have personally noticed people braking heavily upon the approach to that camera. 
404 G. Janzen, "Pascal's Wager and the Nature of God," Sophia 50, no. 3 (2011): 332. 
405 "Is God's belief requirement rational?," Religious Studies 47, no. 4 (2011): 467. 
406 Janzen here draws upon a traditional conception of an omnipotent deity. 
407 Janzen, "Is God's belief requirement rational?," 468. 
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This, of course, is the desired behaviour when seen from the view of the county 
council who erected the camera.408 The presence of the camera is designed to alter 
behaviour, which is why they are legally required to be bright yellow and clearly 
visible. 
If God were continually and perfectly visible, I suggest that our behaviour would be 
affected far more than for a mere speed camera. If every action, word and thought 
were not only observed, but known to be observed, could anyone suggest that we 
would possess free will? As George Orwell noted in his dystopian novel "1984", 
such constant monitoring would make life Hell. At least Big Brother could not read 
Winston Smith's thoughts, which allowed Winston the illusion that he might be able 
to get away with his non-compliance. It was Orwell who coined the term "thought-
crime" which had been invented in that society for the cases where it was immoral 
(and illegal) to even think about disobeying party doctrine. 
Thus, we can imagine that God might have good reasons for being hidden, as it is by 
being concealed from us that our true inclinations and preferred behaviour may be 
observed. If the police wish to catch criminals, then they use secret cameras and 
tape recorders, so that offenders will commit the crime that they have planned, 
believing that they will not be discovered. If police informers carried tape recorders 
in their hands and large placards denouncing them, then no criminal would ever 
talk to them. I therefore suggest that God may be hidden, in order to observe us as 
we truly are, or rather so that we might know how we truly are, since God has 
already seen within our hearts. 
Pascal argues that we have exactly the right level of visibility of God, because: 
"God wishes to move the will, rather than the mind. Perfect clarity would help 
the mind and harm the will". 409 
Pascal rejects Janzen's requirement for full disclosure and does so on rational 
grounds. Janzen insists that if God wishes someone to make a certain decision, then 
he has to make all the relevant facts available. Pascal holds that God is more 
interested in our motives and will than in some purely intellectual exercise. If God 
were fully disclosed,410 then there would be no decision to make. It would be 
completely irrational to decide that God did not exist and would be as crazy as 
denying the existence of the earth. Thus, in order to preserve the integrity of the 
decision, the demands of the intellect must give way to the needs of the will. Pascal 
also wishes to allow space for the determined sinner to be able to succeed in their 
desire to escape God. He writes: 
408 I will not impute the darker motives of revenue generation, as some have done. 
409 Pascal, Pensees: 139. L446 
410 Assuming we could survive such an encounter. 
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"There is enough light to enlighten and enough obscurity to humiliate them. 
There is enough obscurity to blind the reprobate and enough light to condemn 
them and deprive them of excuse". 411 
Peter Kreeft suggests that to reveal fully and adequately the truth about ourselves 
to ourselves in our present state, it was necessary for God to use obscurity.412 Space 
does not permit a full exploration of this topic here; I merely wished to illustrate 
that God might have very good reasons for hiding and thus cannot be considered to 
be irrational for doing so. 
Janzen's next argument is that God cannot rationally both hide and simultaneously 
demand belief in his existence as a criterion for eternal life. He suggests that for 
God to be considered reasonable, there must be an intellectually plausible rationale 
for God's granting salvation only to believers.413 He discusses the problem of what 
he calls "inculpable unbelievers" who are those who are either incapable of 
sophisticated propositional belief, or who have never had the opportunity to 
believe.414 He therefore argues that God is deliberately excluding virtuous people 
on largely arbitrary grounds and revisits the topic of doxastic voluntarism, arguing 
that "some people are not suitably disposed to believe In hidden deities".41S 
This question of inculpable ignorance/unbelief is hardly a new one in theology, 
having been expounded by Thomas Aquinas long before it was re-examined by J.L. 
Schellenberg and Theodore Drange at the end of the 20th century. God may well 
accept behaviour as the criterion for salvation, rather than intellectual assent to a 
given proposition. Accepting Pascal's Wager is not intellectual capitulation in the 
face of a propositional onslaught, but rather a behavioural experiment. 
Janzen's argument thus fails for two reasons: firstly because God is not necessarily 
irrational in hiding and secondly because intellectual belief is not an essential 
component of the Wager's premisses. Pascal argues that if there is a God, who is 
hidden for perfectly good reasons, then it is rational to perform an experiment to 
see whether God will grant salvific faith as a natural consequence. Virgil Nemoianu 
suggests that Janzen's assumption is a common error found in critics of the Wager: 
"Underlying these treatments, one typically finds a central assumption about 
what Pascal takes faith in God to be: wagering, it is said, means having faith, 
and faith is affirming a belief that God exists or taking steps toward affirming a 
belief that God exists. To put it slightly differently, faith is thought to be a 
411 Pascal, Pensees: 73. L236 
412 Peter Kreeft, Christianity for Modern pagans: Pascal's Pensees (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 
1993).249. 
413 Janzen, "Is God's belief requirement rational?," 472. 
414 Ibid., 470. 
415 Ibid. 
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matter of inducing onels intellectl directly or indirectlYI to adopt the belief that 
God exists. 11416 
He suggests that we need to understand the Pascalian insight into the three orders 
of body, mind and charity, rather than our modern understanding of reason as a 
purely intellectual pursuit. Nemoianu holds that for Pascal 
'1aith is love of God rather than merely holding an intellectual belief that God 
exists or imagining God. It is God known by the heart rather than the mind 
(reason) or the body (fancy and imagination)." 417 
Nemoianu thinks that it is possible to love a hidden God and thus there will be no 
tension between God's hiddenness and Pascal's Wager because "while genuine 
faith will likely include corresponding intellectual beliefs, it is not simply or even 
"1 tt fbi' f' thO ,,418 pnman y a rna er 0 e Ie In IS sense. 
Is Pascal's God good? 
Terence Penelhum argues that the God of Pascal's Wager could not be moral. His 
objection hinges upon his assertion that "it seems immoral to condemn someone to 
loss of eternal life for any offence: But it particularly seems immoral to condemn 
him for not believing something.,,419 Penelhum suggests that the only defence to an 
accusation of immorality would be if men were somehow culpable for not believing 
and that it constitutes a moral defect on their part that they do not believe. If so, he 
reasons, then believing in God must be something which they are free to do. 
On the face of it, this creates a paradox. If it is to be a free choice then God must be 
hidden, or there could be no reasonable grounds for doubt. Yet if he is hidden and 
it is morally culpable not to believe, then there must also be sufficient proofs to 
convince us that he does exist and that the only reason we do not see him is 
because he is hidden from us. Penelhum avoids the easy trap of declaring this 
impossible and instead investigates whether it might be that we should recognise 
the signs of God and yet be free to reject them as proper signs of God. 
Our own day and age shows more clearly than the age of Pascal possibly couldl 
that men can, in a quite clear sense, hear of God and yet be totally untouched in 
their convictions by what they hear - even when they may recognise their 
spiritual maladies when the twentieth century priestsl the social scientistsl tell 
them about them.420 
416 Nemoianu, "Pascalian Faith," 27. 
417 Ibid., 31. 
418 Ibid., 32. 
419 Penelhum, Religion and Rationality: 207. 
420 Ibid., 208. 
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In this case, as Penelhum describes it, unbelief is a deliberate choice by people who 
both see and recognise the signs, but reject them as being valid revelation. Atheism 
thus constitutes a direct and considered rebellion against God. Penelhum quotes 
John Baillie as saying that "the atheist denies with the top of his mind that which he 
knows from the bottom of his heart".421 
Pascal rather supports this view of unbelief as a deliberate act saying that: 
"it is not true that everything reveals God and it is not true that everything 
conceals God. But it is true at once that he hides from those who tempt him and 
that he reveals himself to those who seek him'A22 
For Pascal, it is important that men should not be convinced against their will, as he 
writes: 
"If he had wished to overcome the obstinacy of the most hardened, he could 
have done so by revealing himself so plainly that they could not doubt the truth 
of his essence . ... 7here is enough light for those who desire only to see and 
enough darkness for those of a contrary disposition."A23 
Penelhum suggests that the unbeliever's sin is one of self-deception, a place where 
wickedness and foolishness merge and create doubt between them.424 He admits 
that self-deception on all sorts of issues is a common trait in human beings, indeed 
he acknowledges that this is why so much of Pascal's account of humanity in 
Pen sees rings true. 
In order to address Penelhum's concerns in his terms, rather than Pascal's, we need 
to answer whether refusal to believe in God can legitimately be described as wilful 
self-deception of this nature and, more importantly, whether this constitutes a 
moral failing which merits the loss of eternal blessing. Many ancient Christian 
authorities, like Augustine, have no difficulty with this whatsoever and would cite 
the apostle Paul in support: 
For, since the creation of the world, God's invisible qualities-his eternal power 
and divine nature-have been clearly seen, being understood from what has 
been made, so that men are without excuse.425 
It is more problematical in our current age. The rise of rationalism and the march of 
scientific progress has continually undermined what we previously felt instinctively 
421 John Baillie, Our knowledge of God (London: London: Oxford University Press; Humphrey 
Milford, 1939). in Penelhum, Religion and Rationality: 192. 
422 Pascal, Pensees: 139. L444 
423 Ibid., 50. L149 
424 Penelhum, Religion and Rationality: 208. 
425 Romans 1:20, NIV 
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to be true. So is it perhaps more acceptable now to have genuine doubt in the case 
of such conflicting evidence? Penelhum believes so and he argues that if doubt is 
acceptable, then it might be immoral for God to withhold eternal blessing on 
account of it. Penelhum holds that for us to support such an approach would make 
us complicit in God's immorality. If the Wager suggests that we should put 
ourselves in a state of mind where we might come to approve of a cosmic policy 
which is immoral, then we would ourselves become immoral in following the 
Wager. While it might be prudent to follow such a direction, Penelhum believes 
that prudence should not override issues of morality.426 
This argument relies upon the premiss that the sort of exclusivism described is 
inherently immoral, although this is only a statement of faith, however sincerely 
held. However, it does not seem to me to be an unreasonable position for someone 
to take, so it merits proper consideration. 
Let us grant, for the sake of argument, that such exclusivism might be immoral and 
consider whether we will inevitably become complicit in this immorality. By way of 
analogy, let us consider a case where there is a known child murderer, who justifies 
his actions by saying that they are based upon solid reason and that, if we studied 
his rationale, we too would be convinced and would join him. Would we be 
immoral if we simply considered that logic? I do not think so. In fact I think it might 
be incumbent upon us to do so, if only to confirm our suspicions that the logic was 
specious, or that its initial premisses were flawed. Thus, if we have already decided 
that God's actions are immoral and that there can never be sufficient justification 
for his actions, then we find ourselves in a dogmatic stalemate. If we refuse to ever 
consider God's justification, then we would have pre-judged the issue. I am not 
convinced that an argument from prejudice can have any significant weight. 
It is hard to say why we would not at least look at the logic behind his actions. After 
all, society has changed its attitudes towards a wide range of ethical considerations 
over time. Slavery was once completely acceptable and it was deemed extremely 
odd, even offensive, to challenge it. Yet we would now believe the complete 
opposite. It seems unreasonably dogmatic to say that we must never even examine 
the criminal's logic, lest we be irresistibly tempted and corrupted by it. I therefore 
think that we would (however briefly) examine the murderer's justifications and 
that in doing so we would not compromise our own morality. As such, I do not 
believe that contemplating the Wager need give us any grounds for concern over 
the loss our moral rectitude. I would go further still and allow that we may accept 
the Wager to find out whether we can acquire faith and still remain morally secure. 
426 Penelhum, Religion and Rationality: 207. 
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let us consider briefly the two possible outcomes. If we find that there is no God 
after all, then we cannot have aligned ourselves with an immoral God, since none 
(apparently) exists. I grant that we may have behaved in a way which we later 
found ethically problematic, but I hold that this should be at least partially offset by 
our need to keep an open mind on the subject. In the case where the immoral God 
exists, we might find that we do have a genuine belief in a deity after all, but that 
this does not necessarily take away our free choice to decide not to associate with 
him because we deem him unnacceptable.427 Penelhum seems to believe that even 
considering the Wager will in some way corrupt us irrevocably by association, but I 
think that his case is far from proven. 
Does God owe us salvation? 
Now let us return to whether God's exclusivism itself is immoral, as Penelhum 
claims. It seems to me that believers would always have the defence that God's 
morality is not constrained by ours and that he is completely sovereign. This, 
however, is unsatisfying, especially as I argued on page Errorl Bookmark not 
defined. that immoral (or downright evil) Gods are not worth spending eternity 
with. I believe that this is in accord with John Stuart Mill's vehement rejection of a 
second-rate God. 
I will call no being good, who is not what I mean when I apply that epithet to my 
fellow-creatures; and if such a being can sentence me to hell for not so calling 
him, to hell I will go 428 
Thus, I think we do need to consider the proportionality of God's response to the 
perceived offence and I offer the following analogy. let us imagine that we have a 
small child who refuses to eat broccoli. We would consider it reprehensible if we 
suggested that we might not feed the child ever again as a result of this wilful 
disobedience. If the child were to die, we would be (rightly) vilified. In the case of 
eternal salvation, we are postulating an infinite punishment (or deprivation) in 
response to a finite sin. If we feel that a moral deity is obliged to maintain 
proportionality, then this would be unacceptable.429 
427 If we were to accept that God were not moral, then it would put us In a difficult position. After all, 
we would be created by this immoral God (unless we assume a pantheon of some kind), so whence 
came our improved moral powers? If God is flawed, then why are we not also flawed? It seems that 
we would need to postulate a second, better God who is more moral than the Pascalian God and 
who offers salvation to all. As I showed on page 132, we can disregard this universalist God for 
purposes of the Wager, because we receive eternal life no matter what. 
428 John Stuart Mill and J. M. Robson, An examination of Sir William Hamilton's philosophy, and of 
the principal philosophical questions discussed in his writings (london: london: Routledge, 1996)., 
para 394 
429 Such a dilemma could be partially resolved by devices such as some sort of purgatory, by which I 
mean that an unbeliever's sin would result in a punishment or deprivation which is proportional to 
the sin, but which is not eternal. So, for example, someone who does not believe is sent to purgatory 
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Philip Quinn takes the opposite tack and argues that Penelhum's basic assertion is 
false, because God is not obliged to give eternal salvation to anyone. He writes that 
"we must first disabuse ourselves of the notion that humans can merit 
salvation. Nothing any mere human can do requires in justice that God should 
respond with the rewards of an infinity of infinitely happy Ii/e". 430 
It seems logical to me that no finite action could reasonably merit infinite reward, 
as this would of itself be a disproportionate response, which we rejected earlier. 
Quinn suggests, however, that God must be free to grant such a reward to those 
who are pleasing to him in some particular way, be it in their approach to worship, 
or something as arbitrary as the colour of their hair. So, as long as God grants 
salvation fairly, using consistent criteria, Quinn sees nothing immoral in so dOing. 
I am not fully persuaded by Quinn's argument. For God to have the opportunity to 
grant eternal salvation and then to arbitrarily withhold it does not sit comfortably 
with me. For example, imagine if I were to have an immense pile of food and the 
ability to transport it to an area of natural disaster and then I deliberately did not 
share it. Most people would consider that to be bordering on immoral, if not 
downright wicked. Space does not allow adequate coverage for such a complex 
theological issue, so I will briefly give one counter to the argument: namely that any 
insistence that God must grant salvation to all, may lead to the state where it runs 
counter to our wishes. For example, if someone did not want eternal life, then they 
might be eternally grumpy that they were saved against their will. If we allow that 
God must respect our choices, then those who reject belief in God must be allowed 
to reject eternity with it, and only God will be in a position to evaluate who made 
which choice. 
for correction. After a finite time in that place, the person is properly educated and prepared for 
heaven and duly graduates there. In each case the time spent there would be proportional to the 
gravity of the sin. 
Unfortunately, this concept would remove a leg from the decision theory which has so far supported 
the Wager. If such correction is finite, but we still eventually receive an infinite reward, then there is 
now no overriding need to accept the Wager. 
EV(Bet on God). = Infinite reward - cost of faith 
=00 
EV(Bet against God) = Infinite reward - cost of purgatory 
=00 
The question then becomes whether the costs of faith are lower than the cost of potentially 
spending time in a waiting state for heaven. In any case, either cost will be dwarfed by the ultimate 
infinite reward, so we might consider it irrelevant. Although one set of costs might be more 
predictable, it still comes down to a matter of judgement on the relative probabilities of each. So, 
the purgatory becomes a variant of the universalist God, albeit with different finite costs, and the 
logic I have used earlier would still apply as far as decision making goes. (Le. that we can safely 
ignore it, because we never actually lose eternity). 
430 Philip Quinn, "Moral Objections to Pascalian Wagering," in Gambling on God, ed. Jeff Jordan 
(Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 1984), 77. 
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The origin of ethics 
If we are to answer the broader question of whether God is ethical, we first need to 
consider on what we will base our ethics. Theists often ground ethics in the person 
of God, for if God were not the source of morality, then there would have to be 
some higher power to which he would be required to conform and that would 
undermine any Anselmian conception of deity. This is hardly a new philosophical 
problem and is simply the Euthyphro dilemma431 recycled. So, we could argue that 
as God defines what is moral and his actions are by definition perfect (or at least 
maximally so), then whatever his actions are, they will necessarily be maximally 
moral. 
John Stuart Mill would not agree. He expects God to at least conform to the highest 
human standards of morality in order to be worthy of worship. 
If, instead of the "glad tidings" that there exists a Being in whom all the 
excellences which the highest human mind can conceive, exist in a degree 
inconceivable to us, I am informed that the world is ruled by a being whose 
attributes are infinite, but what they are we cannot learn, not what are the 
principles of his government, except that "the highest human morality which we 
are capable of conceiving" does not sanction them,' convince me of it, and I will 
bear my fate as I may. But when I am told that I must believe this, and at the 
same time call this being by the names which express and affirm the highest 
human morality, I say in plain terms that I will not. Whatever power such a 
being may have over me, there is one thing which he shall not do: he shall not 
compel me to worship him. 431 
It can be argued that Mill's sentiments here are somewhat at odds with his 
utilitarian ethics, since the benefits of eternal blessing would surely outweigh any 
finite moral inconvenience that he feels he would endure in order to obtain them. 
However, if this discomfort would persist throughout eternity, then as Alfred Benn 
observes, the moral degradation of worshipping an omnipotent demon through 
eternity might conceivably be more painful than any punishment it is in the 
demon's power to inflict.433 
If we are to resolve this argument for the purposes of the Wager (since it is too 
large a philosophical/theological field to cover in this essay), it seems that we need 
431 Euthyphro appears in Plato's dialogues and features Socrates and a young man named 
Euthyphro. The debate centres on whether actions are pious because the Gods approve of them, or 
whether the Gods approve of them because they are pious. 
432 Mill and Robson, An examination of Sir William Hamilton's philosophy, and of the principal 
philosophical questions discussed in his writings., para 394 
433 Benn, "Pascal's Wager," 322. 
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to examine the case where there is a God and the alternative when there is not. By 
looking at both models, we can look at the potential rewards, risks and cost of each. 
If there is a God, then it is reasonable that some form of divine command ethics 
might apply. If so, then I am convinced by Robert Adams' arguments that any God 
issuing such commands will necessarily be good and in accord with our own moral 
values. He holds that 
Respect for divine authority motivates, largely because it coheres with, 
organises, supports and is supported by goods that we care about for their own 
sakes.434 
We have a sense of what is good, because we are created with that sense. It would 
be perverse for a deity to create beings whose value system was radically different 
from her own and then to condemn them for not acting in accord with those 
values. While this argument is not conclusive, space does not allow me to present 
in full Adams' justification for identifying God with the Good. 
On the other hand, if there is no God, then we find ourselves postulating that either 
there could be a non-theistically derived moral basis to the universe, or perhaps 
that a post-modernist approach applies, where all truth is merely subjective and 
ethnocentric. From the Pascalian viewpoint, we are already presuming that we 
cannot tell whether God exists, since that has been the whole basis of our enquiry 
with the Wager. So is there a way of resolving this? I think there is. 
If God exists and is good, then accepting the Wager should normally be safe, since 
its goal is to bring us to genuine faith in that God via a morally-neutral behavioural 
experiment. If the post-modernists,435 such as Richard Rorty, are correct then our 
ethics are entirely subjective and/or local to our community, so there should be no 
overriding objection to the Wager, because there are no universal ethics with which 
to condemn it. An individual or group could declare the Wager immoral, but their 
decision would not be binding upon anyone else. We should also note that they 
would also be preferring a finite good (their current moral scruples) over an infinite 
good (eternal salvation) which would not be strictly rational in decision theoretical 
terms. However, if the post-modernist already denies the possibility of any after-
life, then such considerations might be discounted. In this sense, they place 
themselves with Craig Duncan's dogmatic atheists.436 
Finally, we need to consider the case where there is an underlying and universal set 
of ethics in the universe, but no God. There is a possibility that the Wager may 
434 Adams, Finite and Infinite Goods: 274-75. 
435 I accept that I am using a broad-brush term for what is a complex philosophical field. 
436 Duncan, "Do Vague Probabilities Really Scotch Pascal's Wager?," 281. 
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offend those ethics, but no easy means of assessing the impact and if there is no 
deity, then there is probably no eternal reward either (nor eternal punishment). In 
any case, I am unaware of any usable consensus on such ethics amongst atheists, 
humanists or agnostics that would help us resolve this problem. Various atheists 
have, at times supported the Wager's logic and only a very few have condemned it 
on ethical grounds, so we may be safe in that respect, but must allow for future 
authors who disagree. If we cannot mitigate our risk, then we need to dismiss this 
scenario under the Principle of Accepted Immitigable Risk. 
Are we complicit in immorality? 
Setting aside the issues of whether God can be immoral, would it be immoral for us 
to comply with the requirements of an immoral God? I do not think that it would 
be. Let us assume that there is an independent standard of "good" against which 
both God's actions and our own can be measured. In this scheme, actions will not 
be deemed moral based upon who does (or commands) them, but by their own 
innate character. So, if a moral God commands us to murder a child under this 
system, then we are evil if we do so, because the act is evil, not because it was 
commanded by an evil being. Likewise, if Satan were to command us to love our 
neighbour, then that act would be good, even if Satan is not. 
Under this system is there anything inherently morally wrong in accepting the 
Wager? I do not believe that there can be. Even if we allow that an uneven 
distribution of salvation should be considered immoral, then it is still not incumbent 
upon me to reject that salvation in order to be moral, since my action is separate 
from God's character. 
I think that Penelhum is conflating political or social action with this issue of 
salvation. We might decide to boycott countries which practice apartheid, but our 
motivation there is to change their behaviour, not to maintain some sort of moral 
distance from them. By instituting sanctions against them, we hope to effect 
change. It might therefore be argued that to continue to buy products from corrupt 
regimes is to be complicit in maintaining that corruption, but there is no hint here 
that our refusal to accept the Wager will have any effect whatever on God's 
behaviour. It is also not clear that our refusal to accept the Wager's terms will 
enable anyone else to be saved in our stead. 
Penelhum's argument is that by coming to worship God as the natural result of 
conversion, we will also come to approve of God's policy on salvation, which he has 
already deemed immoral, and therefore, we will become immoral by converting. 
Again, I think this is not guaranteed. We might not approve of God's policy per se, 
but rather approve of God and trust that God's knowledge of what constitutes 
fairness might actually be better than our own. Since God is transcendent, ineffable 
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etc. we might be able to reasonably suspend judgement on the morality of 
exclusive salvation without thereby becoming corrupted in the process. 
It could be argued that one should honour one's moral imperatives, even in the 
face of other commitments. For example, consider the son of a mafia boss who 
discovers that his father is a gangster. Should he honour his father and take up the 
family business, even though he finds it morally repugnant? Or should he walk away 
from his family and ignore all the sacrifices they have made and the evident love 
that they have for him? I think that this is missing the point. In this example we 
have postulated a child who has a developed and clear moral code about what to 
do. Pascal's Wager rarely applies where the matter is already decided. Its whole 
rationale is to give us a pragmatic way of acting when we do not have such 
imperatives. If someone feels that Pascal's Wager is morally repugnant and could 
never be contemplated, then that is no different in practice from the person who 
decides to be an atheist. The Wager is primarily directed to I'homme moyen sensuel 
who has not yet made up his mind. 
In summary, I would hold that our acceptance or rejection of the Wager is morally 
neutral and is a completely separate issue from the issue of whether God might be 
immoral in selectively offering infinite reward. I believe that we can accept the 
Wager without compromising our moral sensibilities. Yet perhaps we are in 
violation of some epistemic duty by accepting the Wager out of pure self-interest 
and that this might also be morally dubious. I will therefore move on to explore 
whether we might have such a duty and, if we do, whether Pascal's Wager violates 
its principles. 
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3.7 Problems with the process 
A duty not to believe this way 
It is a common objection to Pascal's Wager that it induces people to believe when 
they should not. Larimore Reid Nicholl writes: 
"[Pascal's Wager] is superficially persuasive but actually it is insidiously 
destructive on closer look. First, it claims that somehow it is legitimate to 
believe something in the face of an absence of evidence, or even in spite of 
evidence to the contrary. 
Second, it claims that there is some legitimacy in doing the right thing for the 
wrong reasons, rather than showing the correct reasons for doing it.,A37 
While I could argue that the Wager does not say that one should believe, merely 
that one should try to acquire a genuine faith by means of a behavioural 
experiment, there is a wider issue here, which I feel I should address. Is there a duty 
that we should believe things only for a particular set of reasons and that there is a 
moral duty upon us to only believe under those criteria? The reader will instantly 
have picked up the inherent circularity in this argument. Why should we believe 
that the criteria selected are indeed the right ones? What meta-criteria would we 
need to establish the validity of the criteria? Pretty soon we would find ourselves in 
a Kantian infinite regression of proofs, where each criterion must be justified by 
higher criteria ad infinitum. However, let us grant that there may be worthy reasons 
for belief, such as hard evidence, and that there are unworthy reasons, such as 
prejudice. I do not propose to revisit the entire debate taken up by the Reformed 
Epistemologists which we saw earlier, but I would like to briefly touch on some 
points, especially with respect to the legitimate methods which we may employ to 
decide matters. 
One of the most famous expositions of the moral worthiness of beliefs is W.K. 
Clifford's essay: liThe Ethics of Belief", which I mentioned earlier in this chapter. In it 
Clifford postulates a ship-owner who does not bother to check the state of a vessel 
before sending it to sea, full of immigrants. The owner has legitimate doubts about 
the seaworthiness of the vessel, based upon its past history, but subdues these 
"melancholy reflections,,438 on the grounds that "she had gone safely through so 
many voyages and weathered so many storms that it was idle to suppose she would 
not come safely home from this trip also.,,439 He thus convinced himself that, 
despite his concerns about the trustworthiness of his workmen, he should put his 
437 larimore Reid Nicholl, "Pascal's Wager: The Bet is Off," Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research 39, no. 2 (1978): 279. 
438 Clifford, "The Ethics of Belief." 
439 Ibid. 
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trust in "Providence, which could hardly fail to protect all these unhappy families 
that were leaving their fatherland to seek for better times elsewhere.,,44o The ship 
subsequently sinks, together with all its hands and Clifford asks whether the ship-
owner should be considered to be morally culpable for their deaths. Concluding 
that the ship-owner was at fault, Clifford generalises his argument such that it 
becomes morally wrong to believe without good grounds for doing so. In fact, he 
becomes dogmatic, stating: "it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to 
believe anything upon insufficient evidence" .441 
Philip Quinn notes that Clifford does not argue that believing on insufficient 
evidence is injurious to the believer because it fosters credulity in the believer, but 
rather because it endangers civilization and is a betrayal.442 Clifford's prose borders 
on religious awe: 
In regard, then, to the sacred tradition of humanity, we learn that it consists, 
not in propositions or statements which are to be accepted and believed on the 
authority of the tradition, but in questions rightly asked, in conceptions which 
enable us to ask further questions, and in methods of answering questions. The 
value of all these things depends on their being tested day by day. The very 
sacredness of the precious deposit imposes upon us the duty and the 
responsibility of testing it, of purifying and enlarging it to the utmost of our 
power. He who makes use of its results to stifle his own doubts, or to hamper 
the inquiry of others, is guilty of a sacrilege which centuries shall never be able 
to blot out. When the labours and questionings of honest and brave men shall 
have built up the fabric of known truth to a glory which we in this generation 
can neither hope for nor imagine, in that pure and holy temple he shall have no 
part nor lot, but his name and his works shall be cast out into the darkness of 
oblivion for ever. 
Yet, Clifford's thesis is incomplete. While we might agree that we need sufficient 
grounds for some beliefs, what constitutes "sufficient"? Clifford has no answer for 
us. As George Mavrodes puts it: 
While Clifford tells us that it is wrong to believe on insufficient eVidence, he does 
not tell us how much evidence, in general, is sufficient for belie/. And he does 
not tell us how to go about deciding how much evidence is sufficient.443 
On the other hand, as James observes,444 the history of science is littered with 
beliefs which turned out to be wrong, but which nonetheless have helped advance 
440 Ibid. 
441 Ibid. 
442 Quinn, "Moral Objections to Pascalian Wagering," 64-65. 
443 George Mavrodes, "Intellectual Morality In James and Clifford," in The Ethics of Belief Debate 
(Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1986), 212. 
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the cause. Had no-one ever believed in atoms, then we might never have 
discovered the nucleus, or the even-smaller 'fundamental' particles. Even the 
completely erroneous belief in phlogiston helped us to recognise the role of oxygen 
in combustion. Is it therefore reasonable to make our best guess at the time, 
without risking being accused of betraying the "sacred tradition of humanity"? 
I suspect that Clifford would completely reject Pascal's Wager and see it as a 
corrosive influence, for similar reasons to Nicholl. There seems little doubt from the 
quotation above that he would see belief acquired via the Wager as being morally 
wrong and verging on blasphemy. 
Quinn argues that Pascalian reasoning does not violate Clifford's principles. After 
all, its starting point is that there is insufficient evidence to convince us either way. 
If we take this to mean that there is as much evidence for God's existence as there 
is to the contrary, then how are we to decide? Is must be reasonable that we use 
some sort of tie-breaker in these circumstances and so Mavrodes introduces what 
he calls the "Meatloaf Factor",445 Suppose that there is in your fridge a piece of 
meatloaf which has been there for an unknown period of time. You cannot tell 
whether the meatloaf is good or bad by simply looking at it, so should you eat it or 
not? If you eat it and it turns out to be bad, then you might suffer and even die. 
However, if it is good, then you receive a nutritious meal for free. Thus, there is an 
asymmetry between the outcomes, where the bad case is much worse than the 
good case is beneficial. In those circumstances, he argues, we are justified in 
preferring one outcome over the other. Although we have no firm evidence either 
way, we make our choice based upon pragmatic considerations. Pascal is suggesting 
exactly the same class of decision, where our choice is driven by the asymmetry 
between the potential outcomes. 
A duty to doubt 
Much of the rhetoric surrounding Clifford and his supporters seems to hinge on a 
belief that we have some duty not to be deceived, nor to make ourselves gullible. 
We might therefore reject Pascal's advice that we need to subdue our objections 
and be appalled at the idea that we might "make ourselves docile,,446 as 
Krailsheimer's translation has it. The French phrase used, "vous abetira", 
embarrassed the Port Royal authors, according to Benn,447 and it took a later editor, 
Victor Cousin, to restore Pascal's original text. Brunschvieg's translation rendered it 
as "to stupefy you", which might have confirmed Clifford's suspicions as to where 
this sort of decision making process might lead. 
444 James, The Will To Believe: VIII. 
445 Mavrodes, "Intellectual Morality in James and Clifford," 213. 
446 Pascal, Pensees: 122. L418 
447 Benn, "Pascal's Wager," 309. 
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So do we have a duty to reject the Wager because its ultimate demand is that we 
make ourselves stupid and is that what Pascal really intended? It is easy to claim as 
Benn does that "if so great a writer wanted to say [something else], he had 
command enough of the French language to say it for himself'. Yet that ignores the 
physical evidence of the fragment containing the Wager, which is covered in 
revisions and crossings out and has writing up and down the margins. It also 
overlooks the fact that we are clearly examining a work in progress in Pensees, 
rather than a finished thesis. In my view, it is entirely reasonable that Pascal might 
have phrased his final version more elegantly in order to avoid any hint of 
committing intellectual suicide in accepting the Wager. We also need to see it 
within Pascal's model of humanity, where we are continually blown about by our 
passions and concupiscence, and it is these which need to be tamed, so that 
matters of faith can be properly and soberly considered. 
If the evidence for and against God is equivocal, as Pascal claims, then what duty do 
we violate if we prefer one side over the other? As we saw with Mavrodes' 
meatloaf, we might use pragmatic reasoning in order to settle the matter and thus 
choose to minimise our risk. Indeed, this is following Clifford's example of the ship-
owner. As Quinn observes, part of Clifford's thesis is that the risks are 
asymmetrical. If the ship sinks then the subsequent deaths are a catastrophic loss, 
while the potential losses of an inspection and cancelling the trip are relatively 
minor. If we recast the problem, such that the ship-owner merely worried whether 
the ship looked nice as it sailed and if he ought to repaint it before sailing, no-one 
would hold him morally at fault for failing to go and look. It is the very asymmetry 
of losses which drives the moral conviction. In Pascal's Wager, the same logic 
applies. The potential losses are infinite and eternal, so they must drive our 
behaviour. Clifford is actually a Pascalian (at least in this example).448 
If risk management is a reasonable means of preferring one decision over another 
which is otherwise equally likely, then no Kantian duty can be violated. Someone 
might argue that if we knew one outcome were actually far more likely than the 
other, then we might be in breach of such a duty, but modern law does not 
recognise any such thing. To ferry operators in the early 1980s, it seemed extremely 
unlikely that anyone would leave the bow doors open on a Channel ferry, but when 
it occurred on the Herald of Free Enterprise in 1987, the ship owners were still 
prosecuted for manslaughter.449 It seems that the magnitude of the consequences 
does legitimately playa part in how we should approach our decision making. 
448 I admit that his later example of slander is less so. 
449 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Herald_ofJree_Enterprise 
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Is wagering immoral or simply unworthy? 
The distaste with which many writers discuss Pascal's proposition seems to arise 
from two threads: firstly they believe that gambling is in itself morally suspect; and 
secondly because they hold that such blatant self-interest runs contrary to the 
message of the gospels. 
In current English society gambling is largely frowned upon, although attitudes vary 
considerably by socio-economic class and a large proportion of the population play 
the Lotto every week without a moral qualm. In the USA many people see no moral 
conflict in holidaying, or even getting married in Las Vegas.4SO 
The public attitude to gambling has changed over time. Justine Crump notes that 
disapproval for gambling was absent in earlier writings about the Wager such as 
Tillotson's "Wisdom of Being Religious" (1664). She observes that Tillotson tolerates 
the speculative urge, but attempts to redirect it in a more profitable wager on God, 
rather than on faulty and unsatisfying temporal prizes. This relative acceptance of 
the gambling impulse may reflect the age in which Tillotson wrote, when gambling 
was not yet perceived as an all-devouring social and political monster".451 later 
writers seemed uncomfortable that spiritual matters might be tainted by contact 
with such a disreputable activity, or seemed inappropriate when concerning 
matters of such weight. Voltaire writes: "This article seems a little indecent and 
puerile: the idea of a game, and of loss and gain, does not befit the gravity of the 
subject."4S2 
However, it is the appeal to self-interest that draws the most ire. Nicholl sums this 
attitude up well: 
It cannot escape notice that the prime motivation underlying the glorious wager 
is hedonistic and selfish. The bet is based exclusively on unabashed selfishness -
the attempt to maximise one's own pleasure, both quantitatively and 
qualitatively. Yet it is explicit in Christian ethics that selfish behaviour Is 
unethical, while behaviour based upon genuine altruistic motives is moral and 
necessary for one to be qualified for Christian immortality.453 
Thomas Hardy also expressed his concerns through Coggan, one of the characters In 
his book Far From The Madding Crowd:454 
450 I have been many times to las Vegas in the course of my bUSiness, because there used to be a 
large computer exhibition held in the city every year. I have yet to gamble there. 
451Justine Crump, ""II faut parier": Pascal's Wager and Fielding's "Amelia"," The Modern Language 
Review 95, no. 2 (2000): 314. 
452 F.M.A. Voltaire, "Remarques sur les Pensees de M. Pascal," In Oeuvres, ed. Garnier (Paris: Garnier, 
1728),32-33. vol XXII in Hacking, "The logic of Pascal's Wager," 192. 
453 Nicholl, "Pascal's Wager: The Bet is Off," 278. 
454 lowe this insight to Quinn. 
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"Chapelfolk be more hand-in-glove with them above than we, " said Joseph, 
thoughtfully. 
"Yes, " said Coggan. "We know very well that if anybody do go to heaven, they 
will. They've worked hard for it, and they deserve to have it, such as 'tis. I bain't 
such a fool as to pretend that we who stick to the Church have the same chance 
as they, because we know we have not. But I hate a feller who'll change his old 
ancient doctrines for the sake of getting to heaven. ".455 
Of course, no section on these criticisms of the Wager would be complete without 
William James' scathing condemnation. 
You probably feel that when religious faith expresses itself thus, in the language 
of the gaming-table, it is put to its last trumps. Surely Pascal's own personal 
belief in masses and holy water had far other springs; and this celebrated page 
of his is but an argument for others, a last desperate snatch at a weapon 
against the hardness of the unbelieving heart. We feel that a faith in masses 
and holy water adopted wilfully after such a mechanical calculation lack the 
inner soul offaith's reality; and if we were of the Deity, we should probably take 
pleasure in cutting off believers from their infinite reward. 456 
Strong words indeed and seemingly at odds with James' reputation as a pragmatist. 
I cannot deny that there is something which offends people in the Wager's appeal 
to pure self-interest. Surely, they argue, the pursuit of God (or The Good) should be 
untainted by such worldly matters. While I accept that the Wager is based upon 
self-interest, I will show in the following section that such interest is entirely 
consistent with orthodox Christian doctrine and completely in line with Jesus' 
words as recorded in the gospels. While this may be small comfort to those who do 
not accept the Christian scriptures, it locates the Wager inside the fold of 
mainstream Christian thought, rather than as some black sheep of the theological 
family. 
Self-interest in the gospels 
I do not propose to conduct a deep exegesis in these examples, but merely 
illustrate the compatibility of self-interest with the gospel message. let us start with 
Matthew's account of two of Jesus' parables: 
"The kingdom of heaven is like treasure hidden in a field. When a man found it, 
he hid it again, and then in his joy went and sold all he had and bought that 
field. 
455 Thomas Hardy, Far From the Madding Crowd (London: Penguin Classics, 2007). 267-68. 
456 James, The Will To Believe: II. 
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"Again, the kingdom of heaven is like a merchant looking for fine pearls. When 
he found one of great value, he went away and sold everything he had and 
bought it. ,AS7 
In each of these two parables, one way of reading them is that Jesus describes how 
someone discovers something of great value and then sells all he has in order to 
obtain it for himself.4s8 In each it is implicit that one should give up the lesser good 
for the greater one. 
These are parables with a strong sense of self-interest, yet there is no 
condemnation attached. Again Matthew reports Jesus as saying: 
"But when you give to the needy, do not let your left hand know what your right 
hand is doing, so that your giving may be in secret. Then your Father, who sees 
what is done in secret, will reward you. [ ... J Do not store up for yourselves 
treasures on earth, where moth and rust destroy, and where thieves break In 
and steal. But store up for yourselves treasures in heaven, where moth and rust 
do not destroy, and where thieves do not break in and steal. For where your 
treasure is, there your heart will be also. ,,4S9 
This is another appeal to self-interest. It tells us to act in a particular way, so that 
God will reward us and it explicitly suggests that we should be aiming for reward in 
heaven. It would seem that the gospel writer was not at all uncomfortable with 
staking our worldly goods in order to win heavenly/eternal ones. In fact, it is 
positively recommended. 
On the avoidance of loss, Mark has Jesus saying: 
If your hand causes you to sin, cut it off It is better for you to enter life maimed 
than with two hands to go into hell, where the fire never goes out460 
Jesus appears to be saying that cutting off your hand is a finite loss, which is far 
better than the infinite loss of being thrown into Hell. There is approval for looking 
after your own interests and taking whatever steps necessary, however extreme, in 
order to obtain or preserve your heavenly reward. 
Improperly earning the reward 
For William James it seems that the association with the gaming table implied that 
any faith obtained that way had not been properly earned, much as many people 
are unhappy with the idea of wealth obtained by lottery, rather than by hard work. 
457 Matthew 13:44-46, NIV 
458 We might observe that in the first parable the treasure finder feels no obligation to tell the 
landowner of the true worth of his property I 
459 Matthew 6:3-4 and 19-21 
460 Mark 9:43 
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Yet many would argue that this is the very essence of the gospel; salvation can 
never be earned, it is always the undeserved gift of grace. In any case, there is not a 
hint from Pascal that he thought the Wager would grant salvation, merely that it 
would turn the unbeliever's heart towards finding God. Nicholl dismisses the Wager 
as "doing the right thing for the wrong reasons",461 but does not suggest what the 
right reasons might be. After all, if the pursuit of God is the highest calling, how 
could we cavil at the means by which we discover that truth? 
The morality o/the Wager 
As we have seen, Quinn finds no moral difficulty in God's offering salvation to only a 
selected few, since God cannot reasonably be obliged to grant infinite reward for 
any finite action. I agree and hold that grace is the unearned gift of God, not 
something which can be earned, or demanded as our due. It is this asymmetry 
which is one of the great mysteries of the gospel. Likewise, Pascal's Wager does not 
violate any duty to avoid self-deception, nor does it undermine our belief system in 
general. I suggest that our decision making may be legitimately formed by 
consideration of the outcomes, especially when there is a distinct asymmetry 
between the possibilities. So it is entirely legitimate for us to use a cost/reward 
basis in order to select between alternatives when we have no overriding reasons 
to prefer one option over another. 
I do not believe that the language of gambling tarnishes the pure goals of Pascal's 
Wager. Distaste against gambling should be more about its excesses and, as we 
have seen, attitudes have varied over time. In my view, gambling itself is not 
necessarily evil and even if it were, the present logic of decision theory is not bound 
to it, even if that might have been its birthplace. To give another example, we do 
not suggest that life insurance is morally corrupt, although its actuarial roots lie 
buried in the same statistical soil. 
Finally, one of the insults aimed at Jesus himself was that he was found in the 
company of sinners.462 Pascal might have been proud such an association. 
461 Nicholl, "Pascal's Wager: The Bet is Off," 279. 
462 Luke 15:2 
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3.8 Problems with Pascalian Logic 
Having dealt with some objections to the deity and the process, I now move on to 
discuss some ways in which the logic underpinning Pascal's Wager has been turned 
by critics in order to produce either ridiculous or morally dubious ends. The intent 
of these objections has generally been to question whether the logic itself is sound, 
or whether it is too crude a tool to be used in such important matters. I will start 
with two humorous parodies: Tabbarok's Wager and Pascal's Mugger, in order to 
sketch how the principles established earlier can be used to construct a suitable 
defence against them. I will then tackle Criag Duncan's "Persecutor's Wager" in 
more detail. 
Tabbarok's Wager 
The logic of superdominance that drives the Wager has potential downsides to it. 
Alexander Tabarrok makes the following proposal: 
"For a fee of all your wealth I will use my line to God to put in a word on your 
behalf. I assert that individuals for whom I put in a good word are more likely to 
enter heaven and receive everlasting joy than are other individuals. ,A63 
Tabarrok offers us the opportunity to take advantage of his revelation of God and 
his claimed intimate relationship with the deity, in return for our worldly goods. He 
uses solid Pascalian logic that this is a rational course of action and Lars Peter 
0sterdal confirms the mathematical soundness, although he adds the caveat that 
"even accepting Pascal's Wager, it does not follow that Tabarrok's Wager should be 
accepted".464 This is not a new offer, of course. The Church has a long and sordid 
history of making such offers, although perhaps not quite as openly greedy. 
Indulgences were freely sold by sections of the Catholic Church until the practice 
was banned by Pope Pius V in 1567, following the Council of Trent. One modern 
tongue-in-cheek parody of indulgences can be found in the "Get Out of Hell 
Free!,,46S cards offered by Randy Cassingham which have the tag line '1IlSin All You 
Want, WeIll Print More."466. 
The question in such a mediated offer is whether the offeror can deliver on the 
promise and this was one of the preconditions that I discussed earlier. I doubt that 
anyone, including Tabarrok himself, believes that he can. Tabarrok's defence is that, 
even if he offers only a small increase in our probability of reaching heaven, is it still 
worth doing. He carefully does not explore the possibility that his intervention 
463 Alexander Tabarrok, "Believe in Pascal's Wager? Have I Got a Deal for You I," Theory and Decision 
48(2000): 124. 
464 lars Peter lZIsterdal, "Pascal and Tabarrok's Wagers," Theory and Decision 57(2004): 4. 
465 Randy Cassingham modelled these on the "Get Out of Jail Free" cards in the Hasbro's board 
game, MONOPOLY-. The cards have proved to be very popUlar, especially amongst clergy, and 
Cassingham has sold over a million so far. 
466 http://www.goohf.com/ 
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might decrease our chances of getting into heaven. After all, God might become so 
annoyed with Tabbarok (and/or the gullibility of his followers) that he casts all of 
Tabbarok's believers into hell instead. Tabbarok also glosses over the possibility of 
doing other things with our worldly possessions, such as giving them all to the 
poor467, which might have a better chance of success. Paul Bartha's relative utilities 
(discussed on p93) suggest that when we are faced with two competing infinite 
utilities, we should make the decision on the basis of our subjective probabilities.468 
Tabbarok's Wager ultimately succumbs to a "many alternatives" objection. 
Pascal's Mugger 
There is also an objection known as Pascal's Mugger, which Colin Bostrom describes 
in a humorous essay. In it Pascal is confronted by a mugger who demands Pascal's 
wallet, which contains ten livres. When Pascal asks why he should hand it over, the 
mugger engages in a series of offers, parodying the form of Pascal's Wager, firstly 
by offering to give twice as much money back tomorrow. The mugger then raises 
the stakes by claiming to being an Operator of the Seventh Dimension who can 
deliver additional days of happy life. Pascal is dubious, but the mugger assures him 
that there must be some non-zero probability that he is telling the truth and Pascal 
reluctantly assigns it a probability of one in a quadrillion. 
Mugger: Good. Now we will do some maths. Let us say that the 10 livres that 
you have in your wallet are worth to you the equivalent of one happy day. Let's 
call this quantity of good 1 Uti!. So I ask you to give up 1 Uti!. In return, I could 
promise to per/arm the magic tomorrow that will give you an extra 10 
quadrillion happy days, i.e. 10 quadrillion Uti!s. Since you say there is a lin 10 
quadrillion probability that' will fUlfil my promise, this would be a fair deal. The 
expected Utility for you would be zero. But I feel generous this evening, and I 
will make you a better deal: If you hand me your wallet, , will perform magic 
that will give you an extra 1,000 quadrillion happy days of li/e.469 
Pascal replies "I admit I see no flaw in your mathematics" and grudgingly hands 
over the wallet with its ten livres. 
This satire is directed at the misapplication of superdominance, which we can also 
see appearing in wider fields such as global warming. If there is a non-zero 
probability of infinite disaster, it is argued that we should employ any amount of 
resources in order to avoid it. These arguments usually fail because we either reject 
the underlying proposition, or because we simply cannot afford to mitigate the risk. 
Thus we simply have to accept them. 
467 Matthew 19:21 
468 Bartha, "Relative Utilities, " 30. 
469 Colin Bostrom, "Pascal's Mugger," Analysis 69, no. 3 (2009): 445. 
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In this instance Bostrom is suggesting that there is a non-zero possibility of a 
claimant having magical powers to offer an overwhelming finite reward. Bostrom's 
mugger specifically does not claim to have infinite power, nor to offer an infinite 
reward; he merely offers a vast finite reward which is sufficient to overwhelm a 
small subjective probability. 
It seems that the principle of Maximality should apply: this mugger is not a deity at 
all, let alone a MaximalGod. After all, his powers do not extend to creating, or 
obtaining ten livres of his own. We can thus reject him and if his Seventh Dimension 
exists at all, then there may be better people to deal with. I do think, however, that 
the point being raised by Bostrom is a valid one. If someone can claim to have 
magic powers and if we are willing to assign a non-zero probability of their actually 
possessing them, then there may be cases where our decision theory is frustrated 
by a Pascalian escalation of the rewards on offer. The obvious rebuttal is to demand 
evidence of the claimant's abilities, but this would be to ensnare the Wager in 
similar evidentialist attacks. 
We could also consider the claim in its wider context. After all, there is another 
possibility: that the mugger is lying. Indeed, the style that Bostrom adopts is 
designed to convey this to us in the narrative. It would be rather na'ive of us to not 
acknowledge this fact. However, this does not reduce the Pascalian impact, because 
the loss in that scenario would only be the ten livres. Pascal, however, was much 
brighter than how he is portrayed in Bostrom's account. Anyone who had read his 
brilliant destruction of casuistry in The Provincial letters could believe that he 
would so readily accede to the mugger's demands. There are a number of replies 
which are possible. Firstly, he can reply in like kind and assert that he too is from 
the Seventh Dimension and thus he has as much access to the happy days as the 
mugger does. While this is untrue, it is surely allowable for Pascal to reason that 
there is perhaps a one in a quadrillion chance that it might be true and that he 
might have been previously unaware of it. Perhaps he has been inhabiting the 
Seventh Dimension all this time without knowing it, which might explain his 
frequent headachesl Pascal can reason to himself that while he does not think it to 
be true, if it is possible at all, then there must be some small possibility that he is 
indeed also from the Seventh Dimension. After all, there is no reason to suppose 
that the mugger is more likely to be from that dimension that he himself is. He 
continues in thought and deduces that since he himself does at least have ten 
livres, unlike the mugger who is forced to beg, he ought consider himself the 
superior being and thus more likely to have access to any higher powers. Therefore, 
the mugger is not necessarily offering him anything which he could not obtain 
without the expense of ten livres. Faced with two identical competing rewards, the 
Tie-Break Principle allows us to pick the more probable and/or the one with the 
lower cost. 
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There is a more elegant approach: Pascal could perform a behavioural experiment 
and offer the mugger ten quadrillionths of a livre in return for a single happy day 
tomorrow. Or better still, ten billionths of a livre in return for a billion happy days. If 
the mugger delivers on his promise, which will require less than a billionth of his 
power, then there will be no problem handing over the r:st of the money. 
I believe that this answers Bostrom within the spirit of the Wager. Pascal does not 
guarantee eternal bliss, nor does he think that it is necessarily obtainable in this 
way. The Wager is merely a tool to overcome what Pascal sees as flaws in our 
noetic fabric and to start us on a path towards salvific faith. He makes no promises 
and instead asks us to test it for ourselves. 
If Tabbarok's and Bostrom's suggestions are somewhat tongue-in-cheek, Craig 
Duncan's challenge is more carefully articulated and asks the question whether 
Pascal's could be used to justify actions which we would otherwise hold to be 
morally unacceptable. If so, then we might have to face the possibility that any 
Pascalian arguments are inherently flawed and should therefore be avoided. 
The Persecutor's Wager 
We saw in Chapter 3 that if I accept Pascal's argument from superdominance, then I 
am rationally compelled to try to believe in God. Craig Duncan discusses whether 
similar Pascalian logic might support religious oppression and he sets out this thesis 
in his 2007 paper ''The Persecutors Wager".470 While the aim of his paper is 
primarily an attack on consequentialist thought within a utilitarian framework, I 
believe that we need to examine whether it undermines the legitimacy of Pascalian 
logic in general. In this section I will critically examine Duncan's Persecutors Wager 
as a potential reductio ad absurdum attack on Pascal's Wager. 
The outline of a reductio attack 
We have shown that if a particular action results in infinite gain, then any and all 
finite costs may be incurred in pursuing that action. i.e. 
EV(action) = p(action) x 00 - cost 
=00 
This holds no matter how small a value we choose for the probability of such action 
producing the gain, provided that it is greater than zero. I argue on pages 140-152 
that neither zero, nor infinitesimal probabilities could be rationally used against this 
sort of argument, so it would seem to be a valid line of attack on Pascal's Wager to 
show that all such arguments might be inherently suspect, especially as that is 
many people's instinctive reaction when discussing Pascal's Wager. 
470 Craig Duncan, "The Persecutor's Wager," Philosophical Review 11, no. 1 (2007). 
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The logic behind this reductio attack would be thus: 
a) The argument from superdominance cannot rationally be defeated (within 
its premises) so 
b) If we find a solid argument from superdominance from which 
unquestionable evil inevitably results then 
c) All arguments from superdominance are inherently flawed and may be set 
aside, or at least treated with a large amount of caution. 
I admit that I do not believe this to be a water-tight case against Pascalian 
reasoning, since I am not convinced that the final step necessarily follows from the 
first two. It is not necessarily the case that finding a single unacceptable outcome 
should invalidate a whole methodology. Let me briefly give a counter-example: let 
us say that I believe in fairness (by which I mean treating each person equally) and I 
also believe in eliminating starvation. I will act to maximise each of these goals in 
my life. However, I lack the resources to be able to aid all starving people, so I must 
necessarily limit my charitable actions to a few. This is unfair, by my criteria, on 
those who are not aided. The question is how we could we resolve the dilemma. 
We could accept a compromise, but it could be problematic to find the correct 
balancing point. Should we aid no-one, or perhaps give them each the same, even if 
that is too little food to make any difference to their starvation? There is a tension 
between those two goals, but it does have a gruesome solution: I could simply 
murder all starving people. All would be treated in the same way and afterwards 
there would be no starving people, so it would seem to meet the criteria I set, 
although it is obviously morally abhorrent. 
In a similar fashion, we might find that there are problem sets where Pascal's 
Wager could be turned to produce a recognisably evil outcome, as Craig Duncan 
attempts to do, but we need to consider these within our wider moral framework, 
not as if they existed in some sort of intellectual vacuum. Having said that, I still 
think we need to take this attack seriously. It does, after all, cast further doubt 
about how we might legitimately use infinite utility within such a decision 
theoretical context. 
The end justifies the means 
This Pascalian argument above could be more simply expressed in the traditional 
formula of tithe end justifies the means". The decision theory we have been 
following suggests that if we have infinite reward available, then gaining that 
should justify any costs we incur. In earlier chapters we have been considering that 
equation purely from the viewpoint of the individual who both bears the costs and 
reaps the rewards. In Duncan's thesis we move into a realm where the costs may be 
borne by others, who mayor may not participate in the gains. This is much less 
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acceptable on a moral basis and may render such a course of action to be outside 
the Iive471 options which we might consider. I shall return to this argument later. 
I start by outlining Duncan's Wager and exposing the underlying logic. I also 
highlight what I believe are its strengths, as well as why I believe that the argument 
ultimately fails. I present two defences to the Persecutor's Wager, one as a "free-
will" defence and a "many-errors" defence. In conclusion I summarise why I believe 
that the Persecutor's Wager fails as an argument in its own right and also why it 
makes no real impact on Pascal's Wager, but let us start with Duncan's thought-
provoking paper. He opens his essay with a horrific account: 
In October of 1553, the Unitarian theologian Michael Servetus was burnt at the 
stake in Geneva on the grounds of heresy.... We are told that the executioners 
secured Servetus to the stake with an iron chain. They wound a thick rope 
several times tightly around his neck, until Servetus pleaded that it be wound no 
further. A pile of wood was placed at his feet and a crown of straw coated in 
sulphur was placed on his head; the whole contraption was then set alight. 
Several people from a large crowd of spectators came forward to throw some 
wood of their own onto the fire. As the flames began to reach him, Servetus let 
forth a horrifying shriek; within half an hour he was dead. 472 
Duncan finds support for this execution from the reformer John Calvin, who 
asserted that Servetus had denied the Trinity and since that was a damnable belief, 
it could not be tolerated and death was therefore deserved.473 Christians might find 
some scriptural support for such a hard-line approach in the synoptic Gospels, 
where it says: 
"if anyone causes one of these little ones who believe in me to sin, it would be 
better for him to have a large millstone hung around his neck and to be 
drowned in the depths of the sea. ,A74 
If preaching false doctrine can cause people to fall into sin, then the gospel writers 
have Jesus confirming that death would be preferable. Matthew also records Jesus 
as saying: 
"If your right eye causes you to sin, gouge it out and throw it away. It is better 
for you to lose one part of your body than for your whole body to be thrown into 
hell'A75 476 
471 As William James would put it 
472 Duncan, "Persecutor's Wager," 1. based on Roland Bainton, Hunted Heretic (Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1953). 
473 Duncan, "Persecutor's Wager," 1. 
474 Matthew 18:6 (NIV) 
475 Matthew 5:29 (NIV) 
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The essence of the justification is primarily an epidemiological argument, where 
false doctrine is treated as if it were a transmissible disease. The difference is that, 
since we have an infinite loss to consider, the stakes are much higher. Thus, if 
holding a particular belief might disqualify someone from eternal salvation; and if 
that person were to try and promulgate such a belief such that other people would 
lose (or fail to gain) eternal salvation; then any and all means should be allowable 
to prevent such proselytising. Duncan takes it further still, saying that given that 
eternity is at stake, then it is not only allowable, it is imperative. 
If we were talking about a plague which spread by contact, then we might see it as 
entirely reasonable to prevent people from moving freely, possibly even 
imprisoning them if they refused to comply. One US citizen was recently tracked 
down and isolated477 after failing to comply with a movement restriction when he 
was suffering from extremely drug-resistant tuberculosis (XDR_TB).478 On the other 
hand, it is unlikely that society would approve of the murder of plague carriers and 
even during the great plagues of the past, it was not common. Incurable 
contagions such as leprosy were dealt with by social strictures and by isolation in 
leper colonies, not by genocide. So the burning of heretics seems to be an excessive 
response, unless we consider that isolation from words and ideas is harder to 
achieve than simple segregation and thus murder becomes the only viable option. 
We might find support for this in the evidence of dissidents within Communist 
countries in the twentieth century, where their writings reached the West even 
though the authors were imprisoned in remote areas. 
If false doctrine spreads like a contagion, then written texts and tracts provide a 
reservoir of infection, as well as being a vector for its wider transmission. So the 
quarantine argument would justify book burning and the control of literature, 
perhaps by restricting publication to those books deemed to be suitable by an 
appropriate authority. We do not have to look very far to find examples of this in 
history.479 Modern Western culture, with its emphasis on free speech, finds such an 
approach abhorrent, but could it be justified using some form of Pascalian logic? 
Could it be rational to be cruel to some in order to be kind to the majority? Duncan 
starts with a simple case and then progressively refines it. 
476 There thus appears to be some scriptural backing for maiming or killing heretics, which Duncan 
does not explore, possibly because his target in the essay is consequentialists, rather than orthodox 
Christians. 
477 CDC Investigation of Traveller with Extensively Drug-Resistant Tuberculosis (XDR TB): Questions 
and Answers for Passengers and Flight Crew on Affected Flights 
http://www.cdc.gov/tb/xdrtb/travellerfactsheet.htm 
478 This is a form of tuberculosis which is resistant to all the major antibiotics used to treat the 
disease, and specifically has evolved resistance to rifampicin and isoniazid which are the second-line 
drugs used to treat other resistant forms of TB. 
479 As in the imprimatur of the Roman Catholic Church. 
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The Simple Case 
We can illustrate the simplest case with our familiar 2x2 matrix. Let us consider just 
the Christian God versus no god and decide whether we should enforce Christianity, 
or allow complete religious freedom. Duncan argues that enforcing Christianity will 
result in more people believing in the Christian God. Although this seems 
contentious, it cannot be denied that when Christianity was enforced on past 
cultures then there appeared to be more people who did believe than now. 
Duncan cites Ba rry, who wrote: liThe effectiveness of coercion in producing genuine 
belief over the course of a few generations is beyond question,,480 and Duncan 
argues that the plight of the Baha'is in Iran constitutes a real-life example.481 
In a population, let the number of Christians be "c" and the number of additional 
people who become Christians due to enforcement be "I:!.c" . We assume that each 
believing Christian obtains salvation, whose value we represent here as S. Let the 
probability of the Christian God's existence be p . So we have: 
Grant religious liberty 
Enforce Christianity 
An exclusivist 
Christian God exists 
Sxc 
S x C + L\c) 
EV(liberty) = p x (5 x c) + (1 - p) x 0 
o 
o 
EV(enforce) = p x (5 x (c + I:!.c)) + (1 - p) x 0 
No god exists 
It therefore appears that enforcing Christianity has a higher expected value than 
allowing liberty as long as I:!.c is positive, although we have not yet considered the 
costs involved. For this section I propose to ignore finite cost and assume that they 
are overwhelmed by the benefits. Duncan argues that salvation has incomparably 
greater value than any earthly sacrifice and so it becomes not only allowable, but 
imperative to enforce Christianity. 
It is immediately apparent that this argument has a flaw, for as soon as we give 
salvation an infinite value, there is no longer any gain in enforcement. For if 5 is 
infinite then: 
EV(liberty) = p x (5 x c) 
= p x (co x c) 
= co 
480 Brian Barry, Theories of Justice (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989). in Duncan, 
"Persecutor's Wager." 
481 "Persecutor's Wager," 13. 
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EV(enforce) = p x (5 x (c + ~ c ) ) )
= p x (00 x (c + ~ c ) ) )
=00 
Thus, if the Persecutor's Wager uses infinite value then it becomes trapped in a 
similar way to the difficulties faced by Pascal's Wager with mixed strategies, as we 
saw in Chapter 2. 
In response to this predicament, Duncan tries to argue for a finite, but 
incomparable good, and he acknowledges Alan Hajek's reformulation, which splits 
earthly and heavenly quantities and which I discussed on page 87.482 Duncan admits 
that he struggles to define what the "tremendously large finite number" should be, 
or why it should be different from the normal concept of infinity, much as Hajek 
also rejected the reformulation. However Duncan makes the intuitive step that 
"one should not ipso facto reject the good of salvation in magnitude to the goods of 
this life .... Instead, one ought to conclude that the usual mathematical notion of 00 
turns out not to be the proper way of mathematically modelling the root idea of 
incomparability" .483 Possibly Duncan might find my guesstimation function more 
useful in solving this problem for him, although the function would need to be 
adopted for a population, rather than an individual. This would be an area for 
further research. 
482 Hajek, "Waging War," 39. 
483 Duncan, "Persecutor's Wager," 18. 
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Zero-sum 
Duncan continues exploring the problem and develops an interesting line in 
modelling the zero-sum484 situation of believers/non-believers in a population. He 
considers the case where every member of a population is either a Christian or a 
Muslim. Thus any gain by conversion for one group is an equivalent loss for the 
other. 
Let 5i be the reward for Islamic salvation and 5c be the reward in Christian salvation. 
Then let ~ c c be the increase in Christians if Christianity is enforced and ~ i i be the 
increase in Muslims if Islam is enforced. 
Religious freedom 
Enforce Islam 
Enforce Christianity 
An exclusivist 
Christian God exists 
with probability Pc 
An exclusivist 
Muslim God exists 
with probability Pi 
EV (religious freedom) = Pc x Sc x c + Pi X Si X i 
No god exists 
o 
o 
o 
EV(enforce Islam) = Pc x (Sc x (c - ~ i ) ) ) + Pi x (Si X (i + ~ i ) ) )
EV(enforce Christianity) = Pc x (Sc x (c + ~ c ) ) ) + Pi X (Si x (i - ~ c ) ) )
We can subtract out the common terms from each leaving: 
Relative EV (religious freedom) =0 
Relative EV (enforce Islam) = Pi x Sj x ~ i i - Pc x Sc x ~ i i
Relative EV (enforce Christianity) = Pc x Sc x ~ c c - Pi X Si X ~ c c
It thus depends on which god is more probable, whether the rewards are different 
and/or whether enforcing Islam is more effective than enforcing Christianity. As it 
stands, there appears to be no advantage to religious freedom, apart from its 
predictability. If we can assign values to Pi, Si, ~ i , , etc. then we can choose to enforce 
Christianity or Islam and obtain a better result than with religious freedom. If we 
are indifferent between them, then they all give the same result. 50 enforcement 
never does worse than freedom and sometimes does better. 
484 A zero-sum game is one where any player's gain is necessarily funded by another player's 
corresponding loss. 
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The argument that Duncan then develops is that if we have any reason to believe 
that there is any advantage to enforcing one religion or persecuting another, then it 
becomes a moral imperative that we must engage in such persecution. Clearly, John 
Calvin believed this, although it needs to be noted that he recommended a more 
humane death for 5ervetus and it was the civil authorities who insisted on burning 
at the stake.485 
let us briefly see what happens if we assume that the salvation offered by each 
religion is equivalent, or at least broadly comparable. In this case, 5c ~ ~ 5i, which we 
could simplify back to just the symbol 5 again. Then let us assume that enforcement 
is also similarly effective for either faith, that is: ~ c c ~ ~ ~ i , , which we then simplify to 
just ~ . . We could now write: 
Relative EV (religious freedom) =0 
Relative EV (enforce Islam) = PI X 5 x ~ ~ - Pc x 5 x ~ ~
= (PI - Pc) x (5 x ~ ) )
Relative EV (enforce Christianity) = Pc x 5 x A - PI X 5 x A 
Now, if we assume that they are equiprobable, using the Principle of 
Indifference,486 then (Pc - Pi) = (Pi - Pc) = 0 and we now have: 
Relative EV (religious freedom) = 0 
Relative EV (enforce Islam) = 0 
Relative EV (enforce Christianity) = 0 
So, in a true Pascalian situation where reason cannot help us decide,487 there is no 
advantage in enforcing anyone religion over another. However, if we do have 
reason to believe that one faith is more probable than any another while still 
assuming that the salvation offered and the efficacy of enforcement are equal, it 
becomes incumbent upon us to enforce that religion, as far as we are able. 
485 Edwin Curley, "Sebastian Castellio's Erasmian Liberalism," Philosophical Topics 31(2004): 51. 
486 As I discuss on page 48, the Principle of Indifference is not very reliable In these matters. 
487 Pascal, Pensees (tr. Ariew): 122. L418 
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Duncan does not evaluate a separate issue, which is that one faith might be more 
attractive, or at least easier to enforce than another, for any difference in 
conversion rates (or ~ ) ) also swings the equation as long as we do not hold the two 
to be exactly equiprobable. That is, if we consider one to be marginally more 
probable than the other, say 49.9% likely to 50.1% likely, so that there is a 0.2% 
difference between them. We might also adopt Hajek's concept of vague 
probabilities,488 and say that we consider them to be vaguely equiprobable, but 
with a margin for error. So we might assign the term (Pi - Pc) to have a value 
between -0.2% and +0.2%, but not exactly zero. In this case, the argument for 
enforcement might depend upon the attractiveness of each. 
For example, let us imagine an ascetic faith, which we will call "A" and whose 
adherents eat a single meal a day of plain boiled rice, drink only water and mortify 
their flesh daily using rusty iron flails. Then let us postulate a Bacchanalian religion 
(called "B"), which insists that its followers should eat rich food, drink the best 
wine, have riotous parties and be as sexually promiscuous as they like. Both 
religions have a concept of eternal salvation and each promises eternal bliss for its 
adherents,489 but annihilation for unbelievers. let us assume that each appears 
vaguely equiprobable ceteris paribus. Experience from history strongly implies that 
B might be much more popular than A, especially amongst the undecided. It would 
thus be likely to be easier to enforce and have a higher conversion rate. So ~ b b
would be greater than ~ a a and it would become rational to enforce hedonism. 
488 Hajek, "Objecting Vaguely." 
489 We could imagine that the hedonistic heaven with its endless parties might look a good deal 
more attractive than an eternity of fasting, self-flagellation and silence. 
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A wl,i!f of hellfire 
The picture becomes a little more complex once we add in the possibility of an 
eternal Hell. A deity could choose to send believers to heaven, but cast doubters 
into the fires of an eternal Hell. When I discussed this earlier, with respect to the 
standard Pascalian Wager, it was obvious that the possibility of Hell made no 
difference to the decision. If the comparison were between infinite bliss and 
nothing, then infinite bliss would obviously win. If instead the choice were between 
infinite bliss and infinite agony, then the decision would still be in favour of bliss. 
However, if we postulate several gods, each offering infinite bliss or infinite 
suffering, then it becomes less clear cut. Let us insert Hell into the earlier 
Christian/Muslim decision matrix. 
An exclusivist Christian" . :r " An excluslvlst - , 
, God exists with Muslim God exists with ... 
probability Pc I probability PI 
Religious freedom 
Enforce Islam Si x (i + L\i) + Hi x (c - L\i) 0 
Enforce Christianity Se x (c + L\c) + He X (i - L\c) Si x (i - ~ c ) ) + Hi X (c + ~ c ) ) 0 
Now we see that the effects of choice are doubled. If the right religion is enforced 
then not only do additional people go to heaven, an equal number are saved from 
Hell. However, enforcing the wrong religion has a double disadvantage. Not only do 
we snatch salvation from those who might have otherwise believed, we then also 
subject them to the tortures of Hades. Duncan therefore argues that, although 
there will be regret for those who enforced the wrong religion in either case, there 
will be more regret in the case where the error leads to hellfire. If the enforcers had 
allowed religious tolerance instead, then they might have converted fewer people, 
but as it has turned out, those unconverted people would have gone to heaven. By 
converting them, the enforcer has condemned them to Hell, along with himself. He 
will therefore experience more regret than he would have done if there had been 
no Hell to consider at all. 
Choosing from the options 
It appears that if we look at the best-case scenario, then this occurs when either we 
enforce Christianity and the Christian God exists, or when we enforce Islam and the 
Muslim god exists. Both of these outperform religious freedom, so if we assume 
that we have no prior reason to prefer one over the other (either from the value of 
salvation, or the probability of existence) we might reasonably toss a coin to decide 
which to enforce. 
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likewise, we could examine the worst-case scenario. This occurs when we enforce 
Christianity, but the Muslim God exists, or vice versa; thus, we would have 
converted people away from eternal salvation, which might be considered to have 
infinite negative value. If we want a risk management strategy where we avoid the 
worst-case, we might think that we should therefore support religious freedom. 
However, it is not quite as simple as that, especially when we bring the idea of Hell 
into the equation. Duncan's approach is that the increase in regret means that we 
should prefer religious freedom in those cases, since it has less regret. 
Clearly the worst outcome for the Christian is when the exclusivist Muslim god 
exists and vice versa. If there are more of one group than the other, then this 
disturbs the equilibrium. The minimum overall loss occurs when we have exactly 
the same number of Christians as Muslims in the population. So it would be rational 
to use coercion (or persecution) to maintain equal numbers of each group490 and 
each birth and death would potentially require us to re-balance. 
Duncan's conclusions 
For each of several principles, Duncan tries to show that religious tolerance gives 
the best overall result. However, it seems that he has already decided the outcome 
and then selects weighting to give that result. For example: 
The optimism-pessimism principle. This principle directs one to compute, jor 
each option, a weighted average of that option's best case scenario and worst 
case scenario (the weight of the average being determined by where one 
personally falls on an optimist-pessimist spectrum); one is then to choose the 
option with the highest such weighted average. We have already seen that that 
liberty has the best worst-case scenario; it also has the best best-case scenario, 
namely, the existence of a god who saves all citizens as they are, without any 
ordeal of religious enforcement. Hence liberty will have the highest weighted 
average, and an optimism-pessimism principle will select it as the superior 
option. 491 
Yet, this simply is not true. The best best-case scenario he suggests is identical for 
all options and, in fact, it denies the whole principle. For example, let us postulate a 
god who damns all people to Hell. This gives us a worst-case scenario which 
dominates all others and which renders the whole process futile. Either universal 
salvation or damnation will make any wagering irrelevant, so they should be 
excluded from such calculations. 
Once we take the universalist god out, then we find that religious tolerance does 
not have the best best-case scenario at all. Duncan glosses over this, perhaps in a 
490 Duncan, "Persecutor's Wager," 50. 
491 Ibid. 
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desire for the 'right' conclusion. The actual best best-case is when an exclusive god 
exists and where worship of that god is enforced to the extent that most people are 
converted. The worst worst-case appears to be where there is an exclusive god, 
whom very few people worship, possibly because they have been converted to 
another faith. However, modelling these cases tells us very little that we can 
actually use to make decisions. Duncan wants us to exercise religious tolerance and 
I agree that this does no worse in the worst case and should do better than cases 
where belief in the wrong god is enforced. Although we need to bear in mind that 
an attitude of complete religious tolerance might lead to drifting away from faith 
that they might have retained under a stricter regime, or even under persecution. 
I will now discuss some further weaknesses in Duncan's case and go on to show 
why the Persecutor's Wager does not succeed. 
Duncan's assumptions 
Duncan's argument looks unpromising at first glance because it appears to have so 
many assumptions within it. For example, it assumes that we can reliably Identify 
"damnable" doctrines, for on what basis could John Calvin decide that denying the 
Trinity was a damnable belief, as opposed to being a lesser sin (or even being the 
correct option)? After all, the doctrine of the Trinity was slow to arise within the 
Church, and the first mention of the word is generally acknowledged to be by 
Tertullian (c.155-230). What of all the first century Christians? Were they all 
damned? It took until the Council of Nicea in 325 for the Trinitarian formulation to 
become formal doctrine, largely in response to Arius. Even then, debate raged for 
some time. We therefore need some definitive guide to doctrine, or we need to 
expand our calculations to include some probability estimation for each and every 
belief within the canon. The Seven Deadly Sins would need error bars. 
The Persecutor's Wager also has the premiss that believing wrong doctrine can 
cause us to lose salvation, which, as Duncan notes, is strangely at odds with Calvin's 
insistence on predestination.492 That aside, Duncan argues strongly that 
"so long as there is some probability, no matter how small, that only orthodox 
believers are saved, and no rival religious group can credibly claim that only its 
believers are saved, then ... consequentialism not only permits religious 
persecution, but absolutely requires it. n493 
Duncan's argument intends to be all-embracing for a whole range of belief sets. For 
example, he also goes on to argue that a God who accepts everyone except 
unrepentant murderers is still an exclusivist God. It thus would become incumbent 
492 I freely acknowledge that some Augustinians would hold that it is not necessarily a contradiction, 
but the demands of this thesis do not allow me to pursue this further here. 
493 Duncan, "Persecutor's Wager," 5. 
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upon society to devote all its resources into convincing murderers to repent, since 
by so doing, they would obtain an infinite good. 
Once we allow the possibility of an exclusivist God, it is essential that we do all that 
we can to meet the sufficient conditions for salvation . Duncan therefore concludes 
I 
that any case for religious liberty has to be founded upon a surprisingly strong form 
of religious scepticism in which no one has any reason, however slight, to believe in 
an exclusivist GOd.494 Duncan is carried forward by the Pascalian logic that even the 
tiniest probability will still yield an infinite expected value and thus must drive our 
actions. Duncan makes a strong case for enforcement, but I believe that it is based 
upon a false premiss, that of doctrinal infallibility, which I discuss on page 193. 
One infinity is enough 
One key weakness in trying to use the Persecutor's Wager to attack Pascal's Wager 
is its move from the EV of an individual to the EV of a population. Pascal's Wager 
allows an individual to move from a finite reward in this life to an infinite payoff in 
the next. There is no sense in which a person already has an infinite good. 
Let us assume that we have a population who are either Christian or Muslim, as we 
did before.495 Now let us look at the EV of the population under each scenario . 
I 
Religious freedom 
Enforce Islam 
Enforce Christianity 
An exclusivist 
Christian God exists 
with probability Pc 
An exclusivist 
Muslim God exists 
with probability PI 
Scx C Sj xi 
Sc x (c - L\i Sj x (i + ~ i ) )~ = = = ~ ~
...;S",,--c _x ..1.,;( C,,-+....;;L\=C;L.) __ ----' Sj X (i - L\c) 
Yet if Sj is infinite, as is Sc, then we can simplify this496 to: 
Religious freedom 
Enforce Islam 
Enforce Christianity 
494 Ibid. 
An exclusivist 
Christian God exists 
with probability Pc 
00 
00 ~ = = = = = = =00 ______ _ 
An exclusivist 
Muslim God exists 
with probability PI 
• o 
o 
o 
• o 
o 
o 
495 One interesting thought is whether you can convert people to a religion to which no-one yet 
subscribes. Who would do the evangelising under that scenario? So, if there has to be a believer in 
order to beget more believers, then there must already be infinite utility in the population. 
However, I can see that we might have the first person converted by direct revelation from the 
relevant deity. 
496 I have assumed that no conversion is 100% effective, so that we do not ever reach a position 
where there are no Christians (or Muslims) left. 
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There is now no reason to enforce anything. Whatever the reality of God's 
existence, the overall outcome will be identical for each case. As we saw earlier, 
this is also true if we assume that each god is equiprobable and that conversion 
rates are the same. It is no wonder that Duncan wants a finite proxy for the infinite 
good. This problem of infinite utility is a live one for utilitarians and a number of 
papers have been published by a range of authors making assertions and rebuttals 
about whether infinite utility can be added to or not. I do not propose to rehearse 
those arguments here, because Pascal's Wager suffers similar problems in dealing 
with mixed strategies, as I discuss in Chapter 2. The problem here is that intuitively 
there is some gain in adding another person to the number who will gain eternal 
bliss, but mathematically it appears to make no difference. 
One possibility is if we consider eternal bliss to be strictly incommensurate with 
earthly life, except for the single mathematical relation 497 which states that one 
unit of eternal life is greater than any number of units of earthly satisfaction (or 
cost). We need not use infinity in this case, we could simply say that a unit of 
heavenly life is equ ivalent to 101000 units of earthly life. Thus, to ga in one person 
into heaven is still of greater value than the collective life of humanity and we 
retain the notion that it is better to have two people gaining heavenly life than just 
one. 
Using tile guesstimation function 
We could attempt to restore Duncan's position by using my guesstimation function 
as his finite proxy, although we need to have some flexibility about what we mean 
by .0, which we previously treated as being unique to an individual. As we saw 
earlier: 
EV (bet on God) = (p x .0) + 1 x (1-p) == p.o 
EV (bet against God) = (1 x p) + (1 x (1- p)) = 1 
If we assume that we can sum .0 across a population of size n, then we can plug this 
into our earlier table to give the following: 
Religious freedom 
An exclusivist 
Christian God exists 
with probability Pc 
An exclusivist . 
Muslim God exists 
with probability PI 
fi t x I 
fit x (I + ~ i ) )
fit x (i - ~ c ) )
No god 
exists 
n -I - c 
n-I -c 
n -i-c 
497 Relations are found in a mathematical niche known as discrete mathematics. Th is draws upon set 
theory to establish connections between sets. I do not propose to discuss it further at this point, as 
its use here should be reasonably obvious. 
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We have restored the differential, but only if we can safely assert that there are 
inherent differences between the salvation as perceived by a Christian and that of 
the Muslim. Thus, if we believed that fie> fii we could perhaps argue for forced 
conversion. However, I do not think that we could sustain this, since we observe 
that there are conversions in both directions and it seems unlikely that someone's 
guesstimation function would be so easily mutable. Thus, we return to the dynamic 
equilibrium that we saw before, where the minimum loss strategy is to maintain 
equal numbers of Christians and Muslims. 
God would be much better at coercion than we are 
The fatal flaw in the Persecutor's Wager as a reductio ad absurdum of Pascal's 
Wager is that it relies on free will in order for choice to be salvific, but then assumes 
that a deity would subsequently accept individuals who are convinced against their 
will. Duncan appears to believe that the faith acquired through enforcement will be 
indistinguishable from that achieved in a culture of religious tolerance and 
freedom.498 Even if it might seem that way to earthly observers, there is no 
assurance that the deity would take the same view. I would like to examine this 
idea a little further and suggest that the very existence of free-will should give us 
cause to believe that free choice is an essential part of the salvific process, at least 
in as far as it pertains to the Wagers. For the moment I wish to ignore questions of 
how we might educate our children, or select the 'right' doctrines. 
Why should free will exist? 
let us start by considering the goals of the deity. We might put forward the idea 
that a transcendent god is essentially unknowable, but that rather defeats the 
object of pursuing any natural argument whatsoever. let us instead assume that 
the deity's goals in this area are capable of broad understanding and that the 
thought processes are close enough to our own model of rationality for us to work 
with them. I propose that we take the following premisses: 
(1) The deity only selects those people who have a genuine belief in that deity 
(2) Those who are selected will have an eternal, valuable reward after death 
(3) Those who do not have a genuine belief may be annihilated or punished 
after death 
(4) Genuine belief can only be achieved by a free choice of the individual. 
Of these, only (4) is new to this discussion. We have already been assuming (1)-(3), 
so I will set out the reasons why I believe that (4) is an essential premiss in this 
debate. 
498 Duncan, "Persecutor's Wager," 13. 
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Let us set aside the concept of free-will for a moment and postulate instead that 
the deity wishes the maximum possible yield of the saved and is indifferent to the 
means employed to achieve this. The obvious way to maximise the yield is for the 
god to manufacture her creations with that belief already implanted in such a way 
that it cannot be changed. After all, if a toy manufacturer wanted blue footballs, he 
would naturally ensure that the production line sprayed all the footballs indelibly 
blue during the manufacturing process. Thus, any deity who allowed her creations 
to choose religious beliefs for themselves would necessarily be accepting a much 
lower yield of believers, unless she also presents them with indisputable evidence 
of her existence and the need for belief. This means that a hidden deity, such as we 
observe in the context of the two wagers, either does not care about the yield, or 
has some other reason for risking the possibility that her creations would make the 
wrong choice. If the deity is indifferent to the numbers saved, then there is no 
particular reason to attempt to increase them by coercion and/or persecution of 
dissenters. 
It might be argued that the god wished to participate with believers and that 
persecution of unbelievers was a necessary part of that process. Ignoring the moral 
implications for such a deity, this still does not square with the desire for effective 
conversion. It is hard to imagine that a human persuader could be anywhere nearly 
as effective in ensuring conversion, compared with an omniscient creator, who 
would know all the victim's motivations and desires and who could thus come up 
with a wholly persuasive argument, tailored to each individual. Of course, a 
perverse god might actually value the development of persecutors and be 
indifferent to human suffering, but I am unclear why any decent person would want 
to spend eternity with such a being. 
A deity who built belief into her creations so everyone has the inbuilt belief would 
be pragmatically identical to a universalist god. If it were limited to the elect, then 
she becomes indistinguishable from a predestining god. Using the Principle of 
Accepted Immitigable Risk we have seen that such gods have no effect on Pascal's 
Wager and I contend that such gods have no role to play in the Persecutor's Wager 
either. 
A Free Will defence to the Persecutor's Wager 
Since we can be reasonably sure that that humans do not have such an implanted 
inerrant and universally consistent belief set, it would seem that we are allowed to 
choose to believe because the choice itself is important. As is often argued, love is 
only valued when it is a free choice of the individuals, not when it is forced upon a 
couple. Anything else is little more than puppetry. We therefore need to ask the 
question, that if God wants people to have a free choice, why would we nullify that 
by enforCing a specific belief set, which might not even be the correct one? Any 
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persecution at all becomes hard to justify wherever it reduces the freedom of 
choice. 
A similar approach has been proposed as a theodicy explaining why an 
omnibenevolent God would allow suffering in the world. It suggests that God allows 
suffering because it affords us an opportunity to participate in the process of 
relieving suffering. If no-one suffered, then we would have no opportunity to 
sympathise, or to respond and that our personal development would be 
compromised as a result. Yet what would we be saying about the nature of a deity 
who wanted us to persecute others? 
Thus, we can argue that while coercion increases the apparent yield of believers, it 
is actually decreasing the quality of that belief, possibly to the level where it is 
actively damaging faith and reducing the true yield below the levels achieved by 
religious tolerance.499 Duncan argues that if we believe that enforcing Christianity 
would actually result in a lower yield of Christian believers, then we should 
rationally do the opposite and enforce atheism (or Islam) instead. The resulting 
backlash against coercion would then lead people to contrarily embrace Christianity 
instead and would thus boost the Christian ranks, so that the persecution would 
still be justified. I do not agree. I am not arguing for increasing the notional yield, 
for the reasons I have already given. I believe that the evidence is that it is the free 
choice of Christianity which must be the Christian God's goal and thus coercion, or 
reactive revolt against coercion, will not achieve it. 
Am I building a trap for myself here? If we agree that we must be able to freely 
choose a religion, then surely it then becomes incumbent upon us to make that 
choice as free as possible, which might lead us to think that we need make a 
pluralistic, unbiased presentation of each possible faith. This might be infeasible, for 
to present each person with every possible religious option, in order that their 
decision should not be biased by cultural considerations, would require the subject 
to spend their entire life in the task. So we need some sort of heuristic approach. 
We might, for example, only present those options which we (collectively) deem to 
be the most probable. We might also choose to limit the set to those where choice 
determines eternal destiny, by which I mean that the Pascalian need only consider 
live exclusivist faiths. This is typically what many parents do in bringing their 
children up in their own faith and educating them about it, while accepting that the 
children must ultimately make their own decision in the matter. 
499 It could be argued that the Augustinian persecution of Donatists led in many cases to their having 
a genuine faith, but this presumes that the Augustinian doctrines were the correct option. If the 
Donatists were actually right, then it potentially did infinite harm. 
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A Many-Errors defence to the Persecutor's Wager 
The Persecutor's Wager has another serious problem which I alluded to earlier: 
how could we know that any given belief will disqualify us from infinite reward? If 
we look at extant religions, we see that sects within those groups may disagree on 
specific doctrines and we have seen many cases of major disagreement. The case of 
Servetus, which we started with, is a prime example of where two viewpoints 
collide. In these cases it tends to be ruled by "might is right" and the stronger group 
drives out the weaker. No doubt the victors would ascribe their triumph to the 
rightness of their doctrine, but we can observe that different doctrines have held 
sway at different times, with no evidence that it was a god's support that enabled 
one group to prevail, nor why that deity later apparently changed her mind on the 
matter. It is axiomatic in Pascalian arguments that we do not know the correct 
answer (Le. which god, or which doctrine), so we can only decide by a pragmatic 
assessment of the risks and rewards. Thus, we cannot know which doctrine Is truly 
orthodox, or which might be damnable and should proceed very cautiously In that 
regard. 
If Pascal's Wager is to be troubled by the Many Gods objection, then the 
Persecutor's Wager seems to be afflicted by a parallel "Many Errors" objection. 
After all, any belief might have a non-zero chance of causing us to lose our 
salvation, however small that risk, so believing anything at a" seems foolhardy. For 
any given point of doctrine, there wi" be a single correct solutionSOO, but there are 
an infinite number of wrong answers. Thus, we would have an Infinitesimal chance 
of finding the correct doctrine and it is almost certain that we would be preaching 
heresy at every turn. 
We might accept that we have to believe something, so we could allow the 
presentation of beliefs for consideration. If we hold that each person makes their 
own choices before God, and that to lead them into error could be catastrophic, 
then we cannot ever allow enforcement of a particular belief set. 
Summary 
The Persecutor's Wager ultimately collapses under its own weight. While it might 
show that it is rational to enforce belief, it relies upon our confidence that such a 
belief set is entirely complete and correct. If Calvin can argue that a single 
erroneous belief (in Servetus' case, rejection of the doctrine of the Trinity) leads to 
damnation, then we must recognise that there are an infinite set of such potential 
errors available to us. The many-errors defence sinks the Persecutor's Wager, since 
any persecutor risks damning people rather than saving them. It is also apparent 
that we live in a world where free-will is allowed and must therefore conclude that, 
SOO I admit that this could be an over-simplification. It could be that a deity is so complex that 
doctrinal points can have many simultaneously equivalent solutions. 
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if there is a creator then the creator must have willed it so. Thus, to frustrate that 
desire could itself court the wrath of any deity, and lead us to a charge of hubris, 
since we would necessarily believe that we can inculcate genuine belief better than 
the creator could. 
In my opening comments I suggested that the Persecutor's Wager would have three 
stages in mounting an attack on Pascal's Wager. Let us remind ourselves of the 
second step: 
If we find a solid argument from superdominance from which 
unquestionable evil inevitably results then ..• 
My question here is what constitutes "unquestionable evil"? To what extent are our 
views formed or clouded by our cultural milieu? It seems obvious that John Calvin 
did not see the persecution of heretics as unquestionably evil, even if we might be 
less comfortable with that idea today. So even if the Persecutor's Wager were 
successful, we might be simply arguing in a circle to call its conclusions evil. This 
need not trouble us for too long, since we have seen that the Persecutor's Wager is 
not a solid argument in any case. It does not succeed in demonstrating why 
persecution would be rationally required, as any leanings in favour of persecution 
are equally balanced by the need to avoid error. 
3.9 Conclusions on objections 
In this chapter, I have used my critical framework to work through a wide range of 
objections and showed how none of them succeed when viewed from a risk-
management perspective. This is an important contribution to the debate, because 
previous attempts to resolve the difficulties have largely relied upon ad-hoc 
methodologies with an excessive focus on technicalities. I have analysed some 
objections in reasonable detail in order to show how the principles may be applied 
to reduce the problem set to a manageable size, while for others I have simply 
sketched out which principles may be appropriate for tackling it. 
In the following chapter I will explore whether the core assumptions that have 
prevailed throughout the last fifty years of debate around the Wager may in fact be 
flawed. 
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Chapter 4 The Failure of Expected Value 
So far in this thesis I have discussed the theory of Expected Value (EV) as if it were 
accepted to be true. Recent developments in economics and psychology have 
uncovered numerous examples where EV does not adequately explain actual 
human behaviour. The examples that I will produce in this chapter were at first 
thought to be anomalous and some economists suggested that this was due to the 
process by which they were obtained. Many of these anomalies were identified by 
the means of controlled experiments, which treated economics as if it were a 
disCipline within the experimental sciences. This went against the traditions of 
economists, who had largely assumed up to that point that the topic under 
investigation was too complex and interconnected to be capable of such dissection. 
Since the early experimental results obtained in the 1950s the field has grown and 
flourished to the point that a systematic treatment of the current position would be 
infeaSible, yet many economists are still suspicious of this approach. Bardsley et al 
suggest that 
"it would be a mistake to think that experimental methods are no longer 
controversial in economics. Most economists do not conduct experiments and 
many still remain unconvinced as to their usefulness. ,,sOl 
As the body of experimental evidence has developed, it has become apparent that 
there are systemic problems with Expected Utility Theory in general which cannot 
simply be dismissed as artefacts of an invalid approach. Experimental economics 
has become a new branch of economics and shares much of its methodology with 
experimental psychology, which is hardly surprising since it is engaged in 
discovering the decision-making processes within the human mind. 
In this chapter I trace some of the history of dissatisfaction with Expected Utility 
Theory and discuss the competing philosophies which have been used to try and 
explain the observed behaviour. I will then focus most of my attention on the work 
of one particular experimental psychologist, Daniel Kahneman, whose careful 
exposition of the problems and subsequent exploration of possible causes brought 
him the Nobel Prize for economics in 2002. Having described his theory of cognition 
and decision-making, I will show how I believe that it applies particularly to Pascal's 
Wager and how some of the objections to the Wager can be understood In the light 
of Kahneman's models. I suggest that Kahneman's theories and approach to 
cognition lend support to my own Guesstimation function which I introduced on 
page 107. I believe that my introduction of experimental science Into our 
501 Nicholas Bardsley et aI., Experimental Economics: Rethinking the Rules, (Princeton and London: 
Princeton University Press, 2010). 46. 
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understanding of Pascal's Wager makes a significant contribution and offers a 
number of avenues for future research in this area. 
4.1 The first cracl< in the edifice - the Allais Paradox 
Bernoulli's suggestion of EV remained as part of the canon of economic theory from 
its original formulation in the seventeenth century until Maurice Allais conducted a 
series of experiments which he documented in a paper in 1953. In his first 
experiment Allais asks subjects to choose between two lotteries. The first lottery 
offers a million pounds with 100% chance of success, while the second offers a 10% 
chance of winning five million pounds, an 89% chance of winning one million 
pounds and a 1% chance of winning nothing at all.so2 Which would you prefer? 
The EV for each can be calculated as follows: 
EV1 = £lm 
EV2 = £5m x 0.1 + £lm x 0.89 + 0 x 0.01 
= £500k + £890k 
= £1.39m 
Conventional expected utility theory (EUT) suggests that we should always choose 
the second lottery, because it has a higher EV. Experimentally however, the vast 
majority of people prefer the certainty of the first lottery over the higher potential 
gains of the second, perhaps following the proverb about "a bird in the hand". 
Subjects significantly prefer the offer of a certain million pounds over a 99% chance 
of doing as well (or much better), but with its concomitant 1% risk of receiving 
nothing at all, which seems to loom large over any potential gains. 
On its own, this might simply suggest that people are risk-averse, but Allais 
performed a second experiment. In this case subjects had to choose between two 
lotteries where one offers an 11% chance of £lm and 89% of receiving nothing, 
while the other offers a 10% chance of £5m, but a 90% chance of nothing. 
Before looking at the working below, it is instructive to ask yourself which you 
would choose. 
In EV terms, it is relatively simple to calculate: 
EV3 = 11% x £lm 
= £110k 
502 In Allais' original experiment the currency was French Francs, but further experiments have 
shown that the principle is independent of currency. 
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EV4 = 10% x £5m 
= £500k 
In this case, almost everyone follows the EV calculation and picks the second 
choice, despite the fact that they have a lower probability of winning. It seems that 
the significantly greater prize, for what seems like roughly similar odds, becomes 
the dominant factor in the decision. Thus, in one experiment people exhibit risk· 
averse behaviour, but in the other, they are risk-seeking. This has become known as 
the Allais Paradox. 
A second phenomenon discovered by Allais is known as the common ratio effect 
and can be demonstrated in the following thought experiments.so3 Which would 
you prefer: to win a certain £3000, or to receive a ticket in a lottery with an 80% 
chance of winning £4,0001 
Now consider whether you would rather have a 25% chance of winning £3,000, or a 
20% chance of winning £4,000. 
Allais predicted that most people would choose the certain £3,000 over the risky 
£4,000, but in the second experiment, where there is risk In both options (albeit 
subtly different), people would go for the higher prize of £4,000, despite the lower 
probability of obtaining it. This turns out to be the case. The calculations are below: 
EVs = £3000 
EVs = 80% x £4,000 = £3,200 
EV7 = 25% x £3,000 =£750 
EVa = 20% x £4,000 = £800 
This inversion of preference (as it is known) has perplexed economists since its 
discovery, with many authors proposing new theories in order to try to explain the 
phenomenon. Chris Starmer suggests that most of these theories have three 
features in common: 
i. People's preferences are represented by some function V(.) which Is defined 
over the individual prospects on offer. 
ii. This function V(.) satisfies ordering and continuity. 
SOl Examples adapted from Chris Starmer, "Developments In Non-Expected Utility Theory: The Hunt 
for a Descriptive Theory of Choice under Risk.," Journal of Economic Literature XXXVIII(2000). 
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iii. While V(.) is designed to allow for the observed violations of EUT, it will still 
retain monotonicity. That is, if one prospect dominates the other, then 
subjects will choose that option.so4 
Some authors maintain that it is possible to construct such a function which 
operates on a single domain, while others argue that there may be more factors at 
work and that these must be taken into consideration. Starmer suggests that there 
are two assumptions underpinning conventional understanding of EUT which are 
challenged by empirical studies. 
a. It is assumed that people's preferences are invariant of the method which is 
used to elicit them. That is, that people's choices will not be affected by the 
nature of the experiment and will remain consistent. Th is is known as 
procedure invariance. 
b. It is assumed that preferences will reflect the underlying probabilities and 
rewards and will not be affected by the way in which the prospects are 
described. This is known as description invariance. 
There is a large body of evidence to suggest that both these assumptions are 
markedly false. There are numerous experimental demonstrations of preference 
reversal, usually following the pattern where subjects are asked to choose between 
two prospects. The first prospect (the "money-bet" or liS-bet") offers a small 
chance of winning a 'good' prize. The second (the "probability-bet" or "P-bet") 
offers a larger chance of winning a smaller prize. The experiment thus elicits 
whether subjects value a higher amount of money, or a higher chance of winning. 
After a number of other unrelated intervening tasks, the procedure then asks 
subjects to place a monetary value upon each of those bets, by getting them to set 
the minimum amount that they would accept if they were to sell that bet to a third 
party (which we will designate M(P) and M($)). Repeated studies have shown that 
people choose the better probability over the greater money (i.e. that P > $) but 
that the same subjects place a higher value on the money-bet (Le. M($) > M(P)). 
This was first noticed in 1971 by Sarah Lichtenstein and Paul SlovicsOS and 
separately by Harold lindman.so6 In lichtenstein & Siovic's study, conducted on the 
floor of the Four Queens casino in las Vegas, the two bets were: 
P bet: !.! chance to win 12 chips, 2:... chance to lose 24 chips 
12 12 
$ bet: 122 chance to win 79 chips, ~ ~ ~ chance to lose 5 chips. 
S04 Ibid., 335-38. 
505 Sarah Lichtenstein and Paul Siovic, "Reversals of Preference between Bids and Choices in 
Gambling Decisions," Journal 0/ Experimental Psychology 89, no. 46-55 (1971). 
506 Starmer, "Developments In Non-Expected Utility Theory: The Hunt for a Descriptive Theory of 
Choice under Risk.," 338. 
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As would be expected from Allais' results, gamblers chose the P bet, but placed a 
higher monetary value on the $ bet. 
If we are hoping to use a single evaluation function, it is hard to explain why P > $, 
but M($) > M(P), because it seems to be a violation of transitivity. In normal 
relations if A> 8 and 8> C, then we confidently assume that A> C. It thus ought to 
be the case that our estimation of M(P) and P should be fixed and should not vary 
depending upon context, yet it seems that this does not hold in a number of 
repeatable experiments. 
Two professors of economics, David Grether and Charles Plott, attempted in 1979 
to deal with what they suspected might be experimental biases on the part of the 
psychologists, by constructing experiments of their own. Their concerns included a 
worry that the experiments that had been hitherto chosen were too far removed 
from real life to be able to give a correct account of affairs. They were also worried 
that the subjects selected (often psychology students) were not representative of 
the general population and their motivation might be to get the 'correct' answer, or 
to impress the experimenters who were after all, the teachers responsible for their 
grades. They write: 
"Subjects nearly always speculate about the purposes of experiments and 
psychologists have the reputation for deceiving subjects. It Is also well-known 
that subjects' choices are often influenced by what they perceive to be the 
purpose of the experiment. In order to give the results additional credibility, we 
felt that the experimental setting should be removed from psychology"so7 
In short, the economists did not trust the psychologists and Grether & Plott's 
experiments were specifically designed lito discredit the psychologists' works as 
applied to economics".508 Siovic notes that they identified thirteen criticisms and 
potential artefacts that would render preference reversals irrelevant to economic 
theory and so they included: 
• special incentives to heighten motivation 
• control for income and order effects, 
• the ability to allow indifference in the choice responses, 
• testing the influence of strategic or bargaining biases 
507 David M. Grether and Charles R. Plott, "Economic Theory of Choice and the Preference Reversal 
Phenomenon," The American Economic Review 69, no. 4 (1979): 629. 
50S Ibid., 623. 
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Most importantly, they had 'proper' economists conducting the study. To their 
surprise and probable dismay, preference reversals remained prevalent despite all 
their determined efforts to eradicate them.sOg 
The use of empirical experiments in economic theory is still controversial and 
Bardsley et al observe that any view that experiments provide a test of economic 
theory has been vigorously resisted by economists such as Frank Gul and Wolfgang 
Pesendorfers1o and that a substantial majority of economists still regard economics 
as a nonexperimental science.Sll For the purposes of this chapter, I will therefore 
focus on whether experiments have a place to play in our understanding of Pascal's 
Wager, which is itself fundamentally a question of human decision making and 
theology, rather than pure economics. 
In order to deal with the observed anomalies, many authors from Ward Edwards in 
1955 onwards have suggested that there might be a weighting function which 
adjusts the absolute probabilities of a given risk into a subjective probability used in 
the decision process. Many experimenters have found that people tend to 
overweight very small probabilities, while underweighting large ones. Kahneman 
suggests a rationale for this by setting a thought experiment.S12 He asks how we 
feel about four cases, where our chance of winning £lm increases by 5% in each 
case: 
i) from 0% to 5% 
ii) from 5% to 10% 
iii) from 60% to 65% 
iv) from 95% to 100% 
A simple EV calculation would imply that our utility increases in each case by exactly 
5% of the utility of winning £lm, yet we know that this is not the case. Everyone 
agrees that the change from 0 7 5% and from 95% 7 100% are more impressive 
than either 5% 710% or 60% 7 65%. The change from 5% 7 10% doubles the EV, 
but it does not double the psychological value of the prospect. The large impact of 
0% 7 5% is what Kahneman calls the possibility effect. At 0% there is no possibility 
of winning the prize, while at 5% there definitely is. The psychological value of such 
a difference can be seen in the UK National lottery's slogan of "you've got to be in 
it to win it". Without a ticket, you can never win, but once you have one, then "it 
could be youl" Such techniques are employed to persuade people to participate in 
509 Paul Siovic, "The Construction of Preferences," American Psychologist 50(1995): 366. 
510 Bardsley et aL, Experimental Economics: Rethinking the Rules. 46. 
511 Ibid., 47. 
512 Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (london: Allen lane, 2011). 311. 
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a gamble where the EV is actually negative.suln this case, people overvalue the 
small chance of winning, aided by the disproportionate gain of the large reward and 
its life-changing consequences. Kahneman argues that the change from 0% ~ ~ 5% Is 
a qualitative change, while the change from 60% ~ ~ 65% is merely a quantitative 
one.S14 
Likewise, the change from 95% ~ ~ 100% is also a qualitative change and 
demonstrates what Kahneman calls the certainty effect. He asks us to imagine that 
we have inherited £lm, but our greedy stepsister is contesting the will and has 
taken us to court. The judgement is expected tomorrow and our lawyer assures us 
that we have a 95% chance of a favourable judgment. We are approached by a loss-
adjustment company which offers us £910,000 in cash to take over our claim. This 
is lower by £40,000 than the EV of waiting for tomorrow's decision (and £90,000 
lower than the full amount), but how many of us would actually reject such an 
offer? The offering company, who might make dozens of such approaches, can 
develop a portfolio of cases, such that they can afford to accept some losses, 
because of their overall gains. However our own position with a one-off 
opportunity might persuade us to accept a lower settlement in return for 
certainty.s1s George Quattrone and Amos Tversky consider the game of Russian 
Roulette and point out that people will pay far more to reduce the number of 
bullets from one to none, than they would to reduce it from four to three.516 
Kahneman and his long-term collaborator Amos Tversky performed a number of 
experiments which enabled them to develop a table of people's preferences in 
games with modest monetary stakes.517 
Probability 0 I 2 5 10 20 50 80 90 95 98 99 % 
Decision 0 5.5 8.1 13.2 18.6 26.1 42.1 60.1 71.2 79.3 87.1 91.2 weight 
100 
100 
We can see that the decision weights are identical with the actual probability In the 
extremes of 0% and 100%, but the weights depart dramatically from the expected 
values in the regions very close to those extremes. 
513 The average payout in the UK National Lotto is around £2m, but the actual odds are 
apprOXimately 14 million to one. Thus the EV of a £1 ticket is: ~ ~ - £1, meaning an average loss of 
14m 
roughly 86p for each ticket. 
Source: bttp:l!www,natlonal-lotterv.co.uk/player/p/help/aboutlotto/prlzecalculatlon,ftl 
514 Kahneman, Thinking: 311, 
515 Ibid., 312. 
516 George A. Quattrone and Amos Tversky, "Contrasting Rational and Psychological Analyses of 
Political Choice," American Political Science Review 82, no. 3 (1988). Reprinted In Daniel Kahneman 
and Amos Tversky, eds., Choices, Values and Frames (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 
465. 
517 Kahneman, Thinking: 315. 
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If we compute the perceived v actual gap, showing the number of times by which 
the perceived value is a mUltiple of the actual gap, it looks like this: 
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A 1% risk is viewed as being more than five times as big as it actually is, while the 
corresponding 99% risk is significantly undervalued. Despite being only 1% away 
from 100%, people magnify that gap more than eight times over. 
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4.2 Loss aversion and Prospect Theory 
In addition to mistakes in estimation, Kahneman exposes another flaw in Bernoulli's 
theorem, which he demonstrates with some further thought experiments. Consider 
these two problems: 
Problem 1: Which do you choose? 
Get £900 for sure OR 90% chance to get £1,000. 
Problem 2: Which do you choose? 
Lose £900 for sure OR 90% chance to lose £1,000.518 
Most people choose the first option for problem 1, which is as Bernoulli would 
expect, because it is the risk-averse option. People prefer the sure thing over the 
risk of receiving nothing at all. What would have puzzled Bernoulli is that the vast 
majority prefer the second option in problem 2. It seems that when facing a certain 
loss, people become risk-seeking instead, accepting the possibility of a greater loss 
in the hope of having no loss at all. 
Under traditional EUT the options should be identical, but it appears on 
experimental evidence that losses and gains are as important as the absolute 
amounts involved. Kahneman suggests two further problems to show this. Please 
work out how you would respond to the two problems below: 
Problem 3: In addition to whatever you own, you have been given £1,000. 
You are now asked to choose one of these options: 
50% chance to win £1,000 OR get £500 for sure. 
Problem 4: In addition to whatever you own, you have been given £2,000. 
You are now asked to choose one of these options: 
50% chance to lose £1,000 OR lose £500 for sure.519 
From a pure EUT standpoint, the four possible outcomes are identical. On average 
you would end up richer by £1,500. Yet, as before, the vast majority of respondents 
preferred the sure thing in problem 3, but the gamble in problem 4. 
Kahneman asks how much notice we take of the initial sentence in each problem. 
Did the gift of £1,000 or £2,000 make any difference to us? His experimental 
evidence is that most people simply ignore this and incorporate it into what he calls 
the reference point for the decision.52o Kahneman argues that it is the reference 
point which is the missing variable in Bernoulli's theorem and so he and Amos 
518 Ibid., 279. 
519 Ibid. 
520 Ibid. 
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Tversky came up with what they named prospect theory.S2i In EUT it is deemed 
sufficient to know the state of wealth, but in prospect theory we also need to know 
the reference state. Thus any evaluation is done relative to a reference point, or 
adaptation level. 
To demonstrate this, he suggests that we set up three bowls of water, placing iced 
water in the left-hand bowl, hot water in the right-hand bowl and filling the middle 
one with water at room temperature. Then place our right hand in the right-hand 
bowl and our left in the left-hand bowl for a minute. Finally, move both to the 
central bowl. We will experience the same temperature as heat in one hand, but 
cold in the other.s22 Thus, in Kahneman's model, outcomes which are better than 
the reference point are viewed as gains and those which are worse are perceived as 
losses. 
He suggests that there is diminishing sensitivity in both sensory dimensions and in 
the evaluation of wealth. Just as turning on a weak light in a darkened room has a 
large effect, so there is less subjective difference between a £100 change from £900 
to £1,000, than there is from £100 to £200.523 
The third principle in prospect theory is that of loss aversion. When losses and gains 
are directly compared against each other, losses loom larger than gains. Richard 
Thaler and Cass Sunstein estimate that a gain has to be twice as large as the 
corresponding loss for the two to be considered equal, that is, the prospect of 
winning £200 just offsets the prospect of losing £100.524 
521 Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk" , 
Econometrica 47, no. 2 (1979). 
522 Kahneman, Thinking: 279. 
523 Ibid., 282. 
524 Richard Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and 
Happiness (London: Penguin Books, 2009). 38. 
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The S-shaped curve of prospect theory is significantly steeper for losses than for 
gains, although both show diminishing sensitivity.525 When Pascal presents the 
Wager, he carefully sets out the effect on our happiness (or its psychological value) 
in the following terms: 
If you gain, you gain all; if you lose, you lose nothing. Wager, then, without 
hesitation that He is. 
Pascal presents the alternative of "gain all" against "lose nothing" . He is no doubt 
aware from his friends, M. Mitton and the Duc de Roannez, that losses loom large 
in the eyes of a gambler and thus he reassures his listener that th eir losses will be 
nothing at all. He phrases his wager in the language with the highest psychologica l 
appeal to the listener and he repeats: 
when one is forced to play, he must renounce reason to preserve his life, rather 
than risk it for infinite gain, as likely to happen as the loss of nothingness. 
Again he juxtaposes an infinite gain with a loss of "nothingness" . He offers the 
possibility of infinite reward while dealing with loss-aversion by reassuring his 
reader that there can be no loss in wagering. 
Kahneman demonstrates that the way in which a proposition is framed can have a 
significant impact on the preferences displayed. He asks us to consider the 
following scenarios: 
525 Kahneman, Thinking: 283 . 
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A: Would you accept a gamble that offers a 10% chance to win £95 and a 
90% chance to lose £5? 
B: Would you pay £5 to participate in a lottery that offers a 10% chance to 
win £100 and a 90% chance to win nothing? 
On close inspection, it is obvious that these two propositions are identical in their 
outcomes and that someone who was looking from a purely economic framework 
ought to be indifferent between them. In experiments, however, option B attracts 
far more positive answers.526 When framed as buying a ticket in a lottery, the £5 
loss becomes less visible to us and it appears to be just the cost of playing the game 
and does not appear as a material loss as such. Kahneman reports that Richard 
Thaler used to have a note pinned up on his board which read "COSTS ARE NOT 
LOSSES".527 
I suggest that Pascal could easily have written his Wager in terms which reflect 
Biblical themes, such as Luke 17:33 where we are told to lose our lives in order to 
keep them. He could have framed his Wager in terms of loss, but I believe that it 
would have been less compelling had he done so. For example it might have read: 
"If you lose your life then you will gain an eternal one, but if you keep your 
life you will never receive an infinite reward". 
This does not have the same immediacy as Pascal's formulation, because foregone 
gains are less motivating than the avoidance of losses. We accept costs as part of 
wagering, because we do not see them as losses to be avoided, but if Pascal had 
chosen to frame his wager where the losses were shown explicitly, then it would 
have had far less appeal. 
Given how much of modern thought that Pasca.! anticipated, whether it is decision 
theory itself, or cognitive behaviour therapy, we should not be surprised that he 
also understood the human psyche well enough to choose his words carefully. I 
think that he understood how best to present his case and how to appeal to the 
heart, rather than necessarily to the economic head. 
In this next section, I would like to discuss Kahneman's understanding of human 
cognitive systems and how we make decisions in practice. I will then use this to 
show why the Wager has immediate appeal on first hearing, but then faces a wide 
range of objections. I will also explain why I believe that objectors rarely seem to 
follow through the logical consequences of their objections. In Chapter 3 I 
systematically demonstrated that none of those objections can actually carry 
through against the Wager when examined in depth, yet clearly their original 
526 Ibid., 364. 
527 Ibid. 
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authors believed that they did . I will therefore examine why people raise obj ections 
of this nature, using Kahneman's models and examples as a basis for my argument. 
Syslem 1 and System 2 
To illustrate different types of thinking, Kahneman asks us to look at an image such 
as the one below. 
He suggests that without conscious effort you will have recogni sed th at it is the face 
of a young woman and that she appears to be angry. 
Now consider the following sum: 
14 x 17 = ? 
Kahneman says that you will have recognised immediately that it is a multiplica t ion 
problem and that you were probably dredging up into your memory of how to 
perform long multiplication, or possibly reaching for a calculator. You would be 
quick to realise that 120 and 8,765 were unlikely to be the correct answers, but 
being sure that 258 is wrong would be much harder. If an experimenter were 
observing your reactions, they would have seen that your blood pressure rose, your 
pupils would have dilated and your heart rate would have increased. Getting th e 
actual result (238) requires more effort and concentration that recognising an angry 
face. s28 
Psychologists have recognised these two modes of thinking for some time and Keith 
Stanovich and Richard West dubbed them System 1 and System 2.529 
• System 1 operates automatically and quickly, with littl e or no effort and no 
sense of voluntary control. 
528 Ibid ., 19. 
529 Keith E. Stanovich and Richard F. West, "Individual differences in reasoning: Impl ica tions for the 
rationality debate?," Behavioural and Brain Sciences 23(2000) . 
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• System 2 allocates attention to the effortful mental activities that demand 
it, including complex calculations. 
Kahneman admits that he uses the terms System 1 and 2 rather more fluidly than a 
psychologist might. He suggests that it is System 2 that we identify with, when we 
consider our sense of self. It is the one that makes conscious choices, holds beliefs 
and decides what to think about and what to do.s3o We believe that we are rational, 
thinking creatures and thus we consider ourselves to be primarily System 2 beings, 
rather than reactive animals. 
Pascal was well aware of a level of duality within the human psyche as he writes: 
"For we must make no mistake about ourselves: we are as much automaton as 
mind. As a result, demonstration is not the only instrument for convincing us. 
How few things can be demonstrated! Proofs only convince the mind; habit 
provides the strongest proofs and those which are most believed".531 
Pascal holds that it is our habits (or System 1) which form our strongest beliefs, the 
ones we simply believe without having to consider them at all. As he notes: 
"Whoever proved that it shall dawn tomorrow and that we shall die?"s32 System 1 
provides our basic beliefs about the world and presents them to System 2. When 
we need to make a conscious choice, we will invoke System 2, but our everyday, 
unthinking actions are governed by System 1. It is System 1 which is the automaton 
that Pascal mentions and it is much a part of ourselves as the rational, thinking 
activities of System 2. 
Kahneman lists some tasks (in increasing order of complexity) which are System 1 
tasks: 
• Detect that one object is more distant than another 
• Orientate to the source of a sudden sound 
• Complete the phrase "bread and ... " 
• Make a disgust face when shown a horrible picture 
• Detect hostility in a voice 
• Answer the question: "2 + 2 = 1" 
• Read words on large billboards 
• Drive a car on an empty road 
• Understand simple sentences 
530 Kahneman, Thinking: 19-21. 
531 Pascal, Pensees: 247. L821 
532 Ibid. L821 
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These are automatic tasks, for we are born ready to recognise objects, react to 
sounds and avoid losses.533 Other, more complex tasks can be added to the 
automatic set by means of training and practice. Reading is a learned skill. No-one Is 
born able to read, but with sufficient repetition recognising the words on a poster 
becomes part of System 1. However, reading this thesis still requires the 
engagement of System 2 (even for mel). Likewise the rote learning of "two twos are 
four ... " makes multiplication of simple numbers a System 1 activity, but once 
outside the range of learned values, even by a little, a calculation like 12 x 13 
requires the involvement of System 2. It may still draw upon System 1, such as by 
breaking it down into a known multiplication and an addition (e.g. 12 x 12 = 144 + 
12 = 156), but this is still significantly slower. 
The features of System 2 are many and various, but they have two things In 
common: they require attention and they are disrupted when attention Is drawn 
away. Examples include: 
• Focus on the voice of a particular person in a crowded and noisy room 
• Look for a woman with white hair 
• Try and identify a surprising sound 
• Maintain a faster walking speed than is normal for you. 
• Tell someone your own telephone number. 
• Park in a narrow space (unless you are a garage attendant) 
• Check the validity of a complex logical argumentS34 
System 2 can alter the way that System 1 works to some extent by programming 
the normally automatic functions. For example, while waiting at a busy railway 
station for your grandmother, you can will yourself to look for a white-haired lady 
and thus increase your chance of recognising her in the crowd.S35 Thus, System 1 
can spot someone with white hair (or something that looks like white hair) and It 
then alerts System 2 to examine the candidate more closely for other 
characteristics. In optimum operating conditions the two systems complement each 
other, but they also compete. It is System l's role to note surprising Incidents and 
to draw them to the attention of System 2 for further analysis, although System 1 
may initiate action on its own, particularly for threatening events. A loud bang 
might have us diving for cover long before System 2 recognises the sound of a 
gunshot, or an explosion. System 1 is about survival and takes over when an Instant 
response is required. However, its vigilance can be blunted if we are engaged in a 
heavy System 2 task at the time. 
533 Kahneman, Thinking: 21-22. 
534 Ibid., 21. 
535 Ibid., 22-23. 
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One of the most telling examples of this appears in Christopher Chabris and Daniel 
Simons' experiment dubbed liThe Invisible Gorilla".536 They constructed a short film 
of two teams playing a game of basketbal1.537 One team was dressed in white shirts, 
while the other wore black shirts. The viewers of the film were instructed to count 
the number of passes made by the players in white shirts and to ignore those made 
by the players in black. This task is difficult and requires complete concentration. 
Halfway through the video, someone wearing a gorilla suit enters, walks between 
the players, stands in the middle of the game, which continues. The gorilla turns 
towards the camera, thumps its chest visibly and then continues on. The gorilla is in 
view for nine seconds and is in very close proximity to the players. Many thousands 
of people have watched the video and about half do not notice anything unusual.S38 
It is the counting task and also the instruction to ignore one of the teams that 
causes the blindness. Seeing unusual things and orienting are tasks of System 1, but 
they depend upon some attention being given to the presence of the relevant 
stimulus. The complete absorption of System 2, plus the deliberate ignoring of 
other factors contributed to a blindness that was as surprising to the participants as 
to the researchers. Many of the candidates refused to believe that such a thing 
could have happened while they were watching. Kahneman notes that we are not 
only blind, but we are blind to our blindness.539 Pascal would agree: 
"Let us therefore not look for certainty and stability. Our reason is always 
deceived by fickle shadows . ... If man made himself the first object of study, he 
would see how incapable he is of going further. 11540 
Although System 1 is essential for staying alive in a hostile world and it is very 
useful in everyday life, it can be problematic under other circumstances. For 
example, Kahneman suggest that it has the disadvantage that it cannot be switched 
off. If you are shown a word on the screen in a language that you understand, you 
will read it, unless your attention is totally focused elsewhere. To demonstrate this, 
he suggests that we attempt the following task: 
536 Christopher Chabris and Daniel Simons, The Invisible Gorilla: And Other Ways Our Intuition 
Deceives Us, (HarperCollins, 2010). 
537 A fuller account of the experiment and the video can be seen at 
http://www.theinvisiblegorilla.com/ 
538 http://www.theinvisiblegorilla.com/videos.html 
539 Kahneman, Thinking: 23-24. 
540 Pascal, Pensees: 63-64. l199 
210 
First, go down both columns below, saying out loud whether each word is printed in 
lowercase or uppercase. 
LEFT upper 
left lower 
right LOWER 
RIGHT upper 
RIGHT UPPER 
left lower 
LEFT LOWER 
right upper 
Next, go down both columns again, saying whether each word is printed to th e left 
or right of centre: 
The task is difficult in each case because System 1 is fighting with System 2. In th e 
first example, it was much easier to say whether the words "left" or "right" were in 
upper or lower case, because deciding whether a word is in upper or lower case is 
unfamiliar as an activity and is thus a pure System 2 task. However, when you 
encountered the words "upper" and "lower" in that task, it became much harder 
because System 1 was supplying a conflicting answer based upon reading the word 
itself. The opposite occurred in the second part of that exercise, because th e words 
"left" and "right" potentially conflicted with the task which was to identify wh ere 
the word was printed. 541 
A similar difficulty exists if we try to say for each of the following words the colour 
that the text is printed in : 
Upper 
Green 
Blue 
Green 
Lower 
Red 
Black 
Purple 
You can usually feel your mind grinding to a standstill, especially when looking at 
some of the words. You may experience considerable difficulty in even recalling the 
name of the colour, let alone saying it out loud . 
Kahneman suggests that System 2 is effortful, but one of its main characteri stics is 
laziness and a reluctance to invest more effort than is strictly necessa ry. As a result, 
the majority of our actions and decisions are actually driven by System 1, even 
though System 2 might try to claim the credit. There are vital tasks that only System 
541 Kahneman, Thinking: 25-26. 
211 
2 can perform, because they require effort and self-control in which the intuitions 
and impulses of system 1 are overcome. In order to experience System 2 at full 
throttle, he suggests the following experiment: 
Make up several strings of 4 digits, all different and write each one on an 
index card. Place a blank card on top of the pile then start a metronome 
beating at one tick per second. Remove the blank card and read the four 
digits aloud. Wait for two beats and then say the string with each digit 
incremented by one (3 becomes 4, 6 becomes 7 and 9 becomes 0), so that 
5793 becomes 6804. Keep going for as long as you can.542 
Thinking with System 2 is hard work, which is why we generally prefer the intuitive 
leaps that System 1 is able to offer, even if these might be less accurate at times. 
People who live without a wristwatch are generally able to tell the time of day at a 
single glance and without much consideration. I can do so and will usually be 
accurate to within 15 minutes during the day. This is entirely accurate enough for 
most of my purposes, because System 1 is able to take in the angle of the sun, the 
time since the last meal and so on without any conscious effort. If we only want to 
know if it is time for a cup of tea, then this margin of error is acceptable. It is less 
useful when trying to catch a train, or to attend a business meeting because those 
events are usually less tolerant. 
One interesting phenomenon that was observed when digital watches first came 
into fashion was that it became harder to read the time at a glance. Those of us 
who grew up with analogue clocks can take in the time simply by the relative 
position of the hands and so be able to say "it is about quarter-to-five" without 
thinking. However, when faced with the numbers "16:46" we have to recognise 
them, turn the 24-hour clock into a more familiar form and then convert the overly-
precise 46 minutes into a human-friendly form. Telling the time became a System 2 
activity, which is why many people reverted to analogue faces as soon as they 
could. 
While System 2 prefers to be idle whenever possible, System 1 is eager and willing 
to provide a solution, even if it is the wrong answer. Please attempt the following 
question543 before moving on: 
A bat and a ball together cost £1.10. 
The bat costs £1 more than the ball. 
How much is the ball? 
542 Ibid., 31. 
543 Adapted from ibid., 44. 
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Most people's System 1 will kick in with the immediate answer of lOp for the ball 
and £1 for the bat, but this is the wrong answer. The question states that the bat 
costs £1 more than the ball, but if the bat costs £1 and the ball lOp, then the bat 
would only cost gOP more than the ball. Once System 1 has jumped in with an 
intuitive, but incorrect, answer, it can be very hard to engage System 2 to work out 
the correct one. System 1 continues to jangle its wrong suggestion before our eyes 
and ears, even when we know that we need to find a different solution.s44 
Forming beliefs 
Daniel Gilbert, suggests that the way we form our beliefs Is that we first accept 
them and then later decide to "unbelieve" them.S45 He traces this to Spinoza and 
opposes this view to the traditional Cartesian approach that we first evaluate a 
proposition and then assign it to being either true or false. In Spinoza's view, all 
propositions are first treated as true as part of their comprehension. William James 
summed it up as "All propositions, whether attributive or existential, are believed 
through the very act of being conceived".S46 Kahneman argues that this is exactly 
what we see in System 1 and 2. Our initial action is to accept a proposition using 
system 1 to intuitively grasp it and then, if necessary, we allow the suspicion of 
System 2 to examine the facts in more detail and may then come to reject the 
proposition as being false. Gilbert then proposes a hybrid of the two models (the 
Cartozan approach), allowing that comprehension might be a separate first stage 
which leads on to acceptance as the default conclusion, followed by a later 
rejection. 
In diagrammatic form, we can compare them as follows: 
S44 The correct answer is that the bat costs £1.05 and the ball costs 5p. 
S45 Daniel Gilbert, "How Mental Systems Believe," American Psychologist 46, no. 2 (1991): 108. 
546 William James, Principles of Psychology, (1890), 
http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=TMrJfcaC8bYC. 280. referenced in Gilbert, "How Mental 
Systems Believe," 108. 
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Cartesian Spinozan Cartozan 
Com prehension Comprehension Comprehension 
& Acceptance 
-./ 
Acceptance 
'V 
Acceptance or 
Unacceptance Unacceptance Rejection 
Gilbert argues that we can test what process is going on by placing the person 
under cognitive stress and seeing what conclusions emerge. If Descartes is correct, 
then a person under stress ought to randomly accept or reject propositions, while if 
Spinoza is correct, we ought to find that they tend to accept propositions. If either 
the Cartesian or Cartozan systems are in place, then subjects ought to have some 
sense that they had not yet made up their minds on a proposition, while if the 
Spinozan system applies, they would simply assent to propositions which they had 
not fully considered . 
Gilbert's experiments indicate that it is in fact the Spinozan system which operates 
and Kahneman agrees, developing his own acronym for System 1 dominance, which 
he dubs WYSIATI or "What You See Is All There Is" .547 Thus, if people are stressed, 
such that they do not have time to adequately consider propositions, then they 
simply believe them to be true and are generally unaware that any other option 
was open to them. System 1 is good at jumping to conclusions. 
Pascal intuitively understands System 1 and System 2. He identifies System 1 as our 
"habits" arguing that: 
"habit provides the strongest proofs and those that are most believed. It inclines 
the automaton, which leads the mind unconsciously along with it" (my 
d 
'
" ) 548 un er Imng 
Pascal sees the mind as being led by the automaton, or System 1, just as Kahneman 
does. Although System 2 believes itself to be the master, it is too lazy to enforce 
this state of affairs for the most part and relies instead on System 1 to do the bulk 
547 Kahneman, Thinking : 85 , 
548 Pascal , Pensees: 248. l821 
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of the work. Pascal recognises that System 2 is less able to respond quickly and also 
less available than System 1. He writes: 
"Reason works slowly .. . Feeling does not work like that, but instantly and is 
always ready"549 
System 2 is only engaged when System 1 alerts it to the need for effort and under 
pressure System 1 takes over our entire decision-making process, default ing to 
believing everything it hears. Pascal therefore suggests that we must train System 1 
in order that it may make better decisions automatically. 
"It is the habit that convinces us ... we must resort to habit once the mind has 
seen where the truth lies in order to steep and stain ourselves in that belief ... for 
it is too much trouble to have the proofs always before us. ,,550 
System 2 is effortful and lazy and it would be too hard to have to engage it on every 
decision. Pascal is quite right that it would be too much trouble to have to work 
through the proofs for every evaluation. As Gilbert notes, we have to t rust our eyes 
(and visual cortex) because 
"the human eye is an exceptionally reliable instrument and it would be 
expensive, even foolhardy to regularly question what it tells us. ,,551 
We simply could not function if we had to consciously process all the visual 
information before us at any time. We could certainly never catch a ball if we had 
to evaluate the trajectory, change in perspective, parallax and so on that are part of 
our automatic systems. Learning to catch is an acquired skill, but it builds upon a 
large body of existing visual habits, fine motor control and proprioception . Even the 
eye, though, can be fooled by effects such as the Mliller-Lyer illusion below: 
>>------« < > 
It is very difficult to believe that the two central lines are th e same length, even 
when you know it to be the case. Our System 1 for distance estimation is 
continually telling us the one on the left must be longer, no matter how many times 
we have seen this particular illusion and know the correct answer. 
Pascal also recognises this tension between System 1 and System 2 and he asserts 
that it is System 1 (the automaton) which will dominate if there is conflict. He 
writes: 
S49 Ibid . L821 
sso Ibid ., 247. L821 
551 Gilbert, "How Mental Systems Believe," 117. 
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"When we believe only by the strength of our conviction and the automaton is 
inclined to believe the opposite, that is not enough. We must therefore make 
both parts of us believe: the mind by reasons, which need to be seen only once 
in a lifetime, and the automaton by habit"551 
.Pascal therefore suggests that we must inform our habits, if we want to make good 
decisions, because we will not always engage our reason and if in doubt, System 1 
thinking will triumph. That is why he phrases his remedy for unbelief as he does in 
the Wager. 
"But at least learn your inability to believe, since reason brings you to this, and 
yet you cannot believe. Endeavour then to convince yourself, not by increase of 
proofs of God, but by the abatement of your passions. ,,553 
The proofs of God are an appeal to System 2, as is Pascal's extended discourse on 
probability and infinity. The detailed exposition of the Wager is a System 2 
proposition, because it involves conscious thought and the careful application of 
reason. Pascal knows that this will not be effective in convincing anyone, because 
they will revert to System 1 thinking as soon as their concentration wavers. System 
2 may be convinced by the arguments put forward and may even want to believe 
(or at least want to learn how to believe), but this will be to no avail unless the 
automaton is re-programmed with a new world-view. Pascal holds that once the 
reasons have been seen, they do not need repeating, because we are conSciously 
aware of the logical processes and can replay them in our minds at will. However, 
our actual decision-making is taking place out of sight of our mind and the 
automaton needs to be conditioned by habit, rather than argument. Thus, Pascal 
suggests a retraining of one's habits as the way forward: 
"Follow the way by which they began; by acting as if they believed, taking the 
holy water, having masses said, etc. Even this will naturally make you believe, 
and deaden your acuteness. ,,554 
The domestication of our minds to the new reality is achieved through cognitive 
behavioural therapy, which has as its goal the changing of our core beliefs. These 
reside within System 1. Pascal knows that once we have habituated ourselves into 
the Christian pattern of life, then the intellectual objections of System 2 will be 
informed and shaped by the re-programmed System 1. As he argues: 
What are our natural principles, apart from our accustomed principles? ... A 
different custom will produce different natural principles. 555 
552 Pascal, Pensees: 248. L821 
553 Ibid., 125. L418 
554 Ibid. L418 
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Discourse on the machine 
In this light, the title of the passage in which the Wager is located, "Discourse on 
the Machine", perhaps becomes a little clearer. The machine that Pascal Is talking 
about is the automaton. He recognises that the automaton Is little more than a 
machine, even if it performs important menial tasks that make complex thought 
possible. To describe it as a machine is not derogatory, for we need its machine-like 
speed and repeatability in order to keep up with the pressures of being alive. Below 
the level of the automaton, there are even more basic homeostatic systems in 
operation which make our heart beat, control our body temperature and tell us 
when it is time to eat. The automaton is the first responder which deals with 
threats, challenges and surprises and alerts us to situations which need our 
attention. Although it is not under our direct control, for it houses the core beliefs 
which shape our conscious thought, the machine can be re-programmed by means 
of habituation. It is this process which Pascal recommends to us as therapy for our 
defective belief systems. 
Pascal's Wager and System 1 
One of the things that I have discovered as a research student is that people feel 
obliged to ask what one's thesis is about. I have fallen prey to this myself with other 
PhD students and have observed the dismay that the poor researcher feels in trying 
to sum up a highly complex and abstruse point of research for a complete novice In 
the subject. In this respect I am very fortunate. When asked the same question, I 
reply "Pascal's Wager". Some people understand immediately and no more need be 
said. If they look quizzical I expand it as follows: "lf you believe in God and you're 
wrong, you lose nothing. If you don't believe in God and you're wrong, you lose 
everything". Everyone grasps this immediately and I recall one GB Hockey player 
listening, nodding and thinking for a moment. Then he asked me: "50 how do you 
make study of that last so many years?" I then had to explain how the argument 
was much more subtle than appeared on the surface and that there were lots of 
objections to deal with. However, in my formulation, the Wager Is a pure appeal to 
System 1 and it is framed in terms of loss avoidance, which, as we have seen, Is a 
major driver within the human psyche. 
What I usually find is that people think about it for a moment and then come up 
with objections. These usually fall into one of the objections that I covered In 
Chapter 3. I do not think that I have ever heard a new objection In someone's 
immediate response, because they are operating from System 1. As Kahneman 
notes, 
"it is rare for System 1 to be dumbfounded. System 1 is not constrained by 
capacity limits and is profligate in its computations. When engaged In searching 
555 Pensees (tr. Ariew): 33. S158/L125 
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for an answer to one question, it simultaneously generates the answers to 
related questions, and it may substitute a response that more easily comes to 
mind for the one that was requested. ,,556 
Thus people all leap to pretty much the same conclusions. Objectors in my 
experience usually invoke doxastic voluntarism (e.g Dawkins), or a variant of the 
Many Gods argument, occasionally throwing in a perverse God who damns those 
who accept the Wager. These are System 1 responses to what is seen as a System 1 
proposition. As I have shown at length in Chapter 3, none of them are particularly 
coherent, nor do they stand up to detailed scrutiny. They are simply a knee-jerk 
reaction to the blow of an uncomfortable proposition. After all, the atheist is being 
told that he is wrong to believe as he does and that he ought to take steps to 
change his beliefs. The fact that it is addressed in mathematical terms does not 
make it any more acceptable to him. 
Other immediate responses that I have encountered, often from theists, is that the 
Wager may be morally dubious. The System 1 response is that it must be morally 
deficient for such a worthy ideal (theistic faith) to be obtained or pursued because 
of tawdry materialistic ambitions. William James is the perfect exemplar of this 
outrage, declaring: 
We feel that a faith in masses and holy water adopted wilfully after such a 
mechanical calculation lack the inner soul of faith's reality 557 
As I point out on page 170, the gospels are full of suggestions that we should pursue 
heavenly rewards for their own sake and not for some higher ideal, but these are 
ignored in System l's ability to create a 'solution' to the problem. 
Not all of the objections are driven by System 1. Some are clearly the work of much 
careful thought and both Graham Oppy and Alan Hajek, for example, have devoted 
considerable effort to their papers. However, there is a System 1 tendency in many 
published works to think that a solution which appeals superficially is somehow 
"good enough" and I have encountered many such objections, even in peer-
reviewed journals. There seems to be more of a desire to prove Pascal wrong, than 
to come up with a clearly-articulated and thought-through counter-argument. 
Pascal might say that this is a product of the self, which 
"wants to be great, but sees that it is small; it wants to be happy and sees that 
it is wretched; it wants to be perfect and sees that it is full of imperfections; ... 
The predicament in which it finds itself arouses in it the most unjust and criminal 
556 Kahneman, Thinking: 416. 
557 James, The Will To Believe. 
218 
passion that could possibly be imagined, for it conceives a deadly hatred for the 
truth which rebukes it and convinces it of its faults. ,.558 
I think I would be more cautious, merely observing that some of the most 
vehement critics have been the ones who seem to have paid the least attention to 
the text. Although I believe that Pascal's Wager succeeds against its objections, my 
defence still relies upon some assumptions which could legitimately be challenged. 
Chapter 3 is thus my own System 2's attempt to work carefully through some of the 
objections, in order to examine whether or not any of them completely defeat the 
Wager, or at least make it seem deficient. Using the principles I established at the 
beginning, I hold that they do not and that when the Wager is considered as I set It 
out, together with the axioms I outlined, none of the extant objections succeed. 
That does not mean that we could not create fresh objections which might attack 
my axioms, or explore other possibilities and it would certainly be a valid area for 
further research. 
Guesstimation and System 1 
My Guesstimation function, described on page 104, is unashamedly located within 
System 1. It is an instinctive response rather than a considered one. Were someone 
to offer me the prospect of infinite wealth, I would not ask whether it would be an 
No or Nt infinity, nor would I consider whether there might be a 'bigger' Infinity 
available to me. I am aware that I am incapable of imagining what such a thing 
might be like and would undoubtedly refer to it by a token or symbol, like 00, That Is 
partly because I am lazy, but also because even my System 2 would not fare much 
better in contemplating it. As finite beings, the concept of infinity Is simply too hard 
for us to grasp. 
Thus, I argue that my Guesstimation function is a valid System 1 heuristic, which 
can be used to make a complex equation more tractable to our understanding. It Is 
a more natural fit for human cognition (at least as described by Kahneman et al) 
than a strict mathematical formulation would allow. This does not mean that 
guesstimation is irrational, or even inaccurate. It is simply the mind's way of dealing 
with a problem that is outside its ability to comprehend. 
Kahneman rejects a model of rationality as being simple internal consistency and 
argues that "the definition of rationality as coherence is impOSSibly restrictive; it 
demands adherence to rules of logic that a finite mind is not able to Implement."ss9 
I suggest that we face similar challenges when attempting to deal with the Infinite. 
Just as we cannot escape the limits of our minds in overcoming framing, preference 
reversal and so on when considering economic choices, so I contend that we are 
558 
Pascal, Pensees: 324. L978 
559 Kahneman, Thinking: 411. 
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unequipped to handle the infinite in any way that is meaningful or consistent for us. 
I suggest that my Guesstimation function is a much better fit for the cognitive 
processes actually taking place in Pascal's Wager than the rather abstruse 
mathematics of Hajek, Bartha or Hertzberg. 
Pascal's Wager is a proposition that can be readily grasped by System 1, but which 
is backed by the rigour of System 2 justifications. It is a mark of Pascal's genius that 
he anticipated many of the common objections and built in safeguards against 
them, even in a text which was obviously hurriedly composed, perhaps developed 
solely as a curiosity for the visit of an old friend. It is the only one of the natural 
theological arguments which can be articulated clearly in just a couple of sentences 
and the only one in my view which remains convincing after careful examination. 
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Chapter 5 Summary and Conclusions 
In the course of this thesis, I believe I have demonstrated some of the richness to 
be found in Pascal's thought. His Wager is simple enough for anyone to understand 
immediately, but reveals a profound understanding of the human psyche. While his 
rival Descartes hogged the limelight of psychology for many years, all the 
experimental evidence now points towards Pascal as having the better grasp of 
reality, at least as regards decision-making. In his Wager Pascal sets out the basis 
for decision theory and sees both the strengths and weaknesses of Expected Utility 
Theory at the same time. 
We do not know Pascal's intentions for the Wager. It could have been an 
interesting sideline in the discussion, or it might have formed the cornerstone of an 
apologetic for the ordinary homme moyen sensuel. That hardly matters now, since 
it has taken on a life of its own and many authors debate Pascalian logic in contexts 
far divorced from theology, including global warming and asteroid-collision defence 
systems. What has been particularly fascinating is how robust Pascal's argument 
has been in the face of concerted opposition. In Chapter 3 I have tried to cover 
major exemplars of critiques of the Wager and to consider them carefully, 
examining exactly what assumptions are being made and also what other 
consequences follow from that. I show in this essay that if we treat the Wager as an 
exercise in personal risk-management, then it is both coherent and definitive. I 
accept that it cannot be water-tight in every respect, but I suggest that within the 
framework that I have outlined, the Wager more than holds Its own against its 
critics. 
Let us recall the principles that I outlined on page 58: 
I. Principle of Accepted Immitigable Risk 
If a scenario offers no mitigation, then its risks will be deemed to be 
accepted and the scenario dismissed from further consideration. 
II. Principle of Maximality 
Any deity to be considered must at least meet the criteria prescribed for a 
MaximalGod. 
III. Tie-break Principle 
If two routes tie in terms of their expected utility, then other secondary 
factors may be used to decide between them. This includes a subjective 
assessment of the most likely to occur (even though this probability may 
already have been incorporated in the EV calculation). 
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IV. Principle of Disintermediation 
We will only consider cases that deal with the deity directly and not via any 
intermediaries. 
Using these principles we can summarise the objections and the way that we 
should deal with them in the table below. These are necessarily heavily simplified 
descriptions and outcomes and the reader should refer back to the text itself in the 
event of any doubt. 
Category Objection Brief description Conclusion 
Problems Mixed Tossing a coin does Bartha, Hertzberg and my 
with strategy as well as a straight own Guesstimatlon function 
infinity pSi bet. solve the problem. 
There are an infinite The unknowability means 
Number- number of possibilist that no mitigation is possible 
based gods Gods who have and is thus excluded under 
pill unkowable the Principle of Accepted 
requirements Immitigable Risk. 
Evidence must be equivocal 
for Pascal's Wager, but the 
decision is forced. If we do 
not have an Inbuilt sense of 
Evidentialist Deity requires us to what constitutes "enough" 
or Clifford ian 
apportion belief to then Cliffordian God falls god short of MaximalGod and the evidence. p113 we can exclude under the 
Problems Principle of Maximality. 
with the This case actually has more 
matrix (or in common with moral 
"Many 
objections. Gods") God decides who will No mitigation is possible and Predestining 
receive salvation and is thus excluded under the God 
p12S it does not rely upon Principle of Accepted 
our actions. Immitigable Risk. 
Universalist No mitigation is required 
deity Deity gives salvation and thus we will have this as to all. a fall-back option, even if we p126 
choose a different deity. 
Salvation depends The scenario has inbuilt 
Reincarnation 
upon progression, mitigation, therefore we 
p127 but failures get should choose an alternative 
another chance in that does not, because we 
another life. possess a safety-net. 
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C a t e ~ o r y y Obiection Brief description Conclusion 
No deity No mitigation is possible and 
and/or after- No eternal salvation is thus excluded under the 
life is offered at all. Principle of Accepted 
p128 Immitigable Risk. 
Anti- The deity rejects Deity falls short of 
Pascalian anyone who comes MaximalGod and is rejected 
deity to faith via Pascal's under th e Principle of 
p129 Wager. Maximality. 
Martin's Deity rejects all Deity falls short of Perverse those who believe in MaximalGod and is rejected 
Master 
supernatural beings. under the Principle of p131 Maximality. Perverse Deity falls short of gods Kaufman's Deity rejects all 
God those who engage in MaximalGod and is rejected 
p132 religious activity. 
under the Principle of 
Maximality. 
Atheists go to Cannot have a MaximalGod 
X-Theology heaven and theists in this scenario, so it is go to hell, regardless p134 excluded under the Principle 
of whether God 
of Maximality. 
exists or not. 
It is not rational to assign a 
If we assign a zero 
zero probability to anything 
Zero except a logica l 
probability probability to God's imposs ibili ty, because it 
existence, then the p140 EV is zero. implies th at no amount of 
evidence could ever 
convince. 
Problems Infinitesimal possibilities do 
with 
probability If we assign an not exist In conventional probability theory. Medical infinitesimal 
Infinitesimal probability to God's science is happy with probabilities 
existence then the probabilities as large as 5% p143 
result Is 
for selecting treatments, so 
Indeterminate. 
we are being unreasonable 
in demanding infinitely small 
values. 
God should not God is not necessari ly 
Problems Janzen's simultaneously hide 
irrational in hiding and 
with God Irrational God and demand belief intellectual belief is not an 
p153 without being essential component of the 
irrational. Wager' s premisses. 
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Category Objection Brief description Conclusion 
A MaximalGod should entail 
God's actions in Divine Command Theory 
Penelhum's saving some are and thus God's actions 
Complicity unjust and we cannot be immoral. If not, 
Argument become complicit in then no mitigation is 
p163 his immorality if we possible, so we reject it 
comply. under the Principle of 
Accepted Immitigable Risk. 
Epistemic There are numerous We should not scriptural injunctions to do duty not to 
obtain religious faith exactly that. In any case, believe this purely for self- Pascal only suggests that we 
way. interest. try an experiment to see if p16S 
genuine faith emerges. 
Gambling is not of itself 
Gambling is inherently immoral and 
associated with attitudes about it have 
Wagering at organised crime and changed at different times. 
all is immoral with debt, addiction Pascal does not suggest that 
p169 and poverty. We we win salvation, merely 
should not that we might choose to 
encourage it. undergo a course of therapy 
as a behavioural 
Problems experiment. 
with the Pascal's The mugger has We can assign an equal process Mugger magic powers and probability to having magic 
pError! can grant us powers ourselves. We could 
Bookmark additional days of also test the proposition by 
not defined. happy life in return experiment before handing for our cash. over the wallet. 
Tabbarok will use his 
Tabbarok's influence with the Exclude intermediaries 
Wager deity to improve our under The Principle of 
p173 chances of eternal Disintermediation. 
reward. 
Persecutor's Since eternal life is at 
stake, we should Wager 
enforce religious Free Will/Many Errors pError! faith in order to defence. Bookmark 
maximise the 
not defined. 
number of the saved. 
I believe that I have made a contribution by showing how Pascal's Wager needs to 
be understood in terms of risk management and also by identifying how Pascal's 
224 
.. 
choice of words allows it to resonate with the human psyche, as evidenced by 
leading-edge discoveries in economics and psychology. Pascal's remedy for the 
unbeliever is a therapeutic response which is entirely in line with modern 
psychological practice and should not offend moral sensitivities, because it is purely 
an experiment to see whether faith can naturally arise once the objections are 
temporarily set aside. Pascal believed that the Christian life was the best option 
available and he invites us to sample it, because it offers advantages in our current 
life, whether or not there is a eternal gain to be had at a later date. 
Now, what harm will befall you in taking this side? You will be faithful, honest, 
humble, grateful, generous, a sincere friend, truthful. Certainly you will not have 
those poisonous pleasures, glory and luxury; but will you not have otherst60 
Pascal himself was suspicious of relying upon reason alone, arguing that 
"it is the heart that perceives God and not the reason. That is what faith Is: God 
perceived by the heart and not by reason. /I 561 
Nonetheless, his Wager employs reason in the service of the heart. Pascal's Wager 
uses System 1 language that we can easily comprehend, but which is still sound 
when examined under rigorous System 2 enquiry. 
The father of expected utility theory, John von Neumann, converted to Christianity 
towards the end of his life and JOVially remarked that he thought that Pascal "had a 
point".S62 I rather agree. 
560 p Ip , asca, ensees: 125. l418 
561 Ibid., 127. l424 
562 
Norman Macrae, John Von Neumann: The Scientific Genius Who Pioneered the Modern Computer, 
Game Theory, Nuclear Deterrence, and Much More (American Mathematical Society, 1992). 379. 
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Appendix A. Pascal Chronology 
Year Pascal events Other events 
Etienne Pascal, father of Blaise, born Day of barricades in Paris and Duc 1588 de Guise seizes the city in Clermont Spanish armada defeated 
Copernicus' De Revolutionibus is 
1616 Etienne marries Antoinette Begon placed on the Index of Forbidden 
Books 
1617 Antonia Pascal born, but dies a few 
days after her baptism 
Etienne Pascal buys Langhac 
1619 mansion, which is near the abbey in Slaves first brought to the colonies 
Clermont 
1620 Gilberte Pascal born Mayflower and Speedwell depart Plymouth and arrive in America. 
Blaise Pascal born in Clermont on 
Pope Urban VIII (Maffeo Barberini) 
1623 
19th June. 
succeeds Pope Gregory XV as th e 
235th pope. 
Jacqueline Pascal born. 
1625 Mere Angelique establishes Port- Charles I succeeds James I 
Royal de Paris. 
1626 Antoinette Pascal (Blaise's mother) Charles I dissolves Parliament 
dies 
Etienne Pascal moves the family to 
1631 Paris and teaches his children 
himself. 
Blaise is recognised as a 
mathematical prodigy by the 
Academie Mersenne, which is a France declares war on Spain 
1635 mathematical group to which his 
father belonged. 
Saint-Cyran becomes spiritual 
director at Port-Royal. 
Etienne goes into hiding after 
opposing a fiscal method of 
Richelieu, but the children remain in 
Paris. 
Louis XIV born . 
1638 Jansenius dies. 
Saint-Cyran arrested and 
imprisoned. 
liThe Solitaires", a semi-monastic 
group, set up at Port-Royal (now 
called Port-Royal des Champs). 
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Year Pascal events 
.. ',' 
Other events 
Jacqueline charms Richelieu in a 
1639 play and wins a pardon for her father as well as a job for him as a 
tax collector in Rouen. 
1640 The Pascal family move to Rouen . Publication of Jansen's Augustinius (posthumously). 
Blaise publishes his "Essai pour les 
1641 coniques" on conic sections. 
Gilberte Pascal marries Florin perier. 
Etienne Perier born (who will later Cardinal Richelieu dies 
1642 confirm the provenance of Pascal's English Civil War starts. Memorial. Galileo dies. Blaise begins work on the Pascaline 
1645 Pascal writes Letter to the Chancellor dedicating the Pascaline. 
Etienne Pascal and Pierre Petit 
recreate Torricelli's work on the 
vacuum. Blaise takes over the 
Westminster Confession of Faith 1646 experiments. 
Etienne is injured and cared for by published. 
Jansenist bone-setters who convert 
the family to Jansen ism. 
Pascal decides to return to Paris 
because of his ill-health and 
Jacqueline looks after him. 
Rene Descartes visits him twice in 
1647 September where they discuss the Torricelli dies. barometer. Pascal publishes his first 
work on the vacuum in October. 
Pascal argues with Pere Noel over 
Aristotle and with free-thinker Saint-
Ange over theology. 
Pascal argues with M. de Rebours at 
Port-Royal then returns to Paris to 
write a new treatise on conic 
sections. 
Florin Perier demonstrates Pascal's Pere Mersenne dies. 
barometer at Puy-de-D6me. Pascal 
1648 repeats the experiments and claims 1648-53 The Fronde of the 
the existence of the vacuum to be Parlement (revolt against the 
proved. regency). 
A number of the Paris nuns return to 
Port-Royal des Champs and the 
Solitaires set up nearby. 
Etienne retires back to Paris. 
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Year Pascal events Other events 
Pascal family retreats to Clermont to 
1649 avoid the Fronde and live with Charles I beheaded. 
Gilberte and Florin. 
1650 Descartes dies 
1651 Etienne Pascal dies. Thomas Hobbes publishes Leviathan. 
Jacqueline decides she can now 
enter the convent at Port-Royal, 
which causes a fierce quarrel with 
1652 Blaise over the inheritance. 
Blaise sends a Pascaline to Queen 
Christina of Sweden, together with a 
long letter. 
Pascal ' s "worldly" period begins. 
Pascal travels to Poitou and falls in 
with the duc de Roannez . here he 
meets the Chevalier de Mere and 
1653 Damien Mitton who will interest End of the Fronde 
him in gambling and probability. 
Pope Innocent X condemns the five 
propositions of Jansen's Augustinius. 
Night of Fire. Pascal writes the 
1654 Memorial and sews it into his coat . Louis XIV's coronat ion . 
Blaise becomes reconciled to 
Jacqueline. 
Pascal takes a retreat at Port-Royal Arnaud writes an attack on t he 
1655 for probably three weeks. He wrote Jesuits in his Lettres a un due et 
ferits sur 10 Grace around the end of pere. 
the year (or early 1656) 
First of Pascal's Provincial Letters in 
support of Arnauld and against 
Jesuit casuistry is released to much 
horror and laughter. 
1656 Miracle of the Holy Thorn - the 
healing of Pascal's niece, Marguerite 
Perier. 
Pascal starts work on his great 
apologetic opus. 
The last of the Provincial Letters 
appears. 
1657 Pascal writes a piece on divine grace 
and another on geometry, both of 
which will be published after his 
death. 
229 
Year Pascal events Other events 
Pascal lectures at the Sorbonne on 
1658 his apologetics. Oliver Cromwell dies. He also composes works on 
geometry and rhetoric. 
1658- Pascal writes the text of his Wager 1662 
1659 Blaise Pascal becomes terminally ill. Richard Cromwell disbands English Parliament (and later resigns) 
The ailing Pascal stays in Clermont 
1660 with the Perier family and then later Charles II crowned as king. 
with Roannez in Poitu . 
Jacqueline dies. French priests are required to sign a 1661 Port-Royal is officially closed 
because of Jansenism. declaration rejecting Jansenism. 
Blaise launches his plan for public 
1662 transport in Paris. First meeting of the Royal Society. Pascal dies (August 17) in the Paris 
home of Gilberte. 
Publication of treatises on the 
1663 equilibrium of liquids and on the 
weight of the atmosphere. 
1670 First edition of Pen sees published. Pope Clement X succeeds Pope Clement IX as the 239th pope. 
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